The Execution of Injustice: A Cost and Lack-of-Benefit Analysis of the Death Penalty by Tabak, Ronald J. & Lane, J. Mark
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
11-1-1989
The Execution of Injustice: A Cost and Lack-of-
Benefit Analysis of the Death Penalty
Ronald J. Tabak
J. Mark Lane
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ronald J. Tabak & J. M. Lane, The Execution of Injustice: A Cost and Lack-of-Benefit Analysis of the Death Penalty, 23 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 59
(1989).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol23/iss1/5
THE EXECUTION OF INJUSTICE: A COST AND
LACK-OF-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF THE
DEATH PENALTY*
Ronald . Tabak** and J. Mark Lane***
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................... 61
II. THE DEATH PENALTY IS STILL ARBITRARY AND
CAPRICIOUS ............................................ 62
A. The Capital Punishment System Does Not Rationally
Select Those Who Shall Die ......................... 62
B. Overzealous Prosecutors Improperly Seek and Obtain
Death Sentences ..................................... 64
C Ineffective Defense Renders Capital Trials Unfair ..... 69
D. The Juq Selection Process Fails to Ensure Unbiased
Juries .............................................. 75
E. Jurors in Capital Cases Are Often Misled,
Misinstructed, or Incompletely Informed ............. 77
F. The Lack of Real Proportionality Review Means that
* This Article was prepared for New York Lawyers Against the Death Penalty, an
organization of over 1,000 members of the New York Bar, as a memorandum in opposition to
legislation which would restore the death penalty in New York State. That legislation was
passed by both houses of the New York State Legislature in early 1989, but was vetoed by
Governor Mario Cuomo. In June 1989, when it became apparent that the veto could not be
overridden in the regular 1989 session, the legislature adjourned without a vote on the
proposed override. The proposed legislation is expected to be reintroduced in the 1990 session.
This memorandum has been updated and modified since its initial distribution in Spring 1989.
The authors would like to thank the following people, all of whom provided substantial
assistance in the preparation of tle memorandum upon which this Article is based: James
Pitofsky, Martin I. Rosenbaum, Maura Barry, Tanya Coke, Jeffrey Trachtman, Jonathan E.
Gradess, Stephen Gillers, Channing Kury, Jonathan Lang, Arthur C. Helton, Peter Neufeld,
Howard Schrader, Stephen Latimer, Tom Terrizzi, Polly Passoneau, Holly Levine, Pamela
Winnick, Leon Bijou, and Maureen O'Connor.
** Ronald J. Tabak, B.A. Yale University, J.D. Harvard University; Special Counsel and
Coordinator of Pro Bono Work, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom; Chair, Death Penalty
Committee, American Bar Association, Committee of Individual Rights and Responsibilities;
President, New York Lawyers Against the Death Penalty.
*** J. Mark Lane, B.A. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, J.D. candidate New
York University School of Law, 1990.
60 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
the Arbitrary Imposition of Death Is Not Corrected on
Appeal .............................................. 81
G. Lack of Qualified, Adequately Compensated Counsel
for Post-Conviction Proceedings ...................... 83
H. Overly Strict Procedural Bar Rules Lead to
Executions of People Unconstitutionally Convicted or
Sentenced .......................................... 85
III. THE DEATH PENALTY OPERATES IN A RACIALLY
DISCRIMINATORY MANNER ............................. 89
IV. MENTALLY RETARDED PEOPLE AND OTHERS NOT
COMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL ARE BEING EXECUTED... 93
V. PEOPLE WHO NEITHER KILLED NOR INTENDED TO
KILL ARE RECEIVING DEATH SENTENCES .............. 96
VI. INNOCENT PEOPLE ARE RECEIVING THE DEATH
PENALTY AND SOME ARE BEING EXECUTED ............ 98
A. Innocent People Have Been Sentenced to Death in the
1970s and 1980s .................................... 99
B. Numerous Innocent People Have Been and Still Are
Convicted in New York .............................. 108
C. Innocent People Are Still Being Executed ............. 110
VII. THE DEATH PENALTY IS NOT A DETERRENT ........... 114
A. The Death Penalty Is Not a General Deterrent ........ 114
B. The Death Penalty Is Not Relevant to Arguments for
Specific Deterrence .................................. 119
C. Currently Available Life Sentences for the Most Severe
Murders Do Provide Effective Incapacitation .......... 125
VIII. THE DEATH PENALTY ACTUALLY EXACERBATES THE
PROBLEMS OF VICTIMS' FAMILIES ....................... 129
A. Survivors of Murder Victims Often Oppose the Death
Penalty ............................................. 129
B. Imposition of the Death Penalty Means Continued
Victimization of Survivors ............................ 131
C. Executions Do Not Provide Satisfaction ............... 132
IX. A DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM IS MORE COSTLY THAN A
SYSTEM IN WHICH LIFE IMPRISONMENT IS THE MOST
SEVERE PUNISHMENT ................................... 133
A. There Are Many Reasons Why Death Penalty Cases
Require Additional Expenditure of Tremendous
Amounts of Taxpayers' Money ....................... 133
[Vol. 23:59
THE EXECUTION OF INJUSTICE
B. Numerous Studies Confirm that the Death Penalty Is
More Expensive ..................................... 135
C The Death Penalty Diverts Resources Away from
Fighting Crime ..................................... 136
X. THE DEATH PENALTY PLACES THE UNITED STATES IN
ISOLATION FROM VIRTUALLY ALL DEMOCRATIC
COUNTRIES AND IN THE COMPANY OF THE WORST
DICTATORSHIPS ......................................... 138
XI. THE OLD AND NEW TESTAMENTS HAVE BEEN GROSSLY
DISTORTED AS A PURPORTED JUSTIFICATION FOR THE
DEATH PENALTY ....................................... 142
XII. CONCLUSION ........................................... 146
I. INTRODUCTION
As Virginia Assistant Attorney General Robert Harris recently ac-
knowledged, the more educated the public becomes about capital punish-
ment, the more the public will oppose it.' The facts, readily available
after a decade and a half of trials under the modern death penalty stat-
utes, simply lend no support to the use of capital punishment.
The first six sections of this Article describe fundamental problems
with the death penalty, problems that might be thought of as the social
"costs" of the death penalty. Sections seven through nine correct com-
mon misconceptions that underlie current support for the death penalty.
These sections illustrate that there are no real "benefits" from the death
penalty. Finally, section ten describes the growing international consen-
sus against the use of the death penalty, a consensus that, as discussed in
section eleven, reflects a moral judgment that capital punishment cannot
be justified.
The issues discussed herein are of national significance and the ma-
terial presented covers a wide range of jurisdictions. Moreover, every
problem which this memorandum describes would exist under the pro-
posed death penalty legislation in New York if it were enacted.2
1. Makin, Killing the Killers" Part 6, Toronto Globe and Mail, June 12, 1987, at A3, col.
2.
2. This Article does not purport to be an exhaustive study of all the problems with the
death penalty in other states. Such a study would necessarily include a variety of additional
problems not discussed here because they would not arise under the death penalty bill pro-
posed in New York. For example, this Article does not discuss judicial overrides of jury sen-
tencing decisions. Such overrides are a serious problem in Florida, where judges frequently
ignore jury recommendations of life imprisonment and impose the death penalty instead. See
Tabak, The Death of Fairness: The Arbitrary and Capricious Imposition of the Death Penalty in
the 1980s, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 797, 820-22 (1986).
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II. THE DEATH PENALTY IS STILL ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS
A. The Capital Punishment System Does Not Rationally Select Those
Who Shall Die
The Supreme Court struck down all existing capital punishment
schemes in 1972 because they allowed the "arbitrary and capricious" im-
position of death.3 Four years later, the Court approved certain new cap-
ital statutes which supposedly corrected that constitutional problem.4
However, after over a decade and a half of experience under the new
statutes, as this Article demonstrates, the death penalty is still being ap-
plied arbitrarily and capriciously.
Of the approximately 20,000 homicide arrests in the United States
each year, approximately 4,000 people are ultimately convicted of mur-
der.5 Of those, approximately 250 are sentenced to death.6 If it could be
shown that these 250 are the most heinous murderers, the most danger-
ous criminals confronting the criminal justice system, and that they have
repeatedly killed or are likely to repeatedly kill, then some degree of ra-
tionality in imposing the death sentence might be argued. However,
although the assumption that we are executing the worst killers clearly
underlies public support for capital punishment, that assumption is
baseless.
The so-called "guided discretion" statutes of the post-Furman v.
Georgia 7 era have simply not achieved the goal of carefully and ration-
ally selecting those who die. The most heinous and dangerous criminals
are not necessarily the ones sentenced to death under these schemes. In
fact, some of the worst killers-such as California's notorious "Hillside
Strangler"-have received life sentences or terms of years, even when the
death penalty was sought.' Meanwhile, many sentenced to death row are
3. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
4. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976);
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). The new statutes supposedly corrected the arbitrary
and capricious imposition of the death penalty by, among other things, bifurcating the trial
and requiring jury findings of certain aggravating factors before the death penalty could be
imposed.
5. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA, THE DEATH PENALTY: CRUEL & INHUMAN PUN-
ISHMENT 27 (1987) (based on statistical averages for 1979-1985).
6. Id.
7. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
8. After sentencing Angelo Buono, Jr., the "Hillside Strangler," to life in prison without
possibility of parole, one member of the jury explained that the death penalty would have been
"too good" for him, and that "he should suffer like the women he killed." Juror Says Death
Would Have Been Too Good For Buono, Associated Press, Nov. 20, 1983 (LEXIS, Nexis li-
brary, Omni file). Similarly, after sentencing Joe Hunt to life imprisonment for two gruesome
killings in California, one juror commented, "The death penalty is too quick for Joe Hunt. He
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first-time criminal offenders, 9 ninety percent have never killed before,10
and the vast majority are extremely unlikely to kill again.11 Some com-
mitted crimes of passion or desperation. Others were mere accomplices,
and have never directly harmed or intended bodily harm against another
human being. 2 Some are mentally retarded or seriously mentally ill.' a
Virtually all are poor and uneducated,' 4 and some are undoubtedly
innocent. 15
Even among those sentenced to death, only a relatively small
number are likely to be executed. As of July 14, 1989, there had been
115 executions in the thirteen years since the death penalty was rein-
stated.' 6 At that same date, 2,210 men, women and children were on
death row. 7 Many of the 115 who have been executed had been con-
victed or sentenced unconstitutionally, but were executed nonetheless,
either (a) because the Supreme Court declined to review lower courts'
erroneous rejections of their constitutional claims but then, after their
executions, held that identical claims of unconstitutionality were merito-
rious,' 8 or (b) because the federal courts refused to rule on their meritori-
ous claims of unconstitutionality, due to their lawyers' failures to object
needs to have time to think about the murders he committed." Chambers, Jury Recommends
Life Term for Leader of California Club, N.Y. Times, June 5, 1987, at A19, col. 1. See also
Tabak, supra note 2, at 843 n.329 (describing several additional brutal murder cases where the
jury imposed a life sentence instead of death). Moreover, Ted Bundy, one of the most notori-
ous mass-murderers of modem history, would never have received the death penalty if he had
accepted the prosecution's offer of a life sentence, under an elaborate plea bargain involving
two jurisdictions. See Carter, Does Second Washington Student Share Another Ted Bundy
Trait?, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 21, 1989, at 4, col. 3.
9. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CAPITAL PUNISH-
MENT 1987 8, Table 7 (July 1988).
10. Id.
11. See Marquart & Sorensen, A National Study of the Furman-Commuted Inmates: As-
sessing the Threat to Society from Capital Offenders, 23 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 5 (1989); see also, J.
Marquart, S. Elkand-Olson & J. Sorensen, Gazing Into the Crystal Ball: Can Jurors and Psy-
chiatrists Accurately Predict Future Dangerousness in Capital Cases (unpublished manuscript
on file at Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review) (study of post-Furman death sentenced inmates
in Texas who had their sentences commuted to life imprisonment).
12. See infra notes 279-89 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 251-78 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 290-389 and accompanying text.
16. NAACP LEGAL DEF. AND EDUC. FUND, INC., DEATH Row USA 5 (July 14, 1989).
17. Id. at 1.
18. For example, the vast majority of those executed in Florida prior to the decision in
Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987), were sentenced on the basis of jury instructions
essentially identical to those found unconstitutional in Hitchcock. In Hitchcock, the jury in-
structions only allowed consideration of mitigating circumstances enumerated in the statute.
Id. at 398-99.
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early enough in their proceedings. 19
Executing every man, woman and child on death row would, at the
current sentencing rates, mean at least one execution every day for the
rest of the century.20 That would be a bloodbath of historic proportions
which would place us further in line with Iran, South Africa, the USSR,
China, Cuba and other nations whose inhumanity we often denounce,
rather than with the western democracies with which we normally align
ourselves.21 Indeed, "[i]f U.S. courts continue to invoke the penalty at
the same rate, the only way to break the cycle will be to deprive convicts
of their legal rights of appeal or to embark on an execution spree of epic
proportions."22
As the following discussion shows, capital punishment remains a
cruel lottery because in each stage, from the initial decision whether to
seek the death penalty, through the trial, appeals, post-conviction pro-
ceedings and the clemency process, a defendant's chances of being given
the death penalty depend to an astonishing degree on arbitrary and capri-
cious circumstances rather than on the defendant's criminal and moral
culpability. This system, permeated with unfairness from beginning to
end, is so flawed as to be unjustifiable.
B. Overzealous Prosecutors Improperly Seek and
Obtain Death Sentences
In many cases, prosecutors initially seek and ultimately obtain the
death penalty for improper reasons and by improper means. This may
result from local political pressures,23 racial prejudice,24 an overzealous
desire to secure convictions, or a variety of other factors.25
Although they may confront very similar crimes, prosecutors in
19. See infra notes 193-220 and accompanying text.
20. Makin, Killing the Killers: Part 1, Toronto Globe and Mail, June 6, 1987, at Al, col.
I.
21. See infra notes 525-54 and accompanying text.
22. Makin, supra note 20, at A2, col. 1; see also F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN AGENDA 97 (1986) ("[A]pparently the choice is between a
permanent Reign of Terror or an execution policy that makes a mockery of the legal standards
governing the use of the death penalty.").
23. For example, Louisiana's St. Tammany Parish District Attorney, Marion Farmer, was
severely criticized for not seeking the death penalty in some cases, and, although he subse-
quently sought the death penalty more often, he was defeated for reelection in 1984. See
DeParle, A Matter of Life and Death, New Orleans Times-Picayune, Apr. 7, 1985 (Special
Report), at 6, col. 3.
24. See infra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
25. The Georgia Pardon and Parole Board's Tommy Morris openly acknowledges:
When you look at death versus life cases, there's not a heck of a lot of difference in
most of them. There are so many life cases that very well could have been death
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some counties seek the death penalty far more often than those in other
counties in the same state. For example, according to a recent New
Jersey study, "[a] defendant in a death-possible case in Monmouth
County has a seventy percent chance of being prosecuted for capital mur-
der, while a defendant in an analogous case in Hudson County has a 19
percent chance of having his case designated capital."26 This may result
from, among other things, varying and inconsistent interpretations of a
state's death penalty statute which fails to provide guidelines for the ex-
ercise of prosecutorial discretion.27
The wide discretion afforded to prosecutors under the proposed
death penalty statute in New York would undoubtedly result in similar
disparities, as a prosecutor in one of the state's sixty-two counties would
seek a death sentence whereas in another county, in a case with similar
facts, the prosecutor would not. Indeed, since prosecutors in New York
State are elected, local political pressures may lead some of them to seek
the death penalty out of fear that to do otherwise would lead to defeat at
the polls.
Local pressures and unchecked prosecutorial discretion often lead to
racially discriminatory patterns in seeking the death penalty. If an al-
leged murderer was black and the victim white, the chances that the
prosecution will seek the death penalty initially are many times greater
than in the reverse situation.28 In South Carolina, for example, over a
four year period, prosecutors sought the death penalty in thirty-eight
percent of murder cases involving white victims and black defendants but
in only thirteen percent of such cases involving white defendants and
black victims.29 A study of over 2,000 murder cases tried in Georgia in
the 1970s revealed that the prosecutor sought the death penalty in sev-
enty percent of the cases involving white victims and black defendants,
but in only nineteen percent of cases involving black victims and white
defendants.3 ° Recent studies of the New Jersey capital scheme show that
cases if somebody had prosecuted them that way, and there are others on death row
because they were prosecuted by an overzealous prosecutor.
See Thompson, Once 'Unfit to Live,' Ex-death-row Inmates Winning Parole, Atlanta Const.,
Mar. 12, 1987, at Al, col. 1.
26. See Bienen, Of Race, Crime and Punishment, N.Y. Times, June 21, 1987, § 11, at 22,
col. 1.
27. See infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
28. Bienen, supra note 26.
29. GEORGIA CLEARINGHOUSE ON PRISONS AND JAILS, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, 1985 RE-
PORT (1985).
30. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 287 (1987) (discussing Baldus, Pulaski &
Woodworth, Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Ex-
perience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661 (1983)). The Supreme Court acknowledged that
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such racial patterns also exist in the Northeast.31
Some prosecutors with less than clear cases as to guilt seek the death
penalty so that they may challenge for cause jurors who oppose capital
punishment and thereby secure a "prosecution prone" jury.32 This in-
creases the chances of a conviction in what may be a questionable case.
Bob Wilson, the District Attorney for Dekalb County, Georgia, has
openly conceded that he seeks the death penalty in order to increase his
likelihood of securing a conviction.33 Unfortunately, the defendants in
such cases may end up not only convicted, but also executed.
The death penalty is also improperly used by some prosecutors as a
tactic to extract convictions via plea bargaining. For example, a Louisi-
ana prosecutor followed a policy of giving every person charged with a
capital crime two choices: either plead guilty to second-degree murder
and get a life sentence or plead innocent, "roll the dice," and face the
death penalty. 34 If acting rationally, those clearly guilty of the most hei-
nous crimes would be more likely to accept such offers and avoid the
danger of a death verdict, whereas those with a real chance of exonera-
tion would be more likely to refuse such offers and thereby ironically
become more likely to be sentenced to die.35
In many cases, those who have refused offers of life sentences under
proposed plea bargains, preferring to assert their innocence before a jury,
have ultimately been convicted and sentenced to death.36 In fact, it has
been estimated that well over half of those sentenced to die in the post-
Baldus' study was highly sophisticated and assumed that the study's findings were statistically
valid. Id. at 291 n.7.
31. See Bienen, Weiner, Denno, Allison, & Mills, The Reimposition of Capital Punishment
in New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 27, 327 (1988)
("The results reported here indicate clear and significant discrepancies in the treatment of
potentially capital cases when cases were differentiated by race of defendant and victim and
county ofjurisdiction"); Bienen, supra note 26. See infra text accompanying notes 222-50 for a
discussion of the racially discriminatory operation of the death penalty.
32. See Bentele, The Death Penalty in Georgia: StillArbitrary, 62 WASH. U.L.Q. 573, 620
& n.218 (1985). In Lockhart v. McCree, the Court, in holding that states may exclude from
capital juries those who would never be able to vote for the death penalty, considered it consti-
tutionally insignificant that such exclusions produce conviction-prone juries. 476 U.S. 162,
173 (1986).
33. See Bentele, supra note 32, at 620 & n.218.
34. See DeParle, supra note 23 (quoting Quchita Parish District Attorney Johnny Carl
Parkerson).
35. See generally W. WHITE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE EIGHTIES: AN EXAMINA-
TION OF THE MODERN SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 40 (1987).
36. See DeParle, supra note 23, discussing the case of Timothy Baldwin, who maintained
his innocence rather than accept the prosecution's plea offer. Baldwin was convicted and sub-
sequently executed in September 1984. Id. See also Louisianan Who Killed Neighbor Executed
After Appeal Is Refused, N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1984, at A10, col. 1.
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Furman cases were offered (and refused to accept) life sentences under
proposed plea bargain agreements prior to trial.
37
Experience in death penalty jurisdictions also shows that overzeal-
ous prosecutors often mislead juries. For example, in closing arguments
prosecutors may tell the jury that the death penalty deters crime,38 even
though, unbeknownst to the jury, such claims are insupportable. 39 The
defense is generally not allowed to introduce evidence to refute such an
argument. At most, the defense counsel, not as esteemed by juries as the
prosecutor, is left with an opportunity to disagree with the prosecutor's
bald assertions.
Prosecutors also often egregiously distort religious scripture in try-
ing to justify the death penalty' and make various other highly improper
arguments before the jury, including gross misrepresentations of the law.
In Willie v. Maggio,4 I for example, the prosecutor argued that the jurors
should return a death sentence because, had they caught the defendant in
the process of committing the crime, they supposedly would have been
legally justified in killing him.42 Such improper arguments, although fre-
quently ignored or found harmless by the courts, may be the basis of the
decision to execute the defendant.43
Various other egregious forms of prosecutorial misconduct have re-
sulted in death verdicts. For example, a Georgia prosecutor surrepti-
tiously instructed the jury commissioners on how to exclude blacks and
other minorities from the jury pool.' Evidence exposing this plan was
only discovered accidentally, after defendant Tony Amadeo was already
on death row, by attorneys investigating a totally unrelated civil case.
45
37. See Tabak, Book Review, 33 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 173, 179 & n.32 (1988)(reviewing
W. WHITE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE EIGHTIES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE MODERN
SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1987)). The last man executed in New York's electric
chair, Lee Mays, was offered and refused to accept a plea bargain to a lesser charge. See
Giordano, Showdown on the Chair, Newsday, June 19, 1989, at 33, col. 2.
38. See W. WHITE, supra note 35, at 91, 97-98, 102.
39. See infra notes 390-421 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 555-80 and accompanying text.
41. 737 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1002 (1984).
42. Id. at 1390.
43. The Fifth Circuit considered the prosecutor's closing argument at trial in Willie highly
improper and inaccurate, but refused to order a new sentencing hearing because the defendant
assertedly failed to demonstrate that he would not have received the death penalty but for the
improper argument. Id. at 1391. Yet, at oral argument, the prosecutor's office maintained
that it was necessary to make such arguments in order to obtain the death penalty because the
jury might not impose death otherwise. Tabak, supra note 2, at 843 n.327. Indeed, Willie's co-
defendant, in whose trial the prosecutor had not used this improper final argument, did not
receive the death penalty. See id. at 843.
44. Amadeo v. Zant, 108 S. Ct. 1771, 1779 (1988).
45. Id. at 1774.
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Had it not been for this fortuity, Amadeo-who had been sentenced to
death by a jury selected from the unconstitutional jury pool-almost
surely would have been executed.
Prosecutors have also secured death verdicts by using illegally ob-
tained evidence, such as evidence unconstitutionally secured by jailhouse
informants. On the CBS television broadcast "60 Minutes" on February
26, 1989,46 former jailhouse informant Leslie Vernon White admitted
that he had committed perjury on numerous occasions by fabricating jail-
house confessions of others in exchange for lenient treatment.47 Accord-
ing to the broadcast, at least sixteen people who had been tried,
convicted, and sentenced to the gas chamber in California were convicted
in whole or in part on the basis of questionable testimony from jailhouse
informants.4" Because of White's admissions, California authorities are
investigating at least 200 murder cases in which informants were used.4 9
A recent post-conviction investigation in the Georgia case of Warren
McCleskey revealed that the state had unconstitutionally planted a wit-
ness in the cell next to McCleskey and actively solicited information
from the witness long after McCleskey had obtained counsel.5
In other cases, the prosecution has illegally withheld evidence useful
to the defendant, such as the fact that it has made deals with key wit-
nesses, often co-defendants.5 Death sentences may be returned and the
convicted person actually executed before such misconduct is discovered,
if it is ever discovered at all.
5 2
Currently, states provide no meaningful guidelines as to when prose-
cutors should seek the death penalty. 3 Consequently, even conscien-
tious prosecutors who earnestly desire not to be arbitrary in making such
decisions remain directionless. This so frustrated the State Attorney of
Montgomery County, Maryland that he wrote an article in his state's bar
46. 60 Minutes: The Snitch (CBS television broadcast, Feb. 26, 1989)(transcript on file at
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
47. Id. at 2-3.
48. Id. at 6.
49. See also Curriden, No Honor Among Thieves, 75 A.B.A. J., June 1989, at 52, 55; Rein-
hold, California Shaken Over an Informer, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
50. McCleskey v. Kemp, No. C87-1517A (N.D. Ga. Dec. 23, 1987).
51. See, e.g., Brown v. Wainwright, 785 F.2d 1457 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (prosecutor withheld
existence of agreement with key prosecution witness after witness testified that no agreement
had been made); Lindsey v. King, 769 F.2d 1034 (5th Cir. 1985) (conviction and death sen-
tence reversed upon discovery that prosecution withheld evidence that key witness had told
police that he could not identify assailant).
52. See infra notes 290-389 and accompanying text (most cases discussed there involved
some form of prosecutorial misconduct, often the withholding of exculpatory evidence).
53. See, eg., DeGarmo v. Texas, 474 U.S. 973, 974-75 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
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journal urging courts to provide guidance on the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion. 4 No guidance, however, has been forthcoming.
The proposed New York death penalty bill would conform to this
pattern by giving no real guidance to prosecutors. If it is passed, New
York will be subject to the same problems of prosecutorial misconduct,
political pressure, and unchecked and unguided discretion that have
arisen elsewhere.
C. Ineffective Defense Renders Capital Trials Unfair
State capital trials are so often constitutionally flawed that federal
habeas relief is granted in one-third to one-half of all cases, even though
federal courts are highly deferential to state-court proceedings.5 6 Addi-
tional capital verdicts are reversed in the state courts. Indeed, in New
Jersey, which has had a fully functioning death penalty scheme since
1982, the state supreme court has yet to affirm even one death sentence.5 7
The serious constitutional flaws in capital trials, which often result
in expensive and difficult retrials and additional collateral litigation, are
frequently the result of ineptitude of defense counsel.5 8 Capital trials are
highly complex and require a tremendous amount of time and re-
sources,59 neither of which is available to the average practitioner repre-
senting an indigent defendant in a capital case. The reality is that the
difficulties of providing effective defense counsel for those accused of cap-
ital crimes have frequently been insurmountable obstacles, making the
chances of a fair trial for an indigent defendant highly unlikely.6 1 More-
over, as Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall has observed, many
capital defense lawyers are unaware of the legal principles and rapid de-
54. Sonner, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Death Penalty, MD. B.J., Mar. 1985, at 6, 7.
55. In McCleskey v. Kemp, the Supreme Court attacked the idea of providing such gui-
dance. 481 U.S. 279, 296 (1987).
56. See Godbold, Pro Bono Representation of Death Sentenced Inmates, 42 REc. N.Y.
CITY B.A. 859, 873 (1987).
57. Kerr, Proponents of Death Penalty Seek to Limit Jersey Appeals, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17,
1989, at Bi, col. 2.
58. For example, in one case a federal appellate court found that a court-appointed Texas
attorney was either completely unaware of, or misunderstood, an important five-year old
Supreme Court decision. Jurek v. Estelle, 593 F.2d 672, 682 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 1001 (1981). The attorney lived more than one hundred miles from the nearest public
copies of the Court's opinions. See Tabak, supra note 2, at 801-10 for other examples of inef-
fective assistance of defense counsel in capital trials.
59. See SPANGENBERG GROUP, ANALYSIS OF COSTS OF COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL IN
VIRGINIA, FINAL REPORT 55 (April 1985); Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assist-
ance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 356 (1983).
60. See generally Tabak, supra note 2, at 801-10.
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velopments in the complex law affecting death penalty cases.61 Trial
counsel's failure to make objections creates major problems for capital
defendants who try to raise valid claims on appeal, even where the failure
to object is due to defense counsel's ineptitude.62
It has been estimated that approximately ninety percent of those on
death row could not afford to hire a lawyer when they were tried,63 thus
requiring appointment and compensation of counsel by the state. Often,
attorneys available for appointment to capital cases are inexperienced,
overworked, and inadequately funded.64 Indeed, the Florida Supreme
Court has twice been forced to recognize that the Florida scheme for
funding capital defense counsel is inadequate under the state's constitu-
tion.65 New York, which is unable to adequately deal with indigent de-
fense even under existing law, 66 is no exception, and the proposed death
penalty legislation in New York contains no provision for correcting the
already inadequate public-defense program.67
Yet, the need for properly funded, competent counsel is greater in
capital cases than in other cases. Trial counsel in capital cases must pre-
pare not just for the guilt phase, as in other cases, but also for the sepa-
rate sentencing phase, at which the defense is entitled to present any
evidence which the jury may conclude is mitigating with respect to pun-
ishment.68 But, due to lack of support staff and time, most attorneys
61. Marshall, I., Remarks on the Death Penalty at the Judicial Conference of the Second
Circuit, reprinted in 86 COLuM. L. REV. 1 (1986). See also Godbold, supra note 56, at 873.
Judge Godbold, former Chief Judge of the I I th Circuit Court of Appeals, noted, "the body of
law that exists is complex. It's difficult. It's changeable. And it's very hard to apply." Id. at
865. Judge Godbold has also observed that death penalty law "is the most complex area of the
law that I deal with." "You Don't Have to Be a Bleeding Heart, " Representing Death Row: A
Dialogue Between Judge Abner J. Mivka and Judge John C. Goodbold, 14 HUM. RTS., Winter,
1987, at 22, 24.
62. See infra notes 193-220 and accompanying text.
63. Conyers, The Death Penalty Lottery, N.Y. Times, July 1, 1985 at A15, col. 1.
64. See Tabak, supra note 2, at 801.
65. White v. Board of County Comm'rs, 537 So. 2d 1376 (Fla. 1989); Makemson v. Martin
County, 491 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987). The White court
acknowledged that appointed counsel, because inadequately funded, may spend less time than
required on the case or may accept a plea that is not in the client's interest, thus recreating
"the very injustice appointed counsel was intended to remedy." White, 537 So. 2d at 1380.
66. See Hall & Gradess, Determining Client Eligibility For Appointed Counsel: A Strategy
For Reform in New York State, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 119 (1986).
67. In New Jersey, which has at great expense attempted to provide for adequate defense
in capital cases, no death verdicts were imposed at initial trials in 1988. Presentation of Dale
Jones, New Jersey Office of the Public Advocate (Jan. 19, 1989) (sponsored by the Criminal
Justice Section of the New York State Bar Association) [hereinafter Jones Presentation].
68. See Tabak, supra note 2, at 803-04. All states that provide for capital punishment have
now adopted a bifurcated trial procedure. Note, The Presumption of Life: A Starting Point for
a Due Process Analysis of Capital Sentencing, 94 YALE L.J. 351, 366 (1984). Under this proce-
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handling capital cases at trial are unable to undertake the comprehensive
investigations necessary to effectively represent the defendant at what are
essentially two trials.69 Often, no investigation at all is conducted with
respect to the sentencing phase, so that exculpating or mitigating evi-
dence is never discovered or presented.70
For example, the jury which tried James Messer in Georgia was not
told that Messer had never previously been arrested and had served hon-
orably in the military. 71 Messer was executed in July 1988.72 The Mis-
sissippi jury which sentenced Larry Jones to death never knew that Jones
was mentally retarded, because his attorney presented no mitigating evi-
dence.73 Similarly, evidence that the defendant was abused as a child,
which may sway many jurors,' is often not uncovered and presented.75
Such failures to present exculpating or mitigating evidence undermine
the constitutional requirement of reliability in capital sentencing
verdicts.7 6
Counsel's problems in trying to properly represent murder defend-
ants are often compounded by racial, cultural and class differences be-
tween such attorneys and their clients. In a 1985 murder case, the court-
appointed attorney representing a Vietnamese refugee did not even know
that the person sitting next to him during the trial was not the defend-
dure there must be a "two-phased" trial. The question of guilt or innocence is argued and
decided separately from the question of what sentence should be imposed. Once a defendant is
found guilty of a capital offense the trial court must conduct a separate sentencing hearing in
which both sides may present evidence as to the appropriate sentence. See Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 190-92 (1976).
69. Tabak, supra note 2, at 803-04.
70. See, e.g., House v. Balkcom, 725 F.2d 608 (11th Cir.) (defense counsel was unaware of
and failed to prepare for sentencing phase), cert denied, 469 U.S. 870 (1984); Young v. Zant,
677 F.2d 792 (1 lth Cir. 1982) (defense counsel unaware of Georgia's bifurcated trial procedure
failed to show defendant's favorable background as mitigating evidence during death penalty
phase).
71. Messer v. Kemp, 760 F.2d 1080, 1096 (11th Cir. 1985) (Johnson, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1088 (1986).
72. Newsday, June 20, 1989, at 17, col. 1.
73. See Jones v. Thigpen, 555 F. Supp. 870, 878-79 (S.D. Miss. 1983), modified, 741 F.2d
805 (5th Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 475 U.S. 1003 (1986). Public opinion polls show
that the vast majority of people do not favor execution of the mentally retarded. Patrick H.
Caddell Enterprises, New York Public Opinion Poll, The Death Penalty: An Executive Sum-
mary (May 19, 1989) (unpublished poll results on file at Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review)
[hereinafter Opinion Poll]. See infra text accompanying notes 251-78.
74. A recent poll of New Yorkers showed that 42% oppose the death penalty for a defend-
ant who was abused as a child. See Opinion Poll, supra note 73, at 3.
75. See Tabak, supra note 2, at 805.
76. See, e.g., Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (requirement of reliability in deter-
mining that death is appropriate punishment).
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ant.7 The error was pointed out only by the third witness who testified
at the trial.78 New York, with its extremely diverse population, will con-
front tremendous problems with the adequacy of trial counsel in capital
cases if it enacts the death penalty.
Counsel in capital cases may fail, under these typical adverse cir-
cumstances, to aggressively plea bargain and get their clients to accept
offers of life sentences. A case may go to trial and result in a death ver-
dict because defense counsel failed to properly handle an offer of a plea
bargain or failed to seek such an offer from the prosecutor. In some
cases, death penalties will result although no one-prosecutor, judge, or
even jury-really wants the defendant to be executed.79
Attorneys handling capital cases often fail to effectively assist their
clients in pretrial proceedings. Some fail to file change of venue or sup-
pression motions which are crucial to the client's case.8° In some cases,
attorneys fail to raise valid constitutional claims for fear their practices
will be hurt if they zealously represent an accused murderer.8" Some
attorneys fail to raise such claims because they fear adverse community
reaction will prejudice their clients.82
Trial attorneys sometimes fail to adequately question potential ju-
77. Clendinen, Race and Blind Justice Behind Mixup in Court, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1985,
§ 1, at 26, col. 1.
78. Id. See also Dolman, Georgia's System of Justice Shortchanges the Penniless, Atlanta
Const., Nov. 22, 1985, at 31, col. 1.
79. See infra text accompanying notes 131-47 for a discussion of jurors' misconceptions
regarding the meaning of sentencing alternatives.
80. See Petitioner's Brief, Willie v. Maggio, 737 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir.) (No. 84-3219), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1002 (1984).
81. See Winters v. Cook, 489 F.2d 174, 192 (5th Cir. 1973) (Godbold, J., dissenting);
Whitus v. Balkcom, 333 F.2d 496, 498, 505-07 (5th Cir.) (court noted that attorneys in coun-
ties dominated by segregation may fail to raise issue of jury exclusion of blacks because of
potential reprisals against attorney's business), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 931 (1964).
82. The former Fifth Circuit acknowledged the prevalence of this practice, especially in
small towns and rural areas where the defense lawyer is known by the whole community. See
Whitus, 333 F.2d at 498, 505-08; Goldsby v. Harpole, 263 F.2d 71, 82 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 850 (1959). This remains a problem, as illustrated by Gates v. Zant, 863 F.2d 1492
(I th Cir. 1989). The lawyer for a black defendant failed to challenge the racially-discrimina-
tory method used to select the panel from which the jury was chosen, even though this led to
an all-white jury in a community that was 30% black. Petitioner's Opening Brief at 7 n.3,
Gates v. Zant, 863 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir. 1989) (No. 87-8870). The trial lawyer said that he did
not raise the challenge because he felt that a successful challenge would have biased jurors
against his client. Gates, 863 F.2d at 1497, 1499. However, the Eleventh Circuit held that the
lawyer's conduct was effective, and refused to rule on what it acknowledged to be a prima facie
showing of unconstitutional racial discrimination. Id. at 1497-98. Instead, it affirmed the dis-
trict court's denial of habeas relief. Id. at 1503. See also Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794,
805-10 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1098 (1983).
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rors during the jury selection process.83 For example, counsel frequently
fail to ask potential jurors whether, if they find the accused guilty of
murder, they would automatically impose the death penalty; an affirma-
tive answer would give the defendant the right to strike such jurors from
the venire for cause. 4 The failure to ask such questions undoubtedly
leads to death verdicts and executions imposed by jurors whose
prejudices go undetected.
Some of the most significant mistakes made by attorneys in capital
cases are based on misunderstandings regarding the highly complex bi-
furcated trial." Many lawyers concentrate almost exclusively on the
guilt/innocence phase of the trial, and entirely neglect to prepare for the
crucial sentencing phase, even though there may be little hope of avoid-
ing a conviction but a substantial possibility of avoiding imposition of the
death sentence.86 For example, the attorney who represented Joseph
James Blake did not prepare for the sentencing phase because he thought
he would avoid a conviction by presenting an insanity defense; he chose
not to "prepare for losing" the guilt phase by preparing for the sentenc-
ing phase.87 Further, defense counsel often present no evidence whatso-
ever in mitigation of sentence,88 although at least some favorable
evidence about the defendant is almost always available. 89
Defense counsel must not only develop evidence for use in the pen-
alty phase but must also consider how their penalty-phase strategy im-
pacts the guilt phase.9" Many defense lawyers are so myopic during the
guilt phase that they make arguments in the guilt phase which are totally
inconsistent with their subsequent arguments in the penalty phase.91
Such inconsistency can fatally undermine their credibility before juries.
The problems of ineffective counsel are endemic to the complex cap-
ital punishment system and are not alleviated by the mere appointment
83. Tabak, supra note 2, at 803.
84. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1984) (trial court shall exclude for cause juror
whose views would prevent or substantially impair performance of duties).
85. See supra note 68 for a discussion of the bifurcated trial.
86. In fact, in some cases, counsel admitted to not knowing a separate sentencing trial
would take place until the trial judge announced its commencement. House, 725 F.2d at 613.
See also Young, 677 F.2d at 797-99.
87. Blake v. Kemp, 758 F.2d 523, 533 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 998 (1985).
88. See Tabak, supra note 2, at 805-06.
89. Id.
90. Goodpaster, supra note 59, at 324-25, 329-30, 333-34.
91. For example, counsel may vehemently argue the defendant's innocence during the
guilt phase, but then proceed to argue during the sentencing phase that the defendant is deeply
sorry for what he did. See W. WHITE, supra note 35, at 55-56 (defense strategy at guilt phase
should be tailored to strategy that will be most persuasive at penalty phase in cases where
defendant has little chance of avoiding conviction on capital charge).
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of counsel, who frequently are inexperienced or otherwise inadequate. 92
A study by the Texas Judicial Council revealed that murder defendants
represented by appointed counsel were convicted ninety-three percent of
the time, as opposed to sixty-five percent of the time for those repre-
sented by retained counsel.93 The study also showed that those convicted
of capital murder and represented by appointed counsel were sentenced
to death seventy-nine percent of the time, as opposed to fifty-five percent
for those represented by retained counsel. 94
A conviction or death sentence does not comport with the Constitu-
tion if the defendant received inadequate representation.95 But current
constitutional standards for determining what is "adequate" are so low
as to render practically meaningless the constitutional requirement of ef-
fective counsel. 96 In one recent case, a court-appointed trial lawyer was
found not to have been ineffective97 although he: (1) failed to investigate
or present a jury composition claim where a prima facie case of racial
discrimination in the venire existed, and this caused the black defendant
to be tried by an all-white jury for the rape and murder of a white wo-
man;98 (2) did not find and present any of the numerous readily available
mitigation witnesses;9 9 (3) failed to object to the prosecution's repeated
improper arguments because he did not realize he was allowed to so ob-
ject;1" and (4) referred to his client as a "boy" six times during his clos-
ing argument.10 The Eleventh Circuit found that these and other
actions by trial counsel did not violate the defendant's constitutional
right to effective assistance of counsel."' 2
The impact of the courts' current definition of constitutionally effec-
tive counsel was pointedly noted by the Fifth Circuit in Riles v. McCot-
92. See generally Tabak, supra note 2, at 801-10. In a recent development, the Kentucky
Supreme Court on May 4, 1989 entered an order disbarring attorney Kevin Charters for in-
competence and dishonesty. Order of Kentucky Supreme Court (May 4, 1989). Charters had
been trial counsel for three of Kentucky's death row inmates. Walker, The Death Penalty, The
Advocate, June 1989, at 16, col. 2. Of the 28 people on Kentucky's death row at the beginning
of 1989, seven had been represented at trial by attorneys who have since been disbarred or who
have resigned rather than face disbarment. Id.
93. Factors That Lead to Death Row, Dallas Times-Herald, Nov. 17, 1985, at 18, col. 3.
94. Id.
95. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-87 (1984).
96. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
97. Gates, 863 F.2d at 1497.
98. Petitioner's Opening Brief at 20-21, Gates v. Zant, 863 F.2d 1492 (11 th Cir. 1989) (No.
87-8870).
99. Id. at 31-35.
100. Id. at 29-30, 35-37.
101. Id. at 38.
102. Gates, 863 F.2d at 1496-1500.
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ter.'0 3 In Riles, the concurring judges stated that:
a sufficient showing has been made that trial counsel did not
provide this accused with the quality of defense essential to ade-
quate representation in any serious felony case, and particularly
in a capital case.... Precedent requires me to agree that this is
not enough to justify a certificate of probable cause. The Con-
stitution, as interpreted by the courts, does not require that the
accused, even in a capital case, be represented by able or effec-
tive counsel. . . .Ineffectiveness is not measured against the
standards set by good lawyers but by the average-"reasonable-
ness under prevailing professional norms." ... Consequently,
accused persons who are represented by "not-legally-ineffec-
tive" lawyers may be condemned to die when the same accused,
if represented by effective counsel, would receive at least the
clemency of a life sentence."°
The fundamental problem of inadequate defense may best be sum-
marized by noting a statement by former Florida Attorney General
James Smith, who is now Florida's Secretary of State. In criticizing
those relatively few defense attorneys who vigorously and effectively rep-
resent their clients, Smith said, "[t]he great majority of cases just don't
deserve that aggressive a defense." ' 5
D. The Jury Selection Process Fails to Ensure Unbiased Juries
The jury selection process has been one of the most troubling as-
pects of the capital trial since long before the Furman v. Georgiao 6 and
Gregg v. Georgia "7 opinions initiated modem capital jurisprudence. As
early as the 1880s, jury composition claims were recognized as crucial to
a fair trial for a black defendant in a capital case.108 Since 1961, a series
of cases has held that the defendant must be allowed to establish whether
jurors have been prejudicially exposed to pretrial publicity.10 9 In Batson
103. 799 F.2d 947, 955 (5th Cir. 1986) (Rubin, J., joined by Johnson, J., concurring).
104. Id. (Rubin, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
105. See Milloy, Florida's Law There to Stay, Newsday, June 20, 1989, at 16, col. 2. It
should be noted that the Model Code of Professional Responsibility requirqs that all attorneys
zealously represent their clients within the bounds of the law. MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1980).
106. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
107. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
108. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879); see also Vasquez v. Hillary,
474 U.S. 254 (1986) (relying on Strauder); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (Holmes,
J.).
109. See Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961);
Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1487 (1lth Cir. 1985).
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v. Kentucky,11 ° the Supreme Court held that a defendant may prove pur-
poseful discrimination by showing that his prosecutor used peremptory
challenges to exclude all members of the defendant's race. "' In Turner
v. Murray,112 the Court held that a capital defendant charged with an
interracial crime must be allowed to inform prospective jurors about the
race of the victim and ask them questions about any racial prejudice they
may have. 1
13
Another series of cases has dealt with the significance of juror atti-
tudes about capital punishment. In the seminal case of Witherspoon v.
Illinois, 14 the Court held that the prosecution may strike for cause any
juror who expresses sufficient opposition to the death penalty as to indi-
cate that he or she would be unable to vote to impose it.' On the other
hand, the defendant may strike jurors who express the opinion that they
would automatically impose death if the defendant is found guilty of
murder. 116
However, the various safeguards for capital defendants in jury selec-
tion are generally undermined by the failure to conduct individual se-
questered voir dire.1 17 When prospective jurors must be examined in
public, some bias will go undetected even though clear bias of the same
jurors would be quickly apparent in private, individual questioning.
118
Even when bias is detected, it is often not dealt with adequately. In
the Arkansas trial of Marion Albert Pruett, potential jurors in the nearby
community to which the trial was moved conceded that almost everyone
in the area knew a great deal about the case. 119 One potential juror knew
the victim's sister, had heard that the defendant was later going to be
110. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
111. Id. at 96-98.
112. 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
113. Id. at 36.
114. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
115. Id. at 520.
116. Id. at 521. While these decisions have generally been designed to protect the defend-
ant, they have also made the capital trial much more lengthy and expensive than the non-
capital trial. See Spangenberg & Walsh, Capital Punishment or Life Imprisonment? Some Cost
Considerations, 23 LoY. L.A.L. REV. 45 (1989). In New York, due to the unique racial diver-
sity of the population, these difficulties will be greater than in many other parts of the country.
117. In New York, as in most states, whether to grant sequestered voir dire is left to the
discretion of the trial judge. See, e.g., People v. Pepper, 89 A.D.2d 714, 715, 453 N.Y.S.2d
868, 870 (App. Div. 1982); People v. Boulware, 29 N.Y.2d 135, 272 N.E.2d 538 (1971). Noth-
ing in the proposed New York death penalty statute would correct this problem.
118. See Tabak, supra note 2, at 814. In Ronald Spivey's retrial and Marion Albert Pruett's
Arkansas trial, many prospective jurors who did not raise their hands in the en masse question-
ing were later excused for cause when their biases were revealed during private questioning.
Id.
119. Trial Record, Vol. VII, at 2131, Pruett v. State, 287 Ark. 124, 697 S.W.2d 872 (1985).
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tried in another state for the murder of his wife, and had seen the defend-
ant on television characterizing himself as a "mad dog killer."' 120 The
judge refused to excuse the juror for cause.' 21 In the Georgia retrial of
Ronald Spivey, the judge refused to excuse for cause a prospective juror
who repeatedly said that the retrial was a waste of time and that the
prosecution's evidence stacked up to the ceiling, and who laughed while
responding to questions during jury selection.'22 Both the Pruett and
Spivey death sentences were upheld on appeal.123
Although the importance to the defendant of obtaining an impartial
jury is substantially magnified in a capital case, capital defendants are
typically granted an inadequate number of peremptory challenges, often
no more than in non-capital trials. 124 Yet, additional peremptory chal-
lenges for the defense are badly needed in capital cases for two important
reasons. First, there is generally much more publicity surrounding capi-
tal cases and more challenges are needed to remove jurors who have been
exposed to such publicity. Second, due to the use of bifurcated trials in
capital cases, the defense must in effect select the best possible jury for
two trials-the guilt trial and the sentencing trial.'25
E. Jurors in Capital Cases Are Often Misled, Misinstructed, or
Incompletely Informed
As noted above, prosecutors often mislead jurors in closing argu-
ments by referring to the supposed but non-existent deterrent effect of the
death penalty,126 by improper or inaccurate references to religious scrip-
ture127 and by various other improper assertions.128 There are various
additional ways in which capital juries are misled or inadequately
informed.
120. Id., Vol. III, at 2123-28.
121. Id.
122. Trial Record at 665-95, Spivey v. State, 253 Ga. 187, 319 S.E.2d 420 (1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1132 (1985). See also Tabak, supra note 2, at 812.
123. Pruett v. State, 287 Ark. 124, 697 S.W.2d 872 (1985); Spivey v. State, 253 Ga. 187, 319
S.E.2d 420 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1132 (1985).
124. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-165 (1982). No additional peremptory challenges
are afforded under the death penalty statute proposed in New York.
125. See generally supra note 68 (general discussion of bifurcated trial). This latter problem
could be eliminated by the mandatory use of separate juries for the two stages of the capital
trial. While the proposed New York bill allows the use of a separate jury at the penalty phase
for "good cause shown" and to avoid prejudice to the defendant, the bill fails to mandate it.
See S. 600, A. 1070, New York Legislature, Reg. Sess. § 8 (1989) [hereinafter PROPOSED
LEGISLATION].
126. See infra notes 390-421 and accompanying text.
127. See infra notes 555-80 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
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The sentencing phase of the trial is designed to provide a forum for
introducing evidence and argument on the question of whether the de-
fendant, having been convicted, should be sentenced to death or life im-
prisonment. 129 Jurors are often misled during this crucial phase of the
trial by the failure of defense counsel to introduce evidence for mitigation
of sentence. 130 Without such evidence, the jury cannot properly make
the sentencing decision, because the very purpose of the sentencing
trial-the individualized determination of the proper punishment-is
undermined.
Jurors are also misled by improper jury instructions in the guilt
phase, the sentencing phase, or both phases. Instructions may, for exam-
ple, improperly shift the burden of proof on a key element of the
crime, improperly force the jury to choose between two unacceptable
alternatives, 132 grossly undermine the jury's sense of responsibility for
imposing the death penalty, 133 or fail to adequately inform the jury of the
true meaning of its sentencing choices.
One of the most widespread and egregious problems is the failure to
give juries accurate information about the life-sentence alternative, spe-
cifically about the defendant's potential for release from a life sentence.1
34
Jurors have a distorted impression but actually know very little about
eligibility for parole, 135 a subject they nonetheless consider highly rele-
129. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190-93 (1976).
130. See supra notes 70-76, 85-91 and accompanying text.
131. See, e.g., Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985) (instruction may not relieve prose-
cution of burden of proving intent).
132. In Beck v. Alabama, the Court invalidated a statute which forced the jury to choose
between conviction of first-degree murder, which mandated the death penalty, or acquittal.
447 U.S. 625, 638 (1980). The Court held that the jury instruction unacceptably tilted the
balance toward death. Id. at 637. Jurors may believe in many instances that the state has not
provided them with sufficient alternative sentences. For additional discussion of alternative
sentencing, see infra text accompanying notes 461-78.
133. See Adams v. Wainwright, 804 F.2d 1526 (1lth Cir. 1986), modified and reh'g denied
sub nom. Dugger v. Adams, 816 F.2d 1493 (1987), rev'd on procedural grounds, 109 S. Ct.
1211 (1989). The Eleventh Circuit recognized in Adams that Florida instructions deceiving
the jury by saying it had no responsibility for the sentencing decision undermined the constitu-
tionally required reliability of the capital sentencing proceeding. 816 F.2d at 1501. The
United States Supreme Court later held that the Eleventh Circuit should not have reached the
merits of the claim because Adams' trial attorney had not objected at what Florida sometimes
deems to be the proper time. Adams, 109 S. Ct. at 1216, 1217 n.6; id. at 1220-21 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting). Adams was subsequently executed in May 1989. N.Y. Times, May 5, 1989, at
16A, col. 1. For a discussion of the effects of procedural rules in death penalty cases, see infra
text accompanying notes 193-220.
134. See generally Dayan, Mahler & Widenhouse, Searching for an Impartial Sentencer
Through Jury Selection in Capital Trials, 23 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 151 (1989).
135. A 1975 study of public attitudes in New York found that the average person has al-
most no knowledge of what parole is and how it operates, and is completely unaware of the
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vant to the proper performance of their duty. 136 Recent studies indicate
that jurors typically believe that a life sentence in a capital case will result
in parole after a relatively short period of incarceration, most commonly
believed to be seven years.137 This belief is incorrect in the vast majority
of death penalty states. In a majority of states, life sentences for capital
murder preclude the possibility of parole for as many as twenty, twenty-
five, thirty or forty years, 138 or without such a possibility ever.139 Yet,
sentencing juries continue to return death verdicts because they incor-
rectly believe the defendant would be released after a short period if
given a life sentence."
Juror misconceptions and inaccurate speculations regarding parole
law and practice are often decisive in death sentencing. Thus, failure to
give full and accurate instructions regarding the true meaning of a life
sentence can mean the difference between life and death. However, in
many cases, juries have been denied accurate information even after spe-
cifically requesting the court to instruct them on the meaning of a life
sentence. 141
In most states, judges are not allowed to instruct on the actual
meaning of a life sentence, and defendants are precluded from introduc-
ing any evidence or argument as to their general ineligibility for pa-
role.142 This is true even when the jury specifically requests instructions
regarding parole. 143 While juries which ask questions about parole are
facts regarding the success or failure of parole. Report on New York Parole: A Summary, 11
CRIM. L. BULL. 273, 281 (1975).
136. See, e.g., Paduano & Stafford Smith, Deathly Errors: Juror Misperceptions Concerning
Parole in the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 18 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 211, 252 (1987).
137. Id. at 221-23.
138. See infra note 469 and accompanying text.
139. See infra note 470 and accompanying text.
140. See generally Paduano & Stafford Smith, supra note 136. In several recent Georgia
cases, post-trial interviews with jurors revealed that the death verdict was returned precisely
because the jury incorrectly believed that the defendant would be released after seven years if
sentenced to life imprisonment. See Note, A Capital Defendant's Right to a Meaningful Alter-
native Sentence, (forthcoming in N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE, Fall 1989)(authored by J.
Mark Lane).
141. A study of the trial transcripts of all 256 Georgia trials which resulted in death ver-
dicts between 1973 and July 1988 revealed that the jury specifically inquired about the defend-
ant's potential parole eligibility in 56 cases. Note, supra note 140. In many of those cases,
juries returned with death verdicts within minutes after being denied the information they had
requested regarding a life sentence. Id.
142. Paduano & Stafford Smith, supra note 136, at 216-17. This problem could exist under
the death penalty legislation proposed in New York.
143. Indeed, juries have not been allowed to know the meaning of a life sentence even when
the defendant expressly seeks to ensure that they do. A recent Fifth Circuit decision held that
a capital defendant does not have the right to inquire during jury selection as to the potential
juror's understanding of the parole law. King v. Lynaugh, 850 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir. 1988) (en
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generally admonished not to consider parole in sentencing delibera-
tions, 1" evidence indicates that they are incapable of following such ad-
monitory instructions 4 5 and base the decision to impose death on parole
considerations even in the face of specific and definite instructions not to
do so.
146
Hence, jurors' inaccurate beliefs about parole undermine the relia-
bility of capital sentencing. The death penalty is being imposed arbitrar-
ily, based on juries' misinformation about the true nature of the life
sentence for capital murder. 147
Another serious problem sometimes arises when a court deals with a
"holdout" juror. Under most capital sentencing schemes, both a verdict
on guilt and the sentencing decision must be returned by a unanimous
jury.148 However, jurors who hold out for a not-guilty verdict or a life
sentence are sometimes coerced into changing their minds, or are actu-
ally dismissed from the jury. 149
In one recent case, a holdout juror, who had not been convinced of
the defendant's guilt, was dismissed after only two hours of deliberations
when, at 12:30 a.m., the jury foreman told the judge that the juror, Mr.
Greeson, was "nervous." 5° Once Greeson had been excused-without
either the judge, the defense lawyer, or the prosecutor seeing him-it
took the reconstituted jury only a matter of minutes to convict the de-
banc), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 820 (1989). The Fifth Circuit's opinion rested in part upon the
assumption that jurors will follow instructions not to consider parole in their sentencing deter-
mination, id. at 1060, an assumption which has been proven false.
144. See, eg., Quick v. State, 256 Ga. 780, 353 S.E.2d 497 (1987) (and cases discussed
therein).
145. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that juries are not always capable of following
admonitory or limiting instructions. See, e.g., Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968);
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). See also Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440,
453 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be
overcome by instructions to the jury .... all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated
fiction.").
146. The case of Rogers v. State, 256 Ga. 139, 344 S.E.2d 644 (1986), provides a clear
example. In Rogers, the jury had inquired about parole and had been instructed not to con-
sider the issue, but post-trial interviews ordered by the court for unrelated reasons established
that 10 of the 12 jurors based the decision to sentence Rogers to death on misinformed parole
considerations. Seven of those jurors specifically stated that they believed Rogers would get
out in seven years under a life sentence. He would not, in fact, have even been considered for
parole for at least 15 years. See Note, supra note 140 for a discussion of Rogers.
147. See infra text accompanying notes 461-78 for a discussion of sentencing alternatives
generally, and the reasons for these misperceptions.
148. See Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 102-19 (1980).
149. See Tabak, supra note 2, at 815-16.
150. See Peek v. Kemp, 784 F.2d 1479, 1482 (11th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
939 (1986).
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fendant while Greeson drove himself home unaided.151 At 2:00 a.m., af-
ter a hasty sentencing hearing, the jury sentenced the defendant to
death. 52 The Eleventh Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the con-
viction and sentence, in large part because of defense counsel's failure to
object to Greeson's removal from the jury.153 A similar occurrence tran-
spired during the jury deliberations in Roosevelt Green's trial. 154
A further problem is that jurors are often so misinformed or misled
as to the way in which the capital sentencing system works that they
simply do not believe that the real decision as to whether death will be
imposed rests with them. 5 5 They may return a death verdict because
they believe, due to their distorted view of the length of a life sentence for
capital murder, that this might keep the defendant in jail longer, or to
send a message of extreme disapproval. 56 The latter phenomenon,
known as the "Slovik syndrome,"' 57 may result in the execution of the
defendant, even though the jury never thought its verdict would be car-
ried out.
F The Lack of Real Proportionality Review Means that the Arbitrary
Imposition of Death Is Not Corrected on Appeal
In approving Georgia's new capital punishment scheme in 1976, the
Supreme Court emphasized what it asserted were many safeguards that
supposedly would prevent the arbitrary and capricious imposition of
death.'58 One of these supposed safeguards was the Georgia Supreme
Court's statutorily mandated proportionality review, 159 which was
designed to ensure that a defendant was not executed unless death
151. 784 F.2d at 1504 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
152. Id. (Johnson, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 1484. As the dissent pointed out, the circumstances indicate that Greeson "had
been pressured into resigning" because he was in disagreement with the remaining 11 jurors.
Id. at 1505 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
154. See W. WHITE, supra note 35, at 120-27 for a discussion of Mr. Green's trial.
155. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985); Adams v. Wainwright, 804 F.2d
1526 (11th Cir. 1986), modified and reh'g denied sub nom. Dugger v. Adams 816 F.2d 1493
(1lth Cir. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 109 S. Ct. 1211 (1989).
156. Weltner, J., Remarks of Charles Weltner at Panel Discussion in Atlanta, Georgia
(June 29, 1985) (the Georgia Supreme Court Justice noted that jurors have a distorted view of
life sentences). See also Greenberg, Capital Punishment as a System, 91 YALE L.J. 908, 927
n.119 (1982).
157. The "Slovik syndrome," named for United States Army Private Eddie Slovik who was
sentenced to death in 1944, is the belief by jurors that the death sentence will not actually be
carried out. See generally Newman, Foreword to Project, Parole Release Decisionmaking and
the Sentencing Process, 84 YALE L.J. 810, 812-13 (1975).
158. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 162-68, 190-206 (1976).
159. Id. at 204-06.
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sentences had been returned in most similar cases.16"
However, such proportionality review has generally not occurred.
The Georgia Supreme Court has never vacated a death sentence for mur-
der based on a comparison of different cases. 161 Indeed, one justice of the
Georgia Supreme Court has openly conceded that the court does not ac-
tually do such proportionality review.1 62 This means that when defend-
ants with similar backgrounds commit similar crimes but receive
strikingly different sentences-due to such arbitrary factors as
prosecutorial misconduct, racial discrimination and unguided discre-
tion-the safeguard designed to rectify the disproportionate sentencing
has been put "out of commission."
Tommy Morris of the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles has
acknowledged that inconsistent sentencing remains a problem.1 63 "Any
rational, reasonable person," says Morris, "ought to be able to take 100
life and 100 death cases and shuffle them, and come back and place those
cases back [in the category] they originally came from. And I'm saying it
can't be done.""' Florida prosecutor Jerry Blair has similarly stated
that "[u]niformity in sentencing is not a high priority in terms of the
death penalty."
165
The danger of disproportionate capital sentencing is especially great
in states, like New York, that have locally elected prosecutors, differing
levels of defense services by county, and widely different demographic
patterns in different areas. Although the proposed New York statute
would require the New York Court of Appeals to review a death sen-
tence to determine "whether the sentence is excessive or disproportionate
to the penalty imposed in similar cases," '16 6 experience in other jurisdic-
tions shows that such legislative mandates have generally not ensured
proportionality in death sentencing.
Because proportionality review has not been used to correct the
problem of inconsistent sentencing, today's capital punishment schemes
are defective for the same reasons that such schemes were considered
160. Id. at 198 (noting that the Georgia Supreme Court must determine "whether the sen-
tence is disproportionate to those sentences imposed in other similar cases").
161. See Liebman, Appellate Review of Death Sentences: A Critique of Proportionality Re-
view, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1433, 1434 (1985); accord Bentele, supra note 32.
162. Weltner, supra note 156.
163. See Thompson, Once 'Unfit to Live,' Ex-death-row Inmates Winning Parole, Atlanta
Const., Mar. 12, 1987, at IA, col. 4.
164. Id.
165. See Milloy, Florida's Law There to Stay, Newsday, June 28, 1989, at 5, col. 2.
166. PROPOSED LEGISLATION, supra note 125, § 11.
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unconstitutional by Supreme Court Justice Byron White in 1972.167 As
Justice White then stated, capital punishment schemes provide "no
meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death pen-
alty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not."
168
G. Lack of Qualified, Adequately Compensated Counsel for Post-
Conviction Proceedings
The scarcity of qualified counsel and the inadequacy of counsel's
compensation have been discussed with respect to trials. These problems
are no less significant in the area of post-conviction proceedings where
fact-finding and legal analysis concerning errors made at the trial level
frequently occur.
169
Certain types of constitutional error are raised almost exclusively in
post-conviction proceedings. For example, sixth amendment claims re-
garding the effectiveness of trial counsel are often made only after the
essential factual predicates have been uncovered by post-conviction in-
vestigations, or after new counsel has examined the record and consulted
with the client. 170 An example is the case of Georgia death row inmate
William Walter Curry, whose trial counsel failed to seek an independent
psychiatric evaluation, even though the trial judge said he would allow
one. 171 In state post-conviction proceedings, volunteer counsel presented
evidence that Curry, who had pled guilty, was mentally retarded, suf-
fered from severe mental illness, and was incapable of waiving his consti-
tutional rights. 172 The Georgia Supreme Court held that Curry's sixth
amendment rights had been violated and vacated his death sentence,
73
although it had earlier affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct
appeal. 174
In other cases, counsel working on post-conviction proceedings have
167. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring).
168. Id.
169. As noted above, habeas relief is granted in one-third to one-half of all death penalty
cases in the Eleventh Circuit, which handles the greatest volume of such cases. See Godbold,
supra note 56, at 862. See generally Lardent & Cohen, The Last Best Hope: Representing
Death Row Inmates, 23 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 213 (1989).
170. The Supreme Court has recognized that "collateral review will frequently be the only
means through which an accused can effectuate the right to counsel," because "[a] layman will
ordinarily be unable to recognize counsel's errors and to evaluate counsel's professional per-
formance ... [and thus] will rarely know that he has not been represented competently until
after trial or appeal, usually when he consults another lawyer about his case." Kimmelman v.
Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 378 (1986).
171. Curry v. Zant, 371 S.E.2d 647, 648 (1988).
172. Id. at 648-49.
173. Id. at 649.
174. Curry v. State, 255 Ga. 215, 336 S.E.2d 762 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1090 (1986).
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presented evidence of other fundamental constitutional violations, or new
evidence showing that particular death row inmates were in fact inno-
cent.175 John Henry Knapp's post-conviction attorneys worked more
than 3,000 hours and spent $75,000 in out-of-pocket expenses in showing
that Knapp had been wrongly tried and convicted. 176 As a result, Knapp
was released in 1987.177 In Amadeo v. Zant,178 only a fortuitous turn of
events led to the discovery that the jury which had sentenced Amadeo to
death had been selected from a pool that was intentionally designed to
underrepresent blacks and women. 179 In that case, counsel in an unre-
lated civil case discovered the evidence which, after years of litigation by
volunteer counsel, finally led to relief in post-conviction proceedings."'
Given the number of death row inmates whose cases are at the post-
conviction stage, expecting volunteer counsel to provide all, or even
most, of them with proper representation is unrealistic. Pro se represen-
tation is also entirely inadequate. Many death row inmates are unable to
articulate even those meritorious claims that do not require further fac-
tual investigation, simply because they "are illiterate, uneducated, men-
tally impaired or any combination of the three."1'' As Justice Kennedy
recently stated, it is "unlikely that capital defendants will be able to file
successful petitions for collateral relief without the assistance of persons
learned in the law." 182
Whether counsel will volunteer in any given case, and whether such
counsel will be able to donate the necessary time and resources is becom-
ing increasingly unlikely."8 3 This renders the capital punishment system
even more arbitrary; those who manage to secure counsel with sufficient
resources and abilities benefit, while others are executed because they did
not happen to get such counsel.
Studies commissioned by the American Bar Association (ABA)
have shown that post- conviction representation of death row inmates re-
quires extraordinary amounts of attorney time and involves high out-of-
pocket expenses,18 4 which many attorneys simply cannot afford. Accord-
ing to one study, the median time devoted to state post-conviction alone
175. See infra notes 290-357 and accompanying text.
176. Smethurst, Knapp Update: "Innocent Man," AM. LAW., Apr. 1987, at 8.
177. Id.
178. 108 S. Ct. 1771 (1988).
179. Id. at 1774-75.
180. Id. at 1774.
181. See Mello, Facing Death Alone: The Post-Conviction Attorney Crisis on Death Row, 37
AM. U.L. REv. 513, 548 (1988).
182. Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 2765, 2772 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
183. But see Lardent & Cohen, supra note 169.
184. A.B.A. PosTcoNVIcroN DEATH PENALTY REPRESENTATION PROJECT, TIME AND
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(not including federal habeas corpus) was at least 665 hours.'85 Expenses
averaged as high as $20,000 for those who could document the
amount. 
1 86
The ABA has repeatedly urged that qualified counsel be appointed,
monitored, and adequately compensated for post-conviction representa-
tion of indigent death row inmates. 1 87 However, although appointed
counsel is now guaranteed for federal habeas corpus actions, 18 the pro-
posed New York legislation, like that of many states, does not expressly
provide for such counsel for state post-conviction proceedings. 8 9 Since
the Supreme Court recently held that there is no federal constitutional
guarantee of counsel at the state post-conviction level,' 90 many death
row inmates could be left with no means to effectively present meritori-
ous claims of fundamental error in their convictions and sentences. 91
Lack of qualified, compensated counsel in post-conviction proceed-
ings thus remains a major problem for death row inmates. With proper
counsel in such proceedings, these inmates' sentences are often reversed.
At retrial, with the constitutional defect remedied, many are given life
sentences, and some are even found to be not guilty.' 92
H. Overly-Strict Procedural Bar Rules Lead to Executions of People
Unconstitutionally Convicted or Sentenced
Increasingly onerous "procedural bar" rules are preventing capital
EXPENSE ANALYSIS IN POST-CONVIcTION DEATH PENALTY CASES (Feb. 1987) (data compi-
lation and analysis by the Spangenberg Group).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See A.B.A. RESOLUTION 102B (approved by the A.B.A. House of Delegates at the
1979 Midyear Meeting); A.B.A. RESOLUTION 112D (approved by the A.B.A. House of Dele-
gates at the 1982 Annual Meeting); A.B.A. RESOLUTION 125 (approved by the A.B.A. House
of Delegates at the 1988 Midyear Meeting); Brief of A.B.A., amicus curiae, Murray v. Giar-
ratano, 109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989) (No. 88-411).
188. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a) (1987).
189. The proposed bill provides for appointed counsel "after the entry of judgment impos-
ing a sentence of death but before execution of that judgment," but fails to state expressly
whether this includes the right to appointed counsel in collateral proceedings after an unsuc-
cessful direct appeal. See PROPOSED LEGISLATION, supra note 125, § 14.
190. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. at 2770-71 (1989) (relying on Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S.
551 (1987)).
191. Significantly, the decisive fifth vote in Giarratano was cast by Justice Kennedy, who
implied that he might view the matter differently if a death row inmate was totally unable to
obtain counsel through some means. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. at 2773 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Expressing concern, he nonetheless stated that he would leave matters to "state legislators and
prison administrators" for the time being. Id.
192. See infra text accompanying notes 290-357 for a discussion of defendants sentenced to
death and later found to be not guilty.
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defendants from raising in subsequent proceedings meritorious constitu-
tional issues that trial counsel negligently failed to raise. Under pre-1977
construction of the federal habeas corpus statute, a defendant was per-
mitted to raise valid constitutional claims in the federal courts unless he
had "deliberately bypassed" those claims in state court. 93 A defendant
deliberately bypassed those claims when he "understandingly and know-
ingly" decided to forego a claim for strategic reasons. 194 Under that
standard, the effects of trial counsel's negligent failure to advise or act on
behalf of his client were not devastating, since the defendant was able to
raise his constitutional claims later in a federal habeas corpus petition.
However, under the more recent Supreme Court decisions, a defend-
ant is said to have waived his right to raise constitutional claims collater-
ally unless he can show "cause" for having not raised them earlier and
"prejudice" resulting therefrom. 19 "Cause" and "prejudice" have been
defined so narrowly as to be almost impossible to demonstrate.' 96 There-
fore, this new judicially-created standard prevents many unconstitution-
ally convicted or sentenced death row inmates from securing relief.
A fatal example was the United States Supreme Court's recent hold-
ing that the Eleventh Circuit had erred in considering the claim that
Florida death row inmate Aubrey Dennis Adams had been unconstitu-
tionally sentenced to death.' 97 The Court did not suggest that the Elev-
enth Circuit had been incorrect in its unanimous conclusion that Adams
had been unconstitutionally sentenced. Instead, the Court concluded, by
a five-to-four vote, that because Adams' attorney had raised no objection
at trial and offered no excuse for this failure that would amount to "good
cause,"' 198 the constitutional claim, no matter how meritorious, could not
be considered in federal court. 9 Thus, as the dissenters concluded, the
193. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963).
194. Id. at 439.
195. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977). See also Dugger v. Adams, 109 S. Ct.
1211 (1989); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
196. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87.
197. Dugger v. Adams, 109 S. Ct. 1211 (1989). The Eleventh Circuit had held that the jury
instructions in Adams' case unconstitutionally removed from the jury a sense of its actual
heavy responsibility for the sentencing decision by repeatedly misinforming the jury that the
most important thing for it to understand was that it had no responsibility for the sentencing.
Adams v. Wainwright, 804 F.2d 1526, 1528 (1lth Cir. 1986), modified and rehg denied sub
nom. Dugger v. Adams, 816 F.2d 1493 (11th Cir. 1987). In a later case, every member of the
en banc Eleventh Circuit approved the panel's unanimous holding that Adams had been un-
constitutionally sentenced to death. See Adams, 109 S. Ct. at 1218 n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) (citing Harich v. Dugger, 844 F.2d 1464, 1473 (11th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 1355 (1989)).
198. Adams, 109 S. Ct. at 1216.
199. Id. at 1217-18.
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Supreme Court sent "a man to a presumptively unlawful execution be-
cause he or his lawyers did not raise his objection at what is felt to be the
appropriate time for doing so.""2  Through such decisions, the Court,
which in the past "repeatedly has ruled that the Eighth Amendment pro-
hibits the arbitrary or capricious imposition of the death penalty, [is] it-
self arbitrarily impos[ing] procedural obstacles to thwart the vindication
of... a meritorious Eighth Amendment claim."2 °1 Adams was executed
on May 4, 1989202 even though the only federal appellate court to ad-
dress the merits of his claim had held that his death sentence was uncon-
stitutional and not a harmless error.
In Georgia alone, there have been at least three executions in recent
years of unconstitutionally convicted death row inmates who were held
to have waived meritorious claims. One such fatality of procedural de-
fault was John Eldon Smith, who was tried before a jury picked from a
pool that was later found to have been selected in a way that systemati-
cally excluded blacks and women.20 3 His common-law wife, who was his
co-defendant, was tried before a jury selected from the same unconstitu-
tional pool, but her sentence was reversed because she was held not to
have fully waived her claim.2" At retrial, she received a life sentence.20 5
However, Smith's attorney did not raise the jury-composition claim as
early in the proceedings as his wife's attorney did.20 6 For that reason, the
Eleventh Circuit-which knew from its ruling in the wife's case that
Smith's claim was meritorious-held that he had waived the claim,20 7
and he was subsequently executed.20 8
In another Georgia case, John Young, whose trial lawyer later ad-
mitted to having been on drugs at the time of the trial,209 was executed
210
after the courts refused to hear his claims of ineffective assistance of
200. Id. at 1218 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
201. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In further arbitrariness, six days after procedurally
barring Adams' claim, the Court denied certiorari in Dugger v. Mann, 109 S. Ct. 1353 (1989),
and thus left standing the grant of relief in Mann v. Dugger, 844 F.2d 1446 (1lth Cir. 1988) (en
banc), in which the petitioner bad prevailed on a claim similar to, but somewhat weaker than
Adams'. Mann, 844 F.2d at 1447-48. Unlike the court in Adams, the en banc Eleventh Cir-
cuit had been deeply divided in Mann. Id at 1459, 1461.
202. NAACP LEGAL DEF. AND EDUC. FUND, INC., supra note 16.
203. See Tabak, supra note 2, at 841.
204. Machetti v. Linahan, 679 F.2d 1459 (11th Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1127 (1983).
205. Tabak, supra note 2, at 840-41.
206. Id.
207. See Smith v. Kemp, 715 F.2d 1459 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1003 (1983);
Smith v. Kemp, 464 U.S. 1032 (1983).
208. Tabak, supra note 2, at 841.
209. Affidavit of Charles Marchman, Jr., Mar. 16, 1985; Young v. Kemp, 758 F.2d 514, 518
(11th Cir. 1985).
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counsel and prosecutorial misconduct.2 1 1 The claims were held to have
been raised too late, and were therefore barred from review. 212
Another Georgia example involved co-defendants Joseph Thomas
and Ivon Ray Stanley. Thomas was granted a retrial because the jury
charge at the guilt/innocence stage improperly shifted the burden of
proof to the defendant on the issue of intent.213 Stanley's attorneys did
not raise the same issue in what was deemed to be a "timely" manner;
thus, he was held to have waived his right to raise this valid claim.214
Stanley was subsequently executed.215
These cases are not anomalies. Indeed, very recent Supreme Court
decisions may tighten procedural nooses even further, and thereby in-
crease the number of people executed despite having been unconstitu-
tionally convicted or sentenced through what was not harmless error.
Thus, in Teague v. Lane,216 decided in February 1989, the Court held
that most new federal constitutional holdings would not be retroactively
applied to benefit people whose convictions had been affirmed on direct
appeal and whose certiorari petitions therefrom had been denied before
the date of the ruling establishing the new constitutional principle, even if
such defendants had raised the very same claim at trial and on direct
appeal.21 7 In Penry v. Lynaugh,21 8 the Court announced that Teague
would apply in the context of capital sentencing proceedings. 219 In view
of the actual way in which Penry applied Teague,221 it is not completely
210. John Young was executed on March 20, 1985. NAACP LEGAL DEF. AND EDUC.
FUND, INC., supra note 16.
211. Young, 758 F.2d at 519-20.
212. Id.
213. Thomas v. Kemp, 800 F.2d 1024, 1026 (1lth Cir. 1986).
214. Stanley v. Kemp, 737 F.2d 921, 922 (11th Cir. 1984).
215. Ivon Ray Stanley was executed on July 12, 1984. NAACP LEGAL DEF. AND EDUC.
FUND, INC., supra note 16, at 6.
216. 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989).
217. Id. at 1073.
218. 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989).
219. Id. at 2944-45.
220. Although the Penry Court stated that Teague would apply in death penalty cases, it
did address the merits of Penry's claims, because it held that one ruling which Penry sought
would not be "a 'new rule' under Teague," 109 S. Ct. at 2945, and that his other issue fell
within one of the narrow exceptions to Teague's rule of non-retroactivity. Id. at 2953. The
decision to consider the merits of the first issue caused four justices to complain that Teague
was being gutted. Id at 2964-65 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("It is rare that a principle of law as
significant as that in Teague is adopted and gutted in the same Term."). Penry's second issue
was his claim that the eighth amendment prohibits the execution of the mentally retarded. Id.
The Court, while ruling against him on that issue, stated that an exception to Teague applies to
rules prohibiting certain types of punishment for certain offenders because of their status or
offense. Id.
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clear how often Teague will be held to control retroactivity decisions.
But where it does apply, it will mean that even where it is clear by the
time of the federal habeas corpus proceedings that the petitioner was un-
constitutionally convicted or sentenced, the federal courts will not hear
the claim if the conviction and sentence have been upheld on direct ap-
peal and certiorari therefrom has been denied, even if such denial occurs
a single day before the issuance of a new constitutional holding upon
which petitioner seeks to rely. Hence, two defendants, both presenting
exactly the same claim at simultaneously held trials, may now receive
entirely opposite treatment, with one being granted relief and the other
being executed, on the basis of the fortuity of when their direct appeals
were decided.
In view of the increasingly limited availability of federal habeas
corpus, there will certainly be unconstitutional executions in New
York-as in the rest of the nation-if the death penalty spreads to the
Empire State.
All of the problems discussed above contribute to the arbitrariness
of the capital punishment system and show that the system itself is per-
meated with unfairness at every stage. From the initial decision to seek
the death penalty in a given case, through the prosecution and defense of
the case at trial, to the appeals process and collateral review, the determi:
nation of who is executed is made all too often on the basis of arbitrary
and capricious factors. Thus, almost two decades after Furman v. Geor-
gia,221 it is apparent that the fundamental unfairness of capital punish-
ment in the United States has not been, and cannot be, corrected.
III. THE DEATH PENALTY OPERATES IN A RACIALLY
DISCRIMINATORY MANNER
Perhaps the most carefully documented aspect of the capital punish-
ment system in the United States today is racial discrimination in the
application of the death penalty. Various recent studies of death penalty
states have found that defendants charged with killing white victims have
been at least four times, and as much as eleven times, more likely to
receive a death sentence than those charged with killing black victims in
otherwise similar cases.222
221. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
222. See, e.g., Baldus, Woodworth & Pulaski, Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Ad-
ministration of the Death Penalty, 15 STETSON L. REV. 133 (1986); Baldus, Woodworth &
Pulaski, Monitoring and Evaluating Contemporary Death Sentencing Systems: Lessons from
Georgia, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1275 (1985); Baldus, Woodworth & Pulaski, Comparative
Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. &
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As previously noted, racial disparity in the application of the death
penalty begins at a very early stage in the capital punishment process.223
A study presented to the Supreme Court in McCleskey v. Kemp 224 (the
"Baldus study") showed that prosecutors sought the death penalty in
seventy percent of the cases involving black defendants and white vic-
tims, and in nineteen percent of the cases involving white defendants and
black victims. 2 2  Racism also affects jury deliberations, since jury selec-
tion proceedings do not provide an adequate means of preventing biased
jurors from sitting on capital juries.226 Thus, the race of the victim often
operates as a "silent aggravating circumstance" in the jury's decision to
impose the death penalty.227
The Baldus study reviewed all convictions in murder cases that took
place in Georgia between 1973 and 1979 in order to determine the effect
of race on capital sentencing.22 That study, which examined over 2,000
cases and considered 230 nonracial variables, 229 found, using regression
analysis, 31 that a Georgia defendant's odds of receiving a death sentence
were 4.3 times greater if his victim were white than if his victim were
black.2 31 The study showed that defendants charged with killing whites
were sentenced to death eleven percent of the time, whereas defendants
charged with killing blacks were sentenced to death one percent of the
time.232
A nationwide study conducted by Dallas Times Herald reporters
Jim -Henderson and Jack Taylor, which encompassed 11,425 capital
murders from 1977-1984, revealed "that the killer of a white is nearly
three times more likely to be sentenced to death than the killer of a black
CRIMINOLOGY 661 (1983); Gross, Race and Death: The Judicial Evaluation of Evidence of
Discrimination in Capital Sentencing, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1275 (1985); Gross & Mauro,
Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial Disparities in Capital Sentencing, 37 STAN. L. REV.
27 (1984); Paternoster, Race of the Victim and Location of the Crime, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 754 (1983). In McCleskey v. Kemp, the Supreme Court expressly assumed a study
reaching such results was statistically valid. 481 U.S. 279, 291 n.7 (1987).
223. See supra text accompanying notes 28-31 (discussing racial patterns in prosecutorial
decisions to seek the death penalty).
224. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
225. Id. at 287.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 106-25.
227. See Bendremer, Bramwick, Jones & Lippman, McCleskey v. Kemp: Constitutional
Tolerance for Racially Disparate Capital Sentencing, 41 U. MIAMI L. REv. 295, 296 (1986).
228. McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338, 353 (N.D. Ga. 1984), aff'd, 481 U.S. 279 (1987)
(discussing Baldus study).
229. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286-87.
230. Id. at 292.
231. Id. at 287.
232. Id. at 286 (summarizing results of Baldus study).
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in the thirty-two states where the death penalty has been imposed." '2 3 3 In
some states, the disparities were even higher: in Maryland, killers of
whites were eight times more likely to be sentenced to death than killers
of blacks; in Arkansas, they were six times more likely; and in Texas,
they were five times more likely.234 The study concluded that killers of
whites "are prosecuted more vigorously than the killers of blacks and are
being put to death at eleven times the rate of those who kill blacks." '235
Other studies have yielded similar results. A 1985 Louisiana study
showed that 14.5% of those who killed whites, as compared to 4.1% of
those who killed blacks, were sentenced to die, and that no whites who
had killed blacks were sentenced to die.2 36 Samuel Gross and Robert
Mauro extensively studied homicides which occurred from 1976-1980,
and, after adjusting for background variables, found statistically signifi-
cant disparities in the application of the death penalty according to the
victim's race in Georgia, Florida, Illinois, Oklahoma, North Carolina
and Mississippi.
23 7
As of July 1989, eighty-five percent of the 115 death row inmates
executed under the modem statutes had been convicted of killing white
victims. 238 Only eleven percent of those executed had been convicted of
killing black victims, and all of those defendants were themselves
black.239 Yet, almost half of the homicide victims in this country are
black.2" Indeed, there have been no executions of whites convicted of
killing black or other minority victims in this country under the modem
capital punishment schemes.241
Racial discrimination in the imposition of capital punishment is not
geographically limited. Recent studies show similar results in northern
states with death penalty statutes. In Illinois, for example, between 1977
and 1980, a defendant who killed a white person was six times more
likely to be sentenced to death than one who killed a black person.242
233. Killers of Dallas Blacks Escape the Death Penalty, Dallas Times Herald, Nov. 17, 1985,
at 1, col. 1.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See DeParle, Executions Aren't News: Why They Should Be, WASHINGTON
MONTHLY, Mar. 1986, at 19.
237. See Gross & Mauro, supra note 222, at 54-55, 93-96.
238. NAACP LEGAL DEF. AND EDUC. FUND, INC., supra note 16, at 5.
239. Id. Approximately four percent of those executed had been convicted of killing Asian
or Hispanic victims. Id. All such defendants were also from minority groups. Id.
240. 1988 FBI UNIFORM CRIME REP. 11.
241. NAACP LEGAL DEF. AND EDUC. FUND, INC., supra note 16, at 5.
242. Gross & Mauro, supra note 222, at 55; see also Murphy, Application of the Death
Penalty in Cook County, 73 ILL. BAR J., Oct. 1984, at 90, 93.
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Significant effects depending upon the victim's race have also been shown
in Colorado's imposition of the death penalty.243 Moreover, analysis of
New Jersey cases has revealed that the race of the defendant and victim
play a significant role in death sentencing in that state.2 4 In July 1988,
the New Jersey Supreme Court appointed Professor Baldus, author of
the Baldus study, as a Special Master to investigate the extent of racial
discrimination in New Jersey capital sentencing.245
In January 1988, Chief Judge Wachtler of New York's highest court
commissioned sixteen lawyers, judges and professors to consider, among
other things, whether minorities in New York believe the court system is
racially biased. 246 The resulting report of the New York State Judicial
Commission on Minorities concluded that the New York judicial system
had an "overwhelmingly white complexion," and that minorities fear
that they will be treated unfairly within that system.247 Commission
member Peggy C. Davis of New York University School of Law noted
separately that "[e]very relevant opinion poll of which the Commission is
aware finds that minorities are more likely than other Americans to
doubt the fairness of the court system," and that their doubts are well
founded.24 8 Given the recent racial tensions and related violence in New
York,24 9 no reason exists to presume that New York will differ from the
rest of the nation in the racially discriminatory imposition of the death
penalty. Yet, despite the fact that the Supreme Court has said that legis-
lative action is an appropriate way to deal with racism in the capital
243. See Baldus, Woodworth & Pulaski, Arbitrariness and Discrimination in Colorado's
Post-Furman Capital Charging and Sentencing Process: A Preliminary Report 44 (Oct. 1,
1986) (unpublished manuscript on file at Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
244. See Bienen, Weiner, Denno, Allison & Mills, The Reimposition of Capital Punishment
in New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 27, 170-71 (1988);
Bienen, The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: Homicide Cases from 1982-
1986, Study by the Dep't of the Public Advocate, Trenton, New Jersey (Fall 1986).
245. See Order, New Jersey Supreme Court, July 29, 1988, reprinted in Bienen, Weiner,
Denno, Allison & Mills, supra note 244, at 371-72.
246. Glaberson, Panel Faults Racial Pattern of Court Staffs, N.Y. Times, July 12, 1989, at
BI, col. 5.
247. Id.
248. See Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559, 1559 (1989). One such poll,
conducted by the New York Law Journal in 1988, found that 71% of blacks and 31% of
whites in New York believed that if "two people--one white, one black-are convicted of
identical crimes," the white defendant would get the lighter sentence. Id. at 1559 n.l.
249. Blumenthal, Black Youth Is Killed By Whites; Brooklyn Attack Is Called Racial, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 25, 1989, at A2, col. 1; Farber, The Howard Beach Case: Puzzling Picture of a
Racial Attack, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1987, at B1, col. 2. See generally Roberts, When Crimes
Become Symbols, N.Y. Times, May 7, 1989, at El, col. 5 (discussing recent New York City
murders of both black and white victims and related racial tensions).
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punishment system,25° the proposed New York legislation fails to ad-
dress this serious issue.
IV. MENTALLY RETARDED PEOPLE AND OTHERS NOT COMPETENT
TO STAND TRIAL ARE BEING EXECUTED
On February 8, 1989, the American Bar Association adopted a reso-
lution stating that the mentally retarded should not be subject to the
death penalty.251 The report accompanying the resolution stated that
"[e]xecuting a person with mental retardation violates contemporary
standards of decency. 252 The Alliance for the Mentally Ill of New York
State has stated that "the concept and the act of capital punishment for
mentally disabled persons [are] unacceptable in a civilized nation/
state., 25 3 Moreover, the New York State Association for Retarded Chil-
dren "object[s] to the execution of persons with mental retardation. "254
These national and New York expressions of professional opinion are in
accord with public opinion. A poll conducted in May 1989 showed that
eighty-two percent of New Yorkers oppose use of the death penalty when
the defendant is mentally retarded.255 Similar opinions have been re-
ported internationally.25 6
The Supreme Court has held that no person is competent to stand
trial unless he "has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding" and "has a rational
as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. ' 25 7 It
has further held that the eighth amendment prohibits the execution of
250. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 319 (holding that legislatures are better qualified to weigh
and evaluate results of statistical studies). The ABA has endorsed the passage of such legisla-
tion. See Report 109, passed by the ABA House of Delegates at its annual meeting in 1988.
Summary of Action Taken by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association, Aug. 9-
10, 1988, at 35.
251. A.B.A. RESOLUTION (Feb. 7, 1989).
252. Report accompanying A.B.A. RESOLUTION 2 (Feb. 7, 1989).
253. ALLIANCE FOR THE MENTALLY ILL OF NEW YORK STATE, POSITION PAPER RE:
THE DEATH PENALTY (April 16, 1988).
254. NEW YORK STATE ASSOCIATION FOR RETARDED CHILDREN, INC., IMPOSITION OF
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1988) (bill memorandum).
255. Opinion Poll, supra note 73, at 3.
256. International opinion on the subject is reflected in a United Nations Committee on
Crime Prevention and Control recommendation, made in August, 1988, that member states
retaining the death penalty be advised to eliminate the death penalty "for persons suffering
from mental retardation or extremely limited mental competence whether at the stage of sen-
tence or execution." AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, WHEN THE STATE KILLS: THE DEATH
PENALTY; A HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE 42 (1989).
257. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960).
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the insane.258 However, in June 1989, the Court held that the Constitu-
tion presently does not bar the execution of the mentally retarded.259
Whereas only two and one-half percent of the United States popula-
tion is mentally retarded, more than twelve percent of the inmates cur-
rently on death row have been diagnosed as either retarded or of
borderline intelligence.26 0 At least six people diagnosed as mentally re-
tarded have been executed in the United States in recent years.26'
The convictions and sentences imposed upon the mentally retarded
are often based on evidence that is unreliable because of their retardation.
For example, it is highly doubtful that a mentally retarded person's "con-
fession" is accurate and reliable. The mentally retarded have insufficient
and immature notions of blame and causation,262 and may accept respon-
sibility for an act although they actually had little or nothing to do with
it.263  Mentally retarded people are also much more susceptible than
people of average intelligence to a desire to please authority figures.
264
Thus, more often than not, when a retarded person answers "yes" to a
question, the answer is based solely on a desire to please the interroga-
tor.2 65 The statements of a mentally retarded person are therefore less
258. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986).
259. Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2952-58 (1989). The Penry Court based its deci-
sion largely on the fact that only one state had passed legislation barring execution of the
retarded. Id. at 2955. Thus, the Court based a federal constitutional determination on the
determinations-or inactions-of state legislatures. Although the Court left open the possibil-
ity that it might reconsider the issue if the sentiment against executing the retarded expressed
in public opinion polls and professional organization resolutions were to "find expression in
legislation," id., the decision had the immediate effect of allowing Alabama to proceed with the
execution of retarded prisoner Horace Franklin Dunkins.
260. See Georgia Clearinghouse on Prisons and Jails, Mental Retardation and America's
Death Row (1987) (unpublished study on file at Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
261. See NAACP LEGAL DEF. AND EDUC. FUND, INC., supra note 16. Ivon Stanley was
executed in Georgia on July 12, 1984. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 5, at 195. Mor-
ris Mason was executed in Virginia on June 25, 1985. Id. James Terry Roach was executed in
South Carolina on January 10, 1986. Id. Jerome Bowden was executed in Georgia on June 24,
1986. NAACP LEGAL DEF. AND EDUC. FUND, INC., supra note 16, at 7. John Brogdon was
executed in Louisiana on July 30, 1987. Id. at 8. Horace Franklin Dunkins was executed in
Alabama on July 14, 1989. Id.
262. Ellis & Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
414, 429 n.78 (1985).
263. See generally Person, The Accused Retardate, 4 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 239, 254
(1972); PRESIDENT'S PANEL ON MENTAL RETARDATION, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON
LAW 4 (1963).
264. Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 262, at 430.
265. See Rosen, Floor & Zisfein, Investigations: the Phenomenon of Acquiescence in the
Mentally Handicapped, 20 BRIT. J. MENTAL SUBNORMALITY 58, 58-68 (1974); Sigdman,
Budd, Stankel & Schroenrock, When in Doubt, Say Yes: Acquiescence in Interviews with Men-
tally Retarded Persons, 19'MENTAL RETARDATION 53 (1980).
[Vol. 23:59
THE EXECUTION OF INJUSTICE
likely to be voluntarily made than those of a person of normal
intelligence.
Moreover, mentally retarded persons who "confess" do not usually
make intelligent and knowing waivers of the right to have counsel pres-
ent.26 6 The summary procedure whereby Miranda warnings are read
and suspects are asked whether they understand the warnings is not a
sufficient basis upon which courts may confidently hold that defendants
with a mental age of ten or less have intelligently waived the right to
counsel.267
Yet, courts do make such determinations. Jerome Bowden, a young
black man charged with murder, had been consistently diagnosed over
many years as unquestionably retarded.26 In the absence of physical
evidence, fingerprints, or eyewitnesses, the most incriminating evidence
against Bowden was his confession.269 Bowden later explained to his
lawyer and to the court that the detective who had interrogated him told
him that he was a "friend," who would help Bowden.270 The detective,
according to Bowden, asked him to "sign here," and Bowden had simply
done so. 271 But the court determined that Bowden's confession, which
he did not write, was voluntary and reliable,272 and he was executed on
June 24, 1986.273
The mentally retarded face further problems at trial, where their
limited intelligence may impair their ability to participate meaningfully
in their own defense. This situation is aggravated by the fact that most
retarded people try to "pass" for normal, which may effectively conceal
266. See, e.g., Smith v. Zant, 855 F.2d 712 (1988), reh'g granted, 873 F.2d 253 (1lth Cir.
1989) (en banc). In Smith, the federal appeals court held that the retarded defendant, who had
been sentenced to death, had not knowingly waived his Miranda rights and that admission of
his confession was not harmless error in either the guilt or sentencing phase of the trial. Id. at
721-22.
267. Id. at 716. Smith's IQ was found to be 65. Id. The Eleventh Circuit quoted the
arresting officer as saying: "We read his rights to him. We asked him did he understand them.
He said he did, and he signed it." Id. at 718. The court found that this procedure was insuffi-
cient to assure that the defendant intelligently waived his rights. Id. But see People v. Wil-
liams, 62 N.Y.2d 285, 465 N.E.2d 327, 476 N.Y.S.2d 788 (1984) (holding that functionally
illiterate, borderline mentally retarded 20-year-old man who also suffered from organic brain
damage could validly waive his rights).
268. Pat Smith, Bowden's attorney, Remarks at a Panel Discussion at the ABA Mid-Year
Meeting (Feb. 1987).
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Bowden v. Francis, 733 F.2d 740, 751-56 (11th Cir. 1984) (denying habeas corpus
petition), vacated, 470 U.S. 1079 (1985), aff'd on remand sub nom. Bowden v. Kemp, 767 F.2d
761 (1Ith Cir. 1985).
273. NAACP LEGAL DEF. AND EDUC. FUND, INC., supra note 16.
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their incapacity to understand and participate rationally in their trials. 4
A significant number of men, women and juveniles275 whose mental
state is so degraded that they can only fitfully comprehend (if at all) what
they have done, what is being done to them and why, are being sentenced
to death in the United States. The proposed New York legislation would
not avoid such cruel and inhuman results. Although under the proposed
bill, the jury in the sentencing phase may consider as a mitigating factor
whether "the defendant's mental capacity was significantly impaired
' 276
(a consideration now required by the United States Constitution),
277
nothing in the bill would preclude a jury that finds significant mental
impairment from nonetheless imposing a death sentence.278
V. PEOPLE WHO NEITHER KILLED NOR INTENDED TO KILL ARE
RECEIVING DEATH SENTENCES
Support for the death penalty apparently rests on the assumption
that the worst murderers are the ones selected to be executed. However,
the capital punishment system does not necessarily execute the worst
killers. In fact, people who never killed at all are sometimes sentenced to
death and executed.
The Supreme Court held in Enmund v. Florida27 9 that the death
penalty was a disproportionate penalty solely for participation in a rob-
bery in which another robber takes a life,280 and found that intent to kill
is a necessary element for capital murder.28 Enmund, who had been the
getaway driver in a robbery in which his accomplices killed the vic-
tims,282 was convicted of murder and sentenced to death.283 The Court
held that the death sentence could not stand "in the absence of proof that
Enmund killed or attempted to kill, and regardless of whether Enmund
274. See Smith, The Execution of Jerome Bowden: 'Bringing to Light Something Wrong',
Atlanta Const., June 28, 1986, at A17, col. 1. "People with mental retardation ... spend most
of their lives trying to pass for normal .... Bowden got so good at it that it killed him." Id.
275. James Terry Roach, who was mentally retarded, was a juvenile at the time of the
offense. See NAACP LEGAL DEF. AND EDUC. FUND, INC., supra note 16, at 7. He was
executed in South Carolina in 1986. Id.
276. PROPOSED LEGISLATION, supra note 125, at § 8.
277. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989) (holding that state may not preclude
jury from considering, in mitigation of sentence, evidence that defendant is mentally retarded).
278. See Letter from Professor James Ellis to James Murphy, Executive Director, New
York State Coalition for Criminal Justice, Albany, New York (Dec. 5, 1988) (concluding that
mentally retarded persons could be executed under proposed New York bill).
279. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
280. Id. at 788.
281. Id. at 789-91.
282. Id. at 784.
283. Id. at 785.
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intended or contemplated that life would be taken." '2 8 4 However, the
Court thereafter has substantially cut back on the limitations on the exe-
cution of accomplices and felony-murderers. In Tison v. Arizona,2 85 the
Court held that "reckless indifference to the value of human life" may be
a sufficient variety of "intent" to justify the death penalty.2 86 The Court
therefore held that it would be constitutional to sentence to death two
brothers who had neither killed, intended to kill, nor anticipated that the
killing would take place.287
Under Tison, a defendant may be executed even though he did not
kill, attempt to kill, intend that a killing take place, or contemplate that a
killing probably would occur. At least one such execution has already
occurred. In August 1987, Beauford White was executed in Florida de-
spite the fact that he did not kill or intend to use lethal force, and had
objected to any killing before his accomplices started shooting.288
Frequently, the mastermind of the crime will be sentenced to life
imprisonment, while the accomplice gets the death penalty. This is often
the consequence of the mastermind's willingness to accept a plea-bargain.
A majority of the public in New York does not support executions under
such circumstances. A recent public opinion poll showed that New
Yorkers are overwhelmingly opposed to the execution of non-triggermen.
When given a hypothetical in which the triggerman testified against his
partner and received a prison term, whereas the partner was executed,
eighty-two percent said they opposed the execution.289 But, in view of
the extremely broad death penalty legislation proposed in New York,
which would allow capital punishment for deaths occurring during the
course of a burglary, robbery, or other specified crimes, and which does
284. Id. at 801.
285. 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
286. Id. at 158.
287. The actual killings were committed by the brothers' father and another man, following
their escape with the brothers' aid from an Arizona state prison. Id. at 139-41. There was no
evidence that either brother "took any act which he desired to, or was substantially certain
would, cause death." Id. at 150. In fact, both brothers stated they were surprised by the
shooting. Id. at 141.
288. White v. Wainwright, 809 F.2d 1478 (1 lth Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1044 (1987).
See also Geimer & Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or Death: Operative Factors in Ten
Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 AM. . CRIM. L. 1 (1987).
289. The poll asked the following question:
How would you feel if you heard that two people were involved in an armed robbery.
The person with the gun killed the victim, but he testified against his partner. The
partner was executed for the crime, while the person who actually committed the
murder received a lesser sentence. Would you feel the death penalty for the accom-
plice who did not actually shoot the victim was justified in this case, or not?
Opinion Poll, supra note 73, at 5.
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not limit prosecutorial discretion, such unjust results will surely occur in
New York (as it has occurred elsewhere) if that legislation is enacted.
VI. INNOCENT PEOPLE ARE RECEIVING THE DEATH PENALTY AND
SOME ARE BEING EXECUTED
Every year, the press carries stories about individuals freed from
confinement-as innocent-after evidence is discovered that establishes
that they never committed the crime for which they were convicted.
Often, this evidence is discovered fortuitously, after the individual has
already served many years in prison. Sometimes it is discovered only
because a witness happens to come forward years after the trial. The
mistakes made in these cases can occur in any type of case, capital or not,
in any state. When the defendant is not sentenced to death, there is a
chance to correct the miscarriage of justice. There is, of course, no
chance to correct an execution.
According to a study published in 1987, more than 350 people in
this century have been erroneously convicted in the United States of
crimes potentially punishable by death; 116 of those were sentenced to
death, and twenty-three were actually executed. 290 This same study
found that there have been twenty-nine mistaken convictions in poten-
tially capital cases in New York, sixteen of which resulted in death
verdicts.291
The first part of this section discusses people sentenced to death in
the United States in recent years who, fortuitously, have subsequently
been discovered to have been innocent.292 These cases make it unmistak-
ably clear that innocent people are in fact sentenced to death in this
country today. The second part of this section presents examples of peo-
ple convicted of murder in New York in recent years who were later
found to have been innocent. In view of these cases, it seems apparent
that if New York had the death penalty, it would certainly have sen-
tenced innocent men to death in recent years. The third part of this sec-
tion shows that not all innocent death row inmates have been lucky
enough to have been saved by fortuitous events. From their cases, in-
volving people already executed as well as some remaining on death row,
290. See Bedau & Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L.
REv. 21, 36 (1987). Because the Bedau and Radelet study did not include an evaluation of
every homicide case, it was not a completely exhaustive report. The study may have missed
numerous cases of innocent people convicted of capital crimes.
291. Id. at 37.
292. Some, but not all, of these cases are included in Bedau & Radelet, supra note 290.
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it is clear that execution of the innocent will continue as long as the death
penalty exists.
A. Innocent People Have Been Sentenced to Death
in the 1970s and 1980s
It is impossible to know how many innocent people are currently on
the nation's death rows, but there is no doubt that people are wrongly
convicted and sentenced to death in the United States today under the
modem, allegedly "reliable," death penalty statutes. The clearest evi-
dence of this is the startling number of people who have been released
from death row in recent years after their innocence has been established.
It is important to note, in considering these cases, that the discovery of
innocence has almost never occurred because of the normal operation of
the capital punishment system. Instead, innocence has been discovered
either through totally fortuitous circumstances or because lawyers hap-
pened to be willing and able to reinvestigate cases,2 93 or because, having
been fortunate enough to have been granted retrials on legal grounds not
directly related to their innocence, death row inmates have been acquit-
ted at the retrials. In many of these cases, the only reason why innocent
death row inmates had not been executed before their innocence was
demonstrated was the delay occasioned by pending appeals or post-con-
viction proceedings on other issues.
Jerry Banks was convicted and sentenced to death in Georgia in
1975. When it was shown that the prosecution had knowingly withheld
evidence, Banks was granted a retrial.29a At retrial in 1976, he was again
convicted and resentenced to death.295 Only at his third trial, ordered
after a previously silent witness came forward with new evidence,296 was
it finally determined that Banks was innocent because his gun could not
have fired the fatal shots. After seven years on death row, Banks was
finally released. Three months later, he committed suicide. The state
293. Georgia attorney Bobby Lee Cook, whose career inspired the television series "Mat-
lock," has explained his opposition to the death penalty as arising out of an experience in his
own practice. See Curriden, Bobby Lee Cook. Georgia Maverick, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1989, at 68.
One of Cook's clients was convicted of murder and sentenced to death, although Cook believed
he was innocent. Id. at 71. After the conviction and sentence had been affirmed at all levels of
appeal, Cook's investigators came across evidence which showed that the prosecution's chief
witness had been lying on the stand. Id. at 71-72. Cook's client, Larry Hacker, was released
after a federal judge found that he had been framed. Id. at 72. Cook is now a staunch oppo-
nent of capital punishment: "It's just too damn final," he says. Id.
294. Banks v. State, 235 Ga. 121, 218 S.E.2d 851 (1975), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 975 (1977).
295. Banks v. Glass, 242 Ga. 518, 250 S.E.2d 431 (1978); Banks v. State, 237 Ga. 325, 227
S.E.2d 380 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 975 (1977).
296. Banks v. State, 246 Ga. 1, 268 S.E.2d 630 (1980).
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awarded his children $150,000.297
Johnny Ross, a black man, was sentenced to death in Louisiana in
1975 for the rape of a white woman. The entire trial lasted only a few
hours. When the United States Supreme Court held, in 1976, that the
death penalty for rape was unconstitutional, 298 Ross' death sentence was
commuted to twenty years. 299 After five more years in prison, Ross was
released in 1981, when volunteer lawyers were able to prove that the
blood type of the sperm found in the victim differed from his."°
Earl Charles was convicted of two counts of murder in Georgia in
1975 and sentenced to death. He was released three years later when
new evidence proved his alibi to be true.3°" He was awarded $417,000 in
a civil suit against a police officer for violation of his civil rights, but the
officer was unable to pay, and Charles ultimately settled with the city for
$75,000.302
Anthony Brown was convicted of murder and sentenced to death
(despite a jury recommendation of life) in Florida in 1983. The only
evidence against Brown was the testimony of a co-defendant, who re-
ceived a life sentence for his role in the crime. Brown was granted a
retrial because his right to cross-examine the co-defendant had been im-
properly limited.3 03 Upon retrial in 1986, the co-defendant confessed to
having testified falsely against Brown in order to obtain a life sentence for
himself, and Brown was acquitted.3°
In 1974, Thomas Gladish, Richard Greer, Ronald Keine, and Clar-
ence Smith were convicted of murder, kidnapping, sodomy and rape, and
sentenced to death in New Mexico. Fortunately for them, two newspa-
per reporters from Detroit (home of three of the defendants) decided to
investigate the case. The murder weapon and getaway car were traced to
a drifter in South Carolina, who confessed to the crime. The convictions
297. See Gleason, Undue Process: The Jerry Banks Case, 21 ATLANTA 50 (1982); Atlanta
Const., Apr. 1, 1983, at 10A, col. 1; id., Mar. 22, 1983, at 14A, col. 1; id., Mar. 18, 1983, at El,
col. 2; N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 1980, at 31, col. 5; id., Oct. 17, 1980, at 31, col. 5.
298. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
299. State v. Ross, 343 So. 2d 722, 728 (La. 1977).
300. See generally SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER POVERTY LAW REPORT (Jan.
1982); Letter from John L. Carroll, Ross' attorney, to Michael L. Radelet (Sept. 21, 1983).
301. State v. Charles, No. 23-392 (Ga. Super. Ct. July 5, 1978).
302. See generally Bentele, supra note 32 at 601; Greenberg, Capital Punishment as a Sys-
tern, 91 YALE L.J. 908, 920 n.69 (1982); Schmitz, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt, ATLANTA
WEEKLY, May 30, 1982, at 6.
303. Brown v. State, 471 So. 2d 6, 7 (Fla. 1985).
304. See generally Pensacola News, March 2, 1986, at 1, col. 2; id., Feb. 20, 1986, at IB,
col. 2; id., Feb. 13, 1986, at 1B, col. 2; id., Feb. 9, 1986, at 1B, col. 4; id., July 27, 1983, at 1,
col. 4.
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had been obtained through use of perjured testimony given under police
pressure. After serving nearly two years on death row, the four men
were released in 1976.305
In 1975, Jonathan Charles Treadaway was convicted of the murder
and sodomy of a six-year-old boy, and sentenced to death in Arizona.
Treadaway was later granted a retrial-not because anyone believed him
to be innocent, but rather because evidence of a prior criminal act had
been improperly admitted.30 6 At retrial, five experts showed that there
was no evidence that the boy had been sodomized. Indeed, they demon-
strated that the boy had not been murdered, but had apparently died of
pneumonia. After acquitting Treadaway, members of the jury observed
that the prosecutor had not even been able to establish that Treadaway
had ever been in the victim's home.3" 7
In 1976, Gary Beeman was convicted of murder and sentenced to
death in Ohio. In 1978, a federal court ordered a retrial because Beeman
was denied the right to adequately cross-examine the main witness
against him, an escaped prisoner named Claire Liuzzo. At the retrial,
five witnesses testified that Liuzzo had confessed to the crime, and
Beeman was released in 1979.308
Delbert Tibbs, a black theology student, was convicted (by an all-
white jury) of the rape of a sixteen-year-old white girl and the murder of
her companion, and sentenced to death in Florida in 1974. Tibbs' con-
viction was reversed on evidentiary grounds on appeal,30 9 and in 1977 he
was released while the state attempted to establish that it could legally
reprosecute.31° Ultimately, the case was dropped. The original prosecu-
tor has stated that if there were a retrial, he would appear as a witness for
Tibbs.31'
In 1978, Larry Hicks was convicted of two murders and sentenced
305. See generally Detroit News, Jan. 11, 1976, (Magazine), at 14; Detroit News, Dec. 16,
1975, at 1, col. 1.
306. State v. Treadaway, 116 Ariz. 163, 568 P.2d 1061 (1977).
307. See generally Greenberg, supra note 156, at 920 n.69; Arizona Republic, Oct. 10, 1978,
at 1, col. 4; id., Sept. 22, 1978, at B2, col. 7; id., Sept. 15, 1978, at B1, col. 2; id., Sept. 14, 1978,
at BI, col. 2; id., Sept. 7, 1978, at BI, col. 3; id., Sept. 1, 1978, at B2, col. 3.
308. See Ashtabula Star Beacon, Oct. 5, 1979, at 1, col. 1; id., Sept. 29, 1979, at 14, col. 4;
id., Sept. 25, 1979, at 11, col. 4; id., Sept. 5, 1979, at 1, col. 6; id., Apr. 11, 1978, at 10, col. 4;
id., July 28, 1976, at 9, col. 1; id., June 5, 1976, at 1, col. 2; see generally Greenberg, supra note
156, at 920 n.69.
309. Tibbs v. State, 337 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 1976).
310. See Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), aff'd, 457 U.S. 31
(1982).
311. See McClory, Justice for Mr. Tibbs, Chicago Reader, Feb. 11, 1983, at 1, col 1; Miami
Times, Sept. 16, 1982, at 4, col. 5; Miami Herald, June 8, 1982, at 1, col. 3.
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to death in Indiana. Two weeks before his scheduled execution, a volun-
teer lawyer became interested in the case. In 1980, a new trial was or-
dered on the grounds that Hicks, who is of subnormal intelligence, had
not understood the proceedings well enough to participate in his own
defense. At the retrial, his alibi was proven to be true, and it was shown
that his conviction had rested on perjured testimony. He was acquitted
and released, having avoided the electric chair mainly by a stroke of ex-
traordinary good luck.312
Neil Ferber was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in
Pennsylvania in 1982. Four years later, through the work of a detective
concerned about the case, evidence was produced which showed that the
state's chief witness, a former cellmate of Ferber, had lied. When, in
addition, an eyewitness said she was certain Ferber was not the perpetra-
tor, a new trial was ordered. The charges were dropped, and Ferber was
released in 1986. 313
Wrongful sentencing of innocent people shows no sign of diminish-
ing with the passage of time. Indeed, the capital punishment system
seems to be becoming even less reliable over time. In 1987, 1988, and the
first seven months of 1989 alone, at least a dozen more men who had
received death sentences have been released as innocent.
John Henry Knapp was released from Arizona's death row in 1987
after his volunteer attorneys showed that expert testimony presented at
his trial had improperly determined the cause of death of Knapp's two
children.314 Robert Lewis Wallace was released from Georgia's death
row in 1987 after, on retrial, it was determined that he was innocent.315
Darby Williams and Perry Cobb were released from Illinois' death row
in 1987 after five trials when a prosecutor from another county finally
came forward and revealed that the state's key witness had told him that
the witness' boyfriend had killed the victim. 316 Joseph Green Brown,
who once came within fifteen hours of execution, was released in 1987
312. See The Man Who Didn't Do It, PLAYBOY, Aug. 1980, at 62; The Ordeal of Larry
Hicks, PLAYBOY, May 1981, at 66, 67 ("The way [Hicks'] attorney McShane put it later,
'Larry was one lucky slum kid, and it just makes you wonder how many unlucky ones will be
going to the chair.' "). The Playboy Foundation provided funds for the reinvestigation of
Hicks' case. Id. at 66.
313. See Philadelphia Daily News, Mar. 7, 1986, at 9, col. 1; Philadelphia Inquirer, Mar. 7,
1986, at IB, col. 1; id., Jan. 4, 1986, at IB, col. 2; 60 Minutes: A Good Cop (CBS television
broadcast, Jan. 11, 1987) (transcript on file at Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
314. See Smethurst, Knapp Update: 'Innocent Man,' AM. LAW., Apr. 1987, at 80.
315. Williams, In Second Trial, Defendant Cleared in Officer's Slaying, Atlanta Const.,
June 5, 1987, at 3D, col. 1.
316. Defendants Found Innocent After Five Trials, Associated Press, Jan. 21, 1987 (LEXIS,
Nexis library, Omni file).
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after fourteen years on Florida's death row when it was discovered that
the prosecution had knowingly relied on false testimony.317 Henry
Drake was released after nearly nine years on Georgia's death row, when
it was shown that the testimony which was the basis of his conviction
was perjured. The real perpetrator, who had testified against Drake, fi-
nally conceded that he, not Drake, had committed the crime.3 18
Convicted in 1980, William Riley Jent and Earnest Lee Miller spent
eight years on Florida's death row and came within sixteen hours of exe-
cution. They had been sentenced to death for the murder of eighteen-
year-old Linda Gale Bradshaw, despite the fact that prior to the sentenc-
ing an eyewitness to the crime stated in an affidavit that the murder had
been committed by another man, Bobby Dodd. Dodd was also impli-
cated in the virtually identical murder of another young woman in Geor-
gia. It was eventually discovered that one of the key witnesses against
Jent and Miller had told police that she had only seen the murder "in a
dream." Police had, however, withheld this evidence from the defense.
The other key witness recanted her testimony against Miller and Jent,
saying she had lied because investigators had threatened her with the
electric chair. Miller and Jent were granted a retrial in 1987 by a federal
judge who said prosecutors and police had shown a "callous disregard
for the fundamental principles of truth and fairness. ' 319 The prosecution
nonetheless persisted with the claim that the two were guilty even though
no physical evidence linked them to the crime and although the victim's
family and Dodd's parole officer both wanted Dodd charged with the
crime. Miller and Jent were finally released from prison on January 14,
1988, after they agreed to plea bargain rather than face another trial in
the Florida courts.3 20
In March 1989, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals set aside the
conviction of Randall Dale Adams, who had been sentenced to death in
1977 for the murder of a Dallas police officer. Although Adams had
previously had his death sentence overturned, not because of any ques-
tion about his guilt but because of the unconstitutionality of the statute
Texas was then using,32' he spent twelve years in prison for a crime he
317. Von Drehle, Fairness Was a Fatal Blow to Fast Executions, Miami Herald, July 11,
1988, at 8A, col. 2; 20/20: Hours From Execution (ABC television broadcast, July 23, 1987)
(transcript on file at Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
318. Kaplan, Death Row Dilemma, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 25, 1988, at 35.
319. Judge Orders New Trial for Two Death Row Inmates, Miami Herald, Nov. 4, 1987, at
IA, col. 3.
320. See Finkel, Presumed Guilty, ESQUIRE, Mar. 1989, at 178-88.
321. See Applebome, Overturned Murder Conviction Spotlights Dallas-Style Justice, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 7, 1989, at A19, col. 1.
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did not commit. Then, the critically acclaimed film, "The Thin Blue
Line," brought his case to national prominence after its producer hap-
pened to take an interest in Adams' case. The state's misconduct in the
case included, among numerous other things, its prompting an alleged
eyewitness to identify Adams in a line-up after the witness initially iden-
tified a different man.3 22 As Jim McCloskey (a private investigator who
has worked on four cases in which Texas inmates have ultimately been
released due to their innocence) stated, in commenting on the Adams
case, "[t]he criminal justice system in the United States is... a far leakier
cistern where many people slip through a wide crack than the public
would care to believe.,
323
In April 1989, Timothy Baily Hennis was released from death row
in North Carolina.324 Hennis, an Army sergeant stationed at Fort
Bragg, North Carolina, had been convicted of the 1985 rape and murder
of the wife of an Air Force captain and the murder of her two young
children.325
The brutal murder, which was described by the local sheriff as an
"out of the usual homicide case,"' 32 6 attracted national attention in
1985.327 The police focused on Hennis because several days before the
murder he had responded to an advertisement in which the victims of-
fered to give away a dog.328 Hennis turned himself in as soon as he
heard, on local radio and television stations, that he was being sought in
connection with the crime.32 9 He maintained throughout that he was
innocent and had nothing to do with the murders. 330 The only evidence
against Hennis came from two eyewitnesses-whose testimony the North
Carolina Supreme Court later characterized as "extremely tentative" and
"tenuous." 331 Moreover, pubic hairs and semen samples taken from the
322. See Fricker, Crime and Punishment in Dallas, A.B.A. J., July 1989, at 52, 53; Suro,
Conviction Voided in Texas Murder, N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1989, at A18, col. 6; Applebome, A
Murder in Texas: 12 Years Later, Questions Linger About Justice System, N.Y. Times, Oct. 31,
1988, at A13, col. 4.
323. See Applebome, supra note 321.
324. See UPI Report, Apr. 20, 1989 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file).
325. State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 372 S.E.2d 523 (1988).
326. Minehart, Air Force Slayings, May 16, 1985 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file).
327. See Sergeant Charged in 3 Slayings, Wash. Post, May 17, 1985, at A8, col. 2; Sgt.
Charged in Slaying of 3 in Family, L.A. Times, May 16, 1985, Part I, at A2, col. 5.
328. L.A. Times, May 16, 1985, Part I, at A2, col. 5.
329. Id.
330. See Judge Sentences Hennis to Death, UPI Report, July 9, 1986 (LEXIS, Nexis library,
Omni file). Upon being sentenced, Hennis stated, "[t]he only thing I can say, your Honor, is
that I am not guilty as I have always been." Id.
331. Hennis, 323 N.C. at 281-82, 372 S.E.2d at 525. One witness initially described a man
whom he had allegedly seen in the victims' driveway as "shorter and slighter than himself,"
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scene did not match Hennis'.332 Hennis was nonetheless arrested, in-
dicted, tried, convicted, and sentenced to death.333 In 1988, the North
Carolina Supreme Court reversed his conviction because autopsy photos
had been improperly admitted into evidence.334
Hennis was retried in a different county in 1989. The new jury
found him not guilty on all charges, and he was released.
335
Florida inmate Joseph Richardson was released in May 1989, after
spending twenty-one years in prison. Richardson had been accused of
poisoning his six children, had been sentenced to death in 1968, and had
come within hours of execution. If his death sentence had not been com-
muted to life by Furman v. Georgia,336 he almost certainly would have
been executed over a decade ago. In view of evidence developed by vol-
unteer counsel, even the prosecutor agreed in 1989 that Richardson had
been convicted on the basis of testimony which the prosecution had
known to be false and that the prosecutors had withheld evidence which
would have led to an acquittal.337
On July 5, 1989, Jerry Bigelow was released from California's San
Quentin state prison.338 Bigelow had been sentenced to death in 1980.
3 3
1
A retrial was ordered in 1984.340 At the retrial, the jury acquitted him of
the murder charge, concluding that he had been asleep in the car when
another man committed the crime. However, the trial judge refused to
accept the acquittal and forced the jury to continue deliberating until a
but later revised his impression to match that of Hennis, who was taller and heavier. Id. The
other witness, who testified that she had seen a man who looked like Hennis near the bank
where one victim's bank card had been used, apparently after the murder, initially did not
recall seeing anyone at all. It was almost a year later when she finally recalled seeing Hennis,
and she then admitted that she was not certain whether she was identifying him from newspa-
per photographs or from having actually seen him. Id. at 282, 372 S.E.2d at 525.
332. Id. at 281, 372 S.E.2d at 525.
333. Id. at 287, 372 S.E.2d at 528. See also Judge Sentences Hennis to Death, UPI Report,
July 9, 1986 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file).
334. Hennis, 323 N.C. at 286-87, 372 S.E.2d at 527-28.
335. UPI Report, supra note 333.
336. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
337. See Florida Won't Retry Man in Poisoning Case, N.Y. Times, May 6, 1989, at 28, col.
5; After 21 Years, Florida Man is Released in Poisoning Case, N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1989, at
A16, col. 6; Worth, Jailed for Killing His Child, Father Says He Is a Victim, N.Y. Times, Apr.
23, 1989, at A18, col. 5. See generally Curriden, No Honor Among Thieves, A.B.A. J., June
1989, at 52; Malcolm, Tainted Verdicts Resurrect Specter of Executing the Innocent, N.Y.
Times, May 3, 1989, at A18, col. 1.
338. Morain, Inmate Walks Away From Death Row After His Acquittal, L.A. Times, July 6,
1989, Part I, at 3, col. 1 [hereinafter Morain, Inmate Walks Away After Acquittal].
339. Id.
340. Id.
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mistrial was declared.341 On appeal, the acquittal was reinstated, and
Bigelow was set free.342
Further facts about Bigelow's case significantly illuminate the for-
tuities of the capital punishment system. Years before his innocence was
established, Bigelow attempted to drop his appeals so that he could be
executed, rather than live "through the hell that is Death Row. ' 343 He
later attempted to commit suicide. Then, his conviction was overturned
by the California Supreme Court under Chief Justice Rose Bird, on the
ground that the trial judge should not have let Bigelow represent him-
self.34 Bigelow was fortunate enough to be represented thereafter by an
attorney with access to investigators, jury consultants, and psychologists
to work on the case.345 As the trial judge commented, "[t]his is one case
where the ability of a skillful attorney made all the difference in the
world.
346
Another notable recent case is that of Ronald Monroe. Monroe was
sentenced to death in Louisiana in 1980 for the stabbing murder of Le-
nora Collins, his next-door neighbor. No physical evidence linked
Monroe to the crime, and he and his mother testified that he was home
asleep when it occurred.347 The victim's two young children testified
that their neighbor Monroe was the one who fatally attacked their
mother-the only evidence presented against Monroe. Years later,
Monroe's volunteer attorneys from a large New York law firm presented
new evidence which strongly suggests that the victim's former husband,
George Stinson, had committed the crime. This evidence shows that
341. The judge concluded that since the jury did believe a murder had occurred, it would
still be possible for them to conclude that Bigelow was guilty under the felony murder rule.
Morain, Inmate Walks Away After Acquittal, supra note 338; San Francisco Examiner, July 6,
1989, at AI0, col. 4; Morain, Death Row Prisoner May Gain Freedom By Appeal Court's Rul-
ing, L.A. Times, Mar. 21, 1989, Part I, at 3, col. I [hereinafter Morain, Death Row Prisoner
May Gain Freedom].
342. Morain, Inmate Walks Away After Acquittal, supra note 338.
343. Id.
344. Morain, Death Row Prisoner May Gain Freedom, supra note 341. Bigelow's attorney,
Robert Bryan, has suggested that since the current California Supreme Court affirms twice as
many death sentences as it reverses, it is questionable whether Bigelow's original conviction
and death sentence would have been reversed had the current court decided the case. See
Morain, Blind Justice, L.A. Times, July 16, 1989, Part VI, at 1, col. 1 [hereinafter Morain,
Blind Justice].
345. Morain, Blind Justice, supra note 344.
346. Id. Superior Court Judge Harkjoon Paik, who presided over the retrial, also stated
that, "From day one I told both sides that this was not a death penalty case. I told the DA he
was making a serious mistake by going for the death penalty.... When an attorney tries to
overreach, sometimes it backfires." Id.
347. Applebome, Death Cases: The Law is Reluctant to Start Over, N.Y. Times, Aug. 28,
1988, § 4, at 6, col. 4.
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Stinson was subsequently convicted of the stabbing murder of his next
common-law wife in Michigan in 1980, and that he had attempted to
stab his first wife, as well.348 Moreover, Stinson has recently been impli-
cated in yet another knife attack.349 Furthermore, new evidence has ena-
bled Monroe's attorneys to contend that Stinson had been sexually
abusing the victim's daughter-one of the prosecution's two key wit-
nesses-in the years preceding the murder.3 ° After eight years on death
row, Monroe was only three days away from execution when he was
given a temporary stay in December 1988.351 In August 1989, after na-
tional attention became focused on the case, and after the state Pardon
Board recommended commutation,352 Louisiana Governor Buddy Roe-
mer commuted Monroe's sentence to life without parole.35 3 Governor
Roemer stated, "[iln an execution in this country, the test ought not to be
reasonable doubt. The test ought to be is there any doubt., 354  In
Monroe's case, he said, "the test for execution was not met."
355
It is crucial to recognize that the eventual releases of so many
wrongfully-convicted individuals who had been sentenced to death does
not indicate that the capital punishment system is working. These de-
fendants were still alive when their innocence was fortuitously estab-
lished for reasons other than the system's recognition of their possible
innocence.356 These reasons have sometimes included long delays result-
ing from appeals and collateral proceedings-the very sorts of delays
which have been denounced by, among others, Chief Justice William
Rehnquist.
357
348. Id.
349. Applebome, Governor of Louisiana to Spare Inmate's Life, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1989,
at A16, col. 5.
350. Id.
351. See Wicker, The Last Mile, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1988, at 3, col. 2.
352. See, eg., One Last Chance to Save a Life, N.Y. Daily News, Aug. 3, 1989, at 48, col. 1
(editorial calling on Louisiana governor to commute Monroe's sentence); Herbert, Plea for
Life of an Innocent Man, N.Y. Daily News, Aug. 1, 1989, at 4, col. 1.
353. Applebome, supra note 321. See generally Applebome, Death Row Takes On Higher
Profile, N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1989, at AI0, col. 4.
354. Applebome, supra note 321.
355. Id.
356. For example, Drake was granted a retrial due to an unconstitutional jury charge,
Kaplan, supra note 318, at 37; Randall Adams was alive due to a Supreme Court ruling that
the Texas death penalty statute was unconstitutional, Applebome, supra note 321; and Rich-
ardson was only alive because of Furman v. Georgia, Malcolm, supra note 337.
357. Address by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, in Denver (Feb. 6, 1989).
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B. Numerous Innocent People Have Been and Still
Are Convicted in New York
Perhaps the most well-known case of wrongful conviction in New
York history is Isadore Zimmerman's. On the morning of January 26,
1939, Zimmerman bid a last farewell to his father and two brothers. The
barber shaved Zimmerman's head and a tailor slit his trouser leg on the
right side, where the electrodes would be attached. The execution was
scheduled for 3:00 p.m. Had New York Governor Herbert Lehman not
intervened at 1:00 p.m. and commuted the sentence to life imprisonment,
Zimmerman would have been electrocuted for supplying the gun used to
kill a police detective.35 8 Thereafter, he protested his innocence to all
who would listen, but further appeals failed and he languished in prison.
In 1961, a volunteer lawyer agreed to reinvestigate the case. The
investigation revealed that the trial prosecutor knew Zimmerman was
innocent but had suppressed evidence and pressured witnesses to lie. In
1962, after Zimmerman had served twenty-four years in prison, his con-
viction was vacated and he was released. For the two ensuing decades,
the state rebuffed his efforts to obtain financial compensation. In 1983,
the New York Court of Claims finally awarded Zimmerman $1 million
in damages, four months before he died.359
Zimmerman's disturbing story is by no means unique in New York
history. Like most states, New York has repeatedly incarcerated inno-
cent people for violent crimes only to discover, often much later, that the
wrong person had been tried and convicted.36° Such errors have contin-
358. Zimmerman's conviction and death sentence were affirmed by the New York Court of
Appeals despite the court's acknowledgment that he had not been at the scene of the crime.
See People v. Guariglia, 279 N.Y. 707, 18 N.E.2d 324 (1938). See also supra notes 279-89 and
accompanying text.
359. After 24 Years in Jail, a $1 Million Verdict, NEWSWEEK, June 13, 1983, at 82; McFad-
den, Isadore Zimmerman, 66, Man Unjustly Jailed for Murder, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1983, § 2,
at 6, col. 3; Man, 42, Is Freed After 24 Years, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1962, at 19, col. 1.
360. The two following examples illustrate what has occurred in many New York murder
cases. In 1958, after 11 years in prison and 14 additional years on parole, William Fisher
obtained reversal of his manslaughter conviction on the grounds that the prosecutor knew that
the gun introduced as the murder weapon had not been fired by Fisher, and that the state had
knowingly withheld additional evidence which clearly would have established Fisher's inno-
cence. People v. Fisher, 4 N.Y.2d 943, 151 N.E.2d 617, 175 N.Y.S.2d 820 (1958) (per curiam).
In 1986, the New York Court of Claims awarded Fisher $750,000 for his wrongful conviction
and imprisonment. See Newsday, Feb. 18, 1986, § II, at 3, col. 1; Smothers, Former Convict
Fighting to Right 50-Year Wrong, N.Y. Times, July 3, 1983, at 18, col. 1.
William Pfeffer was convicted in New York of second-degree murder in 1954 and sen-
tenced to 20 years to life in prison. Another man, Roche, later confessed to the crime. A new
trial was ordered for Pfeffer, but the state declined to pursue the charges against him, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 10, 1956, at 63, col. 1. A leading New York newspaper observed at the time that
"the Pfeffer-Roche case dramatically illustrated to New York the built-in danger of its capital
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ued to occur in New York criminal trials in the 1970s and 1980s.
For example, in 1971, Edmond D. Jackson was convicted of two
counts of murder and sentenced to two terms of twenty years-to-life.
The conviction was affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals.361
Seven years later, a federal judge found that what supposedly was eyewit-
ness testimony was unreliable and that "not a scintilla of evidence was
offered at the trial to connect petitioner to the crime. ' 362 The judge said
he "shudder[ed] to think what the situation would have been in this case
if there had been a mandatory death penalty.
'363
In 1981, Robert McLaughlin was convicted of a 1980 Brooklyn fel-
ony murder and sentenced to fifteen years to life.36 4 After serving six
years of this sentence, McLaughlin was released in 1986, when the prose-
cution admitted that his conviction was erroneous. Upon being released,
McLaughlin pointedly observed, "[i]f New York had a death penalty
law, I would now be ashes in an urn on my mom's mantle., 365 Mc-
Laughlin's father, who used to support the death penalty, now lobbies
against it. "People believe errors will be found and corrected," he says.
"The truth of the matter is they don't know. They are just as naive as we
were."
366
In 1982, Nathaniel Carter was convicted of murder in New York
and sentenced to twenty-five years to life in prison, the maximum sen-
tence. Convinced of his innocence, Carter's friends pursued an investiga-
tion that resulted in the state's reopening the case. Carter was freed in
1984, after his former wife, who had been the chief witness against him,
admitted that her testimony had been perjured. One of Carter's lawyers
commented that "[i]f New York State had the death penalty, God knows
what would have happened to this poor man. 
' 367
Gregory Reed served five and one-half years of a fifteen-years-to-life
prison term for the 1978 death of a Brooklyn man. In 1985, New York's
punishment law: the ever-present possibility of executing an innocent man." N.Y. Herald
Tribune, July 20, 1954, at 1, col. 3.
361. People v. Jackson, 35 N.Y.2d 856, 322 N.E.2d 272, 363 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1974).
362. Jackson v. Fogg, 465 F. Supp. 177, 187 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 589 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1978).
363. Lubasch, 1970 Murder Conviction Voided; Judges Criticize Queens Officials, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 23, 1978, at 1, col. 2.
364. State v. McLaughlin, 104 A.D.2d 829, 480 N.Y.S.2d 151 (App. Div. 1984) (affirming
the conviction and sentence).
365. Newfield, They Prefer Revenge Over Prevention, N.Y. Daily News, June 19, 1989, at
12, col. 1. Sweet Land of Liberty: Bobby McLaughlin Comes Home, Village Voice, July 15,
1986, at 13, col. 1; N.Y. Times, July 20, 1986, at 24, col. 1; id., July 4, 1986, at B10, col. 4.
366. See Giordano, Showdown on the Chair, Newsday, June 19, 1989, at 7, col. 1.
367. N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1984, at B9, col. 1; id., Mar. 26, 1984, at B2, col. 4; id., Mar. 16,
1984, at Bl, col. 1; id., Mar. 15, 1984, at BI, col. 1; id., Jan. 26, 1984, at B5, col. 1.
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highest court overturned the conviction, ruling that the testimony of the
state's sole witness against Reed as to the time, location and circum-
stances of the event was riddled with hopeless contradictions. Reed was
later awarded $495,000 in damages for his unjust conviction and
imprisonment.368
It is difficult to say how many of these wrongfully convicted men-
from what is by no means an exhaustive list-would have received the
death penalty, but it is likely that some of them would have. Their cases
dramatically illustrate that New York's criminal justice system remains
fallible enough to execute innocent people if New York reinstates the
death penalty.369
C. Innocent People Are Still Being Executed
Not all those who were wrongly convicted and sentenced to death
have been lucky enough to have been kept alive by the fortuities which
saved those discussed in the above sections. We will never know who
most of them are, because cases are rarely reinvestigated once prisoners
have been executed. Nevertheless, there are many specific instances in
which people executed in the United States are now widely believed to
have been entirely innocent. Joe Hill,37 ° Richard Hauptmann, 371 Sacco
368. N.Y.L.J., Nov. 7, 1988, at 1, col. 5. In the neighboring state of New Jersey, J. James
Landano was released in July 1989 after serving 13 years for a murder he did not commit. The
federal judge who ordered his release noted that prosecutors had systematically withheld evi-
dence that would have proven him not guilty. Had the current death penalty in New Jersey
been in effect when the crime for which Landano was wrongly convicted took place, he would
have been executed after the Supreme Court refused to review his case. "That would have
been before we learned of the new evidence," he said, "and I would have been long gone."
Sullivan, Behind the Overturning of a '76 Murder Verdict, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1989, at DI,
col. 2.
369. A recent case which never went to trial should also be noted. William Gergel, who
was indicted in 1987 for a Queens robbery and triple homicide, was recently released after
spending 17 months in jail awaiting trial. Suspicion had focused on Gergel because a police
computer said he resembled the suspect. Police and prosecutors eventually conceded that they
had arrested the wrong man. One police official explained that "[w]hen a detective works on a
case and develops information and comes up with the fellow he believes is the perpetrator, it's
difficult to turn himself off." See Fried, Man Freed in Queens Triple Slaying, N.Y. Times, Feb.
8, 1989, at B3, col. 1; see also Longtime Criminal Guilty of 3 Murders, N.Y. Times, June 8,
1989, at B4, col. 6; Fried, 'Right'Man on Trial in Three Murders, Prosecutor Tells Jury, N.Y.
Times, May 23, 1989, at B3, col. 1 (correct defendant now on trial).
370. Joseph Hillstrom (real name), the union bard, was executed in 1915 in Utah, despite
appeals from President Wilson and countless others. His conviction and death have been called
"one of the worst travesties of justice in American labor history." FONER, THE CASE OF JOE
HILL 66-96 (1965).
371. Hauptmann was executed in New Jersey in 1936 for the infamous kidnapping of the
Lindbergh baby. "Hauptmann's is a classic case of a conviction based on an intricate web of
circumstantial evidence, perjury, prosecutorial suppression of evidence, a grossly incompetent
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and Vanzetti372 and Ethel Rosenberg373 are perhaps the most famous ex-
amples of those whose guilt has been seriously questioned. There are
numerous others who, although probably wrongly convicted and exe-
cuted, have not become household names. Roosevelt Collins,374 Willie
McGee,375 Sie Dawson,376 and Maurice Mays377 were all executed de-
spite doubts as to their guilt and are now widely believed to have been
defense attorney, and a trial in an atmosphere of near hysteria." Bedau & Radelet, supra note
290, at 124; see also L. KENNEDY, THE AIRMAN AND THE CARPENTER: THE LINDBERGH
KIDNAPPING AND THE FRAMING OF RICHARD HAUPTMANN (1985); A. SCADUTO, SCAPE-
GOAT: THE LONESOME DEATH OF RICHARD BRUNO HAUPTMANN (1976); Seidman, The
Trial and Execution of Bruno Richard Hauptmann: Still Another Case That 'Will Not Die' 66
GEO. L.J. 1 (1977).
372. Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti were executed in Massachusetts in 1927. Vic-
tims of the "Red Scare" of the early 1920s, the two were referred to as "anarchist bastards" by
the judge who tried the case. Although another man confessed to the crime in 1925, motions
for retrial were denied. See generally W. YOUNG & D. KAISER, POSTMORTEM: NEW EVI-
DENCE IN THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETTI (1985). In 1977, in a proclamation designed
to clear the names of Sacco and Vanzetti, Massachusetts Governor Michael S. Dukakis stated
that their "trial and execution ... should serve to remind all civilized people of the constant
need to guard against our susceptibility to prejudice, our intolerance of unorthodox ideas, and
our failure to defend the rights of persons who are looked upon as strangers in our midst."
Proclamation of the Governor of Massachusetts (July 19, 1977), reprinted in EXECUTIVE
DEP'T OF MASS., REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR IN THE MATTER OF SACCO AND VANZETTI
(1977).
373. Even some who have concluded that Julius Rosenberg was guilty have expressed seri-
ous doubt regarding the guilt of his wife, Ethel Rosenberg. See R. RADOSH & J. MILTON, THE
ROSENBERG FILE: A SEARCH FOR THE TRUTH (1983). Others maintain that both were
wrongly convicted. See, e.g., W. SCHNEIR & M. SCHNEIR, INVITATION TO AN INQUEST 168,
238, 246 (2d ed. 1983); N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1985, at 13, col. 1.
374. Collins, a black man executed in Alabama for the rape of a white woman, was known
to have been innocent even by the jurors and the judge who sentenced him. Hum, THE
DEATH PENALTY 91 (1964). Although it was believed that the sexual conduct was consen-
sual, jurors commented that Collins deserved to die simply for "messin' around" with a white
woman. Id.
375. McGee was executed in Mississippi in 1951, after three trials, for the rape of a white
woman. The principal evidence against him was" a "confession" coerced after 32 days of his
being held incommunicado. Evidence later revealed that the "victim" had been consorting
with McGee for four years and charged rape only because he attempted to end the relation-
ship. S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN, AND RAPE 239-45 (1975); W.
PATTERSON, THE MAN WHO CRIED GENOCIDE 157 (1971); C. ROWAN, SOUTH OF FREEDOM
174-92 (1952).
376. Dawson, who was retarded, was executed for murder in Florida in 1964. The only
evidence against him was a confession obtained after a week of incommunicado police interro-
gation. According to Dawson, the police threatened to give him to the "mob" outside if he did
not confess. Tallahassee Democrat, May 20, 1979, at IA, col. 1; St. Petersberg Times, Sept.
20, 1977, at IA, col. 1.
377. Mays was executed for murder in Tennessee in 1919. In 1926, the true killer confessed
to the crime. Egerton, A Case of Prejudice: Maurice Mays and the Knoxville Race Riot of
1919, S. EXPOSURE, July 1983, at 56.
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innocent.378 According to a recent law review article, there may have
been at least twenty-three wrongful executions in the United States in
this century, with New York leading the list with eight, more than any
other state.379
Such miscarriages of justice can, and do, still occur today. Indeed,
there have been executions in very recent years of people whom many
believe to have been innocent. One case that has received international
attention is the Mississippi execution of Edward Earl Johnson. 380 John-
son, who had no prior criminal record, was convicted on the basis of
testimony by a witness who initially said that Johnson was not the at-
tacker but who later changed her story after Johnson signed a confession.
Johnson alleged that the confession was coerced and that he signed it
only out of fear of violence against his grandparents, who had tried to
protect him. Eighteen years old when the crime occurred in 1979, John-
son was executed in Mississippi's gas chamber in May 1987.381
In 1984, James Adams was executed in Florida despite evidence,
raised in the last four weeks before his execution, that he was not the
assailant. A hair sample found in the victim's hand was shown not to be
Adams'. Moreover, a witness who had identified Adams as fleeing the
crime scene was found to have had a grudge against Adams for being
involved with the witness' wife. Another witness positively stated that
Adams was not the person seen fleeing the crime. Nevertheless, Florida
Governor Bob Graham-who now as a United States Senator complains
about delays in carrying out executions-refused to grant even a short
stay to permit an evaluation of this evidence.
3 82
In another Florida case, Willie Jasper Darden was executed on
March 15, 1988, even though substantial evidence supported his claim of
innocence, and despite appeals for clemency from such diverse sources as
378. This catalogue does not include the numerous "unofficial" executions by lynch mobs,
such as the notorious lynching of Leo Frank in Georgia. Frank, who had been sentenced to
death, was taken from jail and lynched in an atmosphere of violent anti-semitism, after the
governor bravely commuted his sentence to life. Frank was fully pardoned by the Georgia
Board of Pardons and Paroles in 1986. Georgia Pardons Victim 70 Years After Lynching, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 12, 1986, at A16, col. 1.
379. See Bedau & Radelet, supra note 290, at 73.
380. Johnson's story was the subject of a British Broadcasting Company special, later
shown in edited form on Home Box Office, entitled "Fourteen Days in May." Haunting
Chronicle of a Death Foretold, N.Y. Times, May 22, 1988, at 29, col. I. His attorney, Clive
Stafford Smith of the Southern Prisoners Defense Committee in Atlanta, Georgia, is continu-
ing his efforts to prove that Johnson was innocent.
381. See Wicker, Death and Disparity, N.Y. Times, May 16, 1987, at 31, col. 6; Black is
Executed in Mississippi for Murder of White Lawman, Reuters, May 20, 1987.
382. See Bedau & Radelet, supra note 290, at 91.
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Pope John Paul II, Nobel laureate Andrei Sakharov, presidential candi-
date Jesse Jackson, Amnesty International, and 10,000 Dutch petition
signers. Darden was first identified not in a line-up but rather in court,
where he was the only black man in the room. No physical evidence was
ever established to link Darden to the crime. Moreover, two independent
witnesses came forward to say that Darden had been far from the crime
scene on the night in question. One of the two court-appointed attorneys
who represented Darden at trial, neither of whom had ever tried a capital
case before, later commented that the trial was "one of the worst cases I
have ever been associated with." '38 3 Supreme Court Justice Harry Black-
mun, dissenting from the Court's five-to-four decision denying relief to
Darden despite its unanimous agreement that there had been
prosecutorial misconduct, stated that the "level of fairness and reliability
[was] so low it should make conscientious prosecutors cringe. "384
There are people currently on death row who may yet be executed
despite their innocence. Clarence Brandley, a black man, was convicted
and sentenced to death in Texas in 1980 for the rape and murder of a
sixteen-year-old white girl. Brandley had been the only black of five jani-
tors at the high school where the crime took place. The other four jani-
tors provided alibis for each other, and Brandley was convicted largely
because he had no way to verify his whereabouts at the time of the crime.
Attorneys for Brandley have presented new evidence, including video-
taped statements by two of the janitors conceding that another white
janitor, not Brandley, committed the crime. Moreover, semen samples
taken from the victim's body, along with pubic hair and a body hair
found in her pubic area, all of which were clearly not from a black man,
were "lost" and their existence was not disclosed to the jury.385 In 1987,
a Texas judge recommended that Brandley be given a new trial, stating:
"The authorities wholly ignored any evidence or leads to evidence which
might prove inconsistent with their premature conclusion that Brandley
had committed the crime .... The conclusion is inescapable that the
383. See Lefevere, Major Justice Questions Lurk in Some Executions, NAT'L CATHOLIC
REP., July 1, 1988, at 7-8.
384. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 189 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). As the
majority had noted, the prosecutor's closing arguments in the case had been highly improper.
Id. at 178-83. The dissent referred to the argument as "a calculated and sustained attempt to
inflame the jury," and contended that the evidence against Darden was "sufficiently problem-
atic" as to make it unclear that a jury which had not been subject to such inflammatory argu-
ments would have convicted him. Id. at 197-200.
385. See Applebome, The Truth Is Also on Trial In a Texas Death Row Case, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 4, 1987, at 26, col. 1; Applebome, 7 Years Later, Hope for Texas Death Row Inmate, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 22, 1987, at 26, col. 1; 60 Minutes: Clarence Brandley Is On Death Row (CBS
television broadcast, Apr. 4, 1987) (transcript on file at Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
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investigation was conducted not to solve the crime, but to convict Bran-
dley. ' 386 Despite the judge's recommendation, however, the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals has not responded to Brandley's case, and he
remains on death row.387
There are undoubtedly other innocent people among the approxi-
mately 2,200 people on death rows across the nation today. When one
considers the recent cases finding people innocent, and how their inno-
cence was established-for example, only because a witness happened to
come forward, some volunteer reinvestigated the facts, or the defendant
was granted a retrial on some other ground and his lawyer then managed
to establish his innocence at retrial-one must conclude that there are
other innocent people on death row. Unfortunately, some innocent peo-
ple on death row will be executed before their innocence is discovered, if
it is ever discovered.
That any active capital punishment system in this country will
sometimes execute the innocent is not seriously disputed. Even ardent
capital punishment advocate Ernest van den Haag concedes this. But
Professor van den Haag argues that these errors are comparable to
"wrongful deaths" that occur in "building houses, driving a car, playing
golf or football," and that what he believes to be the "net gain" of the
death penalty generally is worth the price of such errors.388 Van den
Haag's notion that we must accept the execution of innocent persons is,
however, contrary to the principles of fundamental fairness and due pro-
cess at the core of our constitutional system of government. Moreover,
van den Haag's notion is based on the false premise that the death pen-
alty achieves benefits for society.38 9
The inevitability of executing the innocent is one of the leading rea-
sons why the death penalty must be abolished where it now exists. And
it is a major reason why New York must not reinstitute capital
punishment.
VII. THE DEATH PENALTY IS NOT A DETERRENT
A. The Death Penalty Is Not a General Deterrent
Proponents of the death penalty-including prosecutors arguing to
386. UPI Report, Jan. 18, 1989 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file).
387. UPI Report, June 29, 1989 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file).
388. 25 Wrongfully Executed in US., Study Finds, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1985, at 13, col. 1;
see also van den Haag, The Ultimate Punishment: A Defense, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1662, 1664
(1986) ("I do not doubt that, over a long enough period, miscarriages of justice will occur even
in capital cases.").
389. See infra text accompanying notes 390-478.
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capital sentencing juries-often claim that capital punishment is justified
by its supposed deterrent effect.390 But while various studies have been
conducted to examine the assertion that the death penalty deters, no sub-
stantial study has demonstrated a deterrent effect.391
Indeed, many death penalty supporters who have seen the death
penalty in action concede that it is not deterring murder. For example,
Texas Attorney General Jim Mattox, the chief law enforcement officer of
the state with the most executions since Gregg v. Georgia, has acknowl-
edged that the death penalty is probably not having a deterrent effect in
Texas precisely because it is so often carried out.392 Mattox says he has
390. See, e-g., VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS 209-12 (1975).
391. See, e.g., THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 93-185 (H. Bedau ed. 1981). A United
Nations study has also concluded that the death penalty has no demonstrable deterrent effect.
See SIXTH UNITED NATIONS CONGRESS ON THE PREVENTION OF CRIME AND THE TREAT-
MENT OF OFFENDERS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: WORKING PAPER PREPARED BY THE SECRE-
TARIAT 87-9, 65 (1980); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184-85 (1976) ("Statistical
attempts to evaluate the worth of the death penalty as a deterrent to crimes... simply have
been inconclusive."). A study published in. 1975 purported to show that the death penalty did
deter crime. See Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and
Death, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 397 (1975). That study, which shocked the criminological com-
munity because its conclusions were so at odds with those of all other such studies, has been
extensively criticized for methodological error and poor use of data. See, e.g., Gibbs, Preven-
tive Effects of Capital Punishment Other Than Deterrence, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN
AMERICA, supra, at 103; Klein, Forst & Filatov, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment:
An Assessment of the Evidence, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, supra, at 138; Zeisel,
The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty: Facts v. Faith, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN
AMERICA, supra, at 116; see also Fox & Radelet, Persistent Flaws in Econometric Studies of the
Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty, 23 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 29, 29 n.3 (1989) (studies cited). A
more recent study also purported to show that the death penalty has a deterrent effect on
crime. See Layson, Homicide and Deterrence: A Reexamination of the United States Time-
Series Evidence, 52 S. ECON. J. 68 (1985). This study has also come under sharp criticism for
using unreliable data and a flawed methodology. See generally Fox & Radelet, supra, at 29; see
also Capital Punishment: Hearings on H.R. 2837 and H.R. 343 Before the Subcomm. on Crim-
inal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 323-47 (1985) (testi-
mony and prepared statement of Alan Fox) [hereinafter House Hearings]. It is somewhat
surprising that Layson purported to show any deterrent effect of the death penalty based on his
research. Although his study covered the period from 1934 to 1977, Layson only actually
claimed to have found a deterrent effect during the last fifteen of those years, during eight of
which there were no executions in the United States. As Layson himself conceded during
testimony before the United States House of Representatives, "if I exclude all the data past
1960, I do find that the evidence for the deterrent effect of capital punishment is very weak," or
even "nonexistent." See House Hearings, supra, at 312, 316 (testimony of Stephen Layson).
Layson, who was a student of Ehrlich at the University of Chicago, see id. at 313-14, admitted
that his study was "not conclusive," and that many more studies would be needed before one
could argue that the death penalty has a deterrent effect. Id. at 313.
392. See Top Official and Death Row Fear Texas is Shrugging Off Executions, N.Y. Times,
July 2, 1987, at A21, col. 1. However, another death penalty supporter, Vicki Marani of the
Washington Legal Foundation, gives a diametrically opposite excuse for why the death penalty
does not deter, saying, "It's not a deterrent because it is so infrequently used." Malcolm,
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interviewed nearly every person executed in Texas and that the possibil-
ity of being sentenced to death never even crossed their minds.39 3 He
advocates televising executions to cause deterrence.394
Nevertheless, other death penalty supporters still claim that it is a
deterrent. An example is the Senate sponsor of the New York bill, Sena-
tor Dale Volker. His "evidence" for deterrence is the rise in the number
of murders in the years since capital punishment ceased in New York.395
That, however, was merely part of a general increase in murder across
the nation, including the states that maintained the death penalty.396
Furthermore, a comparison of states with similar social and economic
conditions shows that those without the death penalty often have lower
homicide rates than nearby states that have the death penalty. For ex-
ample, Virginia and Washington, each of which has a death penalty,
have higher homicide rates than their respective neighboring states of
West Virginia and Oregon, that do not have the death penalty. 97
Some death penalty advocates claim, in contradistinction to Texas
Attorney General Mattox, that deterrence depends on the death penalty
being carried out regularly.39 8 This claim is contradicted by a great
many facts. For example, Texas, the state with the most executions in
American history and with the most active current death penalty, also
has one of the highest murder rates.399 The Texas murder rate-which
hovers around 13-14 murders per 100,000 people per year 4 ---is consid-
erably higher than that of New York State, which is approximately 9-10
per 100,000.411 In fact, in 1985, all the most active death penalty
states-including Florida (11.4), Georgia (10.4), Alabama (9.8), and
Louisiana (10.9), as well as Texas (13.0)-had higher murder rates than
Tainted Verdicts Resurrect Specter of Executing the Innocent, N.Y. Times, May 3, 1989, at
A18, col. 1.
393. Magagnini, Death's Door is Opening, Sacramento Bee, Mar. 27, 1988, at Al, col. 1.
394. N.Y. Times, July 2, 1987, at A21, col. 1.
395. Letter from New York State Senator Dale Volker to New York State Senator Manfred
Ohrenstein (Mar. 30, 1989) (letter sent to all members of New York State Senate).
396. See Forst, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Cross-State Analysis of the
1960s, 61 MINN. L. REv. 743 (1977).
397. 1985 FBI UNIFORM CRIME REP. 52, 59-62, Table 5 (released July 1, 1986) [hereinafter
CRIME REPORTS 1985].
398. See Malcolm, supra note 392 (quoting Vicki Marani of the Washington Legal
Foundation).
399. See CRIME REPORTS 1985, supra note 397, at 52-62, Table 5.
400. See id. at 59; 1986 FBI UNIFORM CRIME REP. 52, 61, Table 5 [hereinafter CRIME
REPORTS 1986].
401. See CRIME REPORTS 1986, supra note 400, at 58, Table 5; CRIME REPORTS 1985,
supra note 397, at 58, Table 5.
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New York (9.5).402
Those states' high murder rates persist, and even grow, despite their
high number of executions. From 1984 to 1985, the number of execu-
tions in Texas increased by 100%; from 1985 to 1986, it nearly doubled
again."° Yet during this same period, the murder rate in Texas contin-
ued to rise. There were 126 more murders in Texas in 1986 than in
1985.' Similar increases occurred during this period in Florida, Geor-
gia, Louisiana and Alabama.40 5 Indeed, several independent studies have
shown that the number of homicides may actually increase during the
period immediately after an execution.40 6 One such study40 7 analyzed
monthly homicide rates in New York State from 1907 to 1963, a period
during which New York carried out more executions than any other
state in the nation.40 8 That study found that there had been, on the aver-
age, two additional homicides in the month after an execution. 40 9
Thus, far from having the net effect of deterring crime, use of the
death penalty actually may have a "brutalizing effect.", 41 ° That may ex-
plain such cases as the Florida murder of Ullyses Block in March 1988.
On March 15, 1988, at 7:00 a.m., the State of Florida executed Willie
Jasper Darden. 41' Ken Brooks, a Florida prison guard, spent the day
guarding prisoners who talked of virtually nothing but the execution.
That afternoon, Brooks left work, and at 5:30 p.m. he murdered his ex-
wife's suspected lover.412 That same evening, Brooks was booked for
402. CRIME REPORTS 1985, supra note 397, at 52-62, Table 5.
403. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CAPITAL PUNISH-
MENT 1984, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1985, & CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1986.
404. Compare CRIME REPORTS 1985, supra note 397, at 61, Table 5 with CRIME REPORTS
1986, supra note 400, at 61, Table 5.
405. Compare CRIME REPORTS 1985, supra note 397 at 53-61, Table 5 with CRIME RE-
PORTS 1986, supra note 400, at 53-61, Table 5.
406. See, e.g., T. SELLIN, THE DEATH PENALTY 23 (1959) (study conducted for the Model
Penal Code Project of the American Law Institute); Bailey, Disaggregation in Deterrence and
Death Penalty Research: The Case of Murder in Chicago, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 827
(1983); Bowers & Pierce, Deterrence or Brutalization: What is the Effect of Executions?, 26
CRIME AND DELINQ. 453 (1980).
407. Bowers & Pierce, supra note 406.
408. NEW YORK STATE COALITION FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE REPORT 6 (1987).
409. Bowers & Pierce, supra note 406, at 453-84.
410. As State Supreme Court Justice, former Bronx District Attorney Burton Roberts said
of the death penalty: "It's wrong. It's a cosmetic approach to the problem and doesn't deter
the commission of homicides. In fact, it exacerbates it. Stupid kids may try to emulate some-
one who was lionized on Death Row." Lazar, The Death Penalty Divides N. Y Prosecutors,
N.Y. Observer, Mar. 6, 1989, at 1, col. 4.
411. Breslin, Plenty of Smoke on Electric Chair, N.Y. Daily News, Mar. 17, 1988, at 4.
Darden is believed by many to have been innocent. See supra notes 383-84 and accompanying
text.
412. Breslin, supra note 411.
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first-degree murder, a potentially capital offense.4 13
Proponents of the death penalty, including Senator Volker, also
make the more specific claim that the death penalty would deter the kill-
ing of police officers.414 This claim is also contrary to fact, since the
death penalty actually does not deter police killings. A 1955 study
showed that police homicides were higher in states that had the death
penalty than in states that did not.4"' Another study, conducted in 1980,
produced similar results.416 A recent review of FBI statistics reveals that
police officers still face a greater risk in states with the death penalty.
For the ten-year period from 1976 to 1986, the murder rate for police
officers was highest in the states that had executed people during that
period, was next highest in the states with a death penalty but no execu-
tions, and was lowest in the states without a death penalty.417
Specifically, the twelve states that executed people during that ten-
year period had 340 law-enforcement officers killed, for an officer-killed
rate of 4.9 per million population, and had a murder rate of 106 per
million population.418 The twenty-five states with a death penalty but no
executions had 374 officers killed, for an officer-killed rate of 3.2 per mil-
lion population, and had a murder rate of 66 per million population.419
The thirteen states without a death penalty had 143 officers killed, for an
officer-killed rate of 2.7 per million population, and had a murder rate of
53 per million.42
In view of these facts, it is not surprising that even the well known
academic advocate of the death penalty, Ernest van den Haag, has con-
ceded that deterrence has not been shown.42 Yet politicians and prose-
413. Id.
414. See Volker, supra note 395.
415. Sellin, The Death Penalty and Police Safety, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of
the Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Capital and Corporal Punish-
ment, 20 OTTAWA QUEENS PRINTER 718-28 (1955).
416, Sellin, The Penalty of Death, 102 SAGE LIBR. OF Soc. RES. 171-72 (1980).
417. NEW YORK STATE COALITION FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, ALBANY, N.Y., REPORT
(1987) (summarizing FBI statistics).
418. Id. at 6, 11.
419. Id. at 6.
420. Id. See also NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, ANNUAL REPORT: OF-
FICERS KILLED IN THE LINE OF DUTY (1988). During 1988, five officers were killed in New
York, nine in California, eight in Florida and eleven in Texas. California, Florida and Texas
have the death penalty, and Florida and Texas led the nation in executions. NEw YORK
STATE COALITION FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE REPORT 10 (1987).
421. Van den Haag, supra note 390, at 134-35. Professor van den Haag candidly admits
that "deterrence is no panacea," although he does continue to make an argument for specific
deterrence, or incapacitation. Id. at 208-10.
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cutors seeking the death penalty continue to rely on discredited notions
of deterrence.
B. The Death Penalty Is Not Relevant to Arguments
for Specific Deterrence
Many death penalty supporters who now concede that the death
penalty does not generally deter murders proceed to contend that it
would nevertheless prevent murders committed by criminals who have
been paroled a few years before. However, in reality, the death penalty
would not, and does not, prevent such murders.
In making the specific deterrence, or incapacitation argument, death
penalty proponents regularly advert to situations in which individuals
have committed violent crimes within a few years after being released on
parole, or in which notorious murderers or other violent criminals have
been considered for, or even given parole within a similarly brief period.
The death penalty is needed, these proponents say, in order to prevent
such people from committing new murders.
This argument is completely erroneous, because it rests on inaccu-
rate presumptions regarding both the examples cited and the available
sentencing alternatives. When these false presumptions are corrected,
the "house of cards" supporting the specific deterrence/incapacitation
argument collapses.
The first error in the specific deterrence/incapacitation argument is
the assertion that a death penalty statute would prevent murders com-
mitted by people paroled within a few years after their convictions. Con-
trary to this assertion, the well-publicized cases of parolees who have
committed such murders have generally involved people whose previous
conviction was not for homicide at all4.. or was for a degree of homicide
less than capital murder, and who, for those or other reasons, received
less than the most severe available life Sentence for homicide when origi-
nally convicted.
If the death penalty had been on the books-as it often was in such
cases-it would have had no effect on what happened, for two reasons.
422. It is also important to note that over 90% of those on death row had never been
convicted of any homicide other than the one resulting in their death sentence. Justice Depart-
ment statistics show that of the 1,862 people on death row at the end of 1988 for whom
relevant information was available (there were 262 inmates for whom such information was
not available), 1,688 had no prior homicide conviction. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 1988, Table 7
(July 1989). Since 91% of death row inmates (for whom there was data) had never before been
convicted of any degree of homicide, the death penalty could not possibly, and did not, inca-
pacitate them from committing the homicide for which they were sentenced to death.
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First, such people could not have received the death sentence for their
prior convictions for crimes other than homicide, or for homicide convic-
tions that were not of the most severe degree, because the death sentence
cannot constitutionally be imposed for violent crimes other than the most
severe degree of homicide.423 Second, even those whose prior conviction
was for the most severe degree of homicide would generally not have
been eligible for parole in so few years if they had received the most
severe available sentence for that degree of homicide. Since the parolees
in these well-publicized cases had either not been found guilty of the
most severe degree of homicide or had not received the most severe avail-
able sentence for that crime, they surely would not have gotten the death
sentence if-as was often the case-such a sentence existed in their
states.
A few examples of well-publicized cases illustrate the fallacies of the
incapacitation argument. One case which caused considerable public re-
action was the case of Mauricio Silva. Silva was convicted in California
in 1984 for three murders, all committed, as the media observed, within a
week of his release from prison on parole.424 However, the conviction
from which Silva was paroled was a manslaughter conviction, not a first-
degree murder conviction.425 Because the death penalty is not available
for manslaughter, the death penalty was entirely irrelevant to preventing
the 1984 murders.
One of the most notorious recent cases in which the granting of pa-
role has outraged a community is that of Lawrence Singleton. Singleton
was convicted of rape and attempted murder in California in 1979,426 in
a case where the young victim's arms were brutally chopped off.4 27 He
was released on parole in 1987 amidst an angry public outcry.428 Single-
ton had been given a fourteen-year prison sentence, the maximum prison
term available at that time for the crimes of which he was convicted.429
423. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Coker
v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
424. See Pristin, Jury Votes Death for Killer of Three Teen-Agers, L.A. Times, May 29,
1986, Part 11, at 1, col. 1.
425. L.A. Times, Aug. 12, 1986, Part I, at 2, col. 4; McGraw, Parolee Booked in Murder of
Girl, 17, L.A. Times, May 30, 1984, Part II, at 1, col. 1.
426. Bishop, Sentencing Roulette, CAL. LAW., Dec. 1987, at 40; Crabbe, Lawrence Single-
ton: The Neighbor Nobody Wants, UPI, Apr. 24, 1987; Morain & Stein, Singleton: He's A
Symbol of the Public's Fear, L.A. Times, May 31, 1987, Part I, at 3, col. 1.
427. Morain, Florida Balks at Singleton's Parole in State, L.A. Times, Apr. 28, 1987, Part
I, at 17, col. 3.
428. Id.
429. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 264 (rape) (as amended 1978) (maximum sentence eight
years) (West 1988 & Supp. 1989), 204 (mayhem) (as amended 1978) (maximum sentence six
years) (West 1988).
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The death penalty, although it existed, was not, and could not constitu-
tionally have been, available as a sentencing alternative for those
crimes.43°
Another pertinent example has ironically been provided by Senator
Dale Volker, the Senate sponsor of the proposed New York death pen-
alty legislation. In a letter to his colleagues in which he argues in favor
of the death penalty, Senator Volker cites the case of Clifford Phillips,
stating: "Clifford Phillips murdered his 3 year old son here in New
York. After serving 4 years for this crime, he headed to Texas where he
committed another murder in 1982. "143' This is simply untrue. Clifford
Phillips was convicted in New York, not of murder, but of second-degree
manslaughter, for which he served his time.4 32 Even if there had been a
death penalty statute such as the Volker-Graber bill on the books at the
time of the first crime, it would have made absolutely no difference in the
outcome. Phillips would still have been released when he was because
Volker's bill does not, and constitutionally cannot, provide for capital
punishment for second-degree manslaughter.433 Such arguments, per-
petuating misunderstandings and inaccuracies, are apparently necessary
to maintain support for the proposed legislation.
Numerous other examples are frequently raised in the media. One
famous case is that of Jimmy Lee Smith, whose story was the source of
Joseph Wambaugh's novel, The Onion Field. Smith was convicted of
murdering a Los Angeles policeman the same year he was paroled from
Folsom Prison, where he was serving time on theft and drug convic-
tions434- convictions for which he could not have received the death
penalty.
Another example, often miscited4 35 in support of the death penalty,
is the case of Dan White, who killed San Francisco Mayor George Mos-
cone and Supervisor Harvey Milk in 1978. White (in a state with the
death penalty) was found guilty only of voluntary manslaughter, on the
430. See supra note 423 and accompanying text.
431. Volker, supra note 395.
432. Telephone conversation with Eden Harrington, Phillips' attorney (Apr. 12, 1989).
433. See supra note 423 and accompanying text. Phillips' case is still being litigated in
Texas. Telephone conversation with Eden Harrington, Phillips' attorney (Apr. 12, 1989). His
attorneys say that the final outcome of the case cannot be predicted at this time. Id.
434. See Baker & Quintana, Freedom Defeats 'Onion Field' Killer Again, L.A. Times, June
8, 1989, Part II, at 1, col. 1.
435. The death penalty existed at the time White was convicted, but could not be applied to
his conviction, which was for voluntary manslaughter. California Lt. Governor Leo McCar-
thy, formerly a staunch opponent of the death penalty, became an advocate of it after White
was released on parole. See Ingram, McCarthy Disagrees But Still Backs Bird, L.A. Times,
Oct. 17, 1985, Part I, at 3, col. 2.
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basis of his defense that eating junk food (along with financial and other
pressures) had left him unable to control himself. He was sentenced to
only seven years, the maximum at that time for voluntary manslaughter,
and was paroled after only four years (after which he died without com-
mitting another crime).
If, unlike White's case, the defendant could have been, but was not
sentenced to a term which would have prevented his early release on
parole, the problem lies not with the range of available non-death
sentences, but rather with the failure of the sentencer to sentence the
defendant more severely within that range, or perhaps with the failure of
the state to ensure rehabilitation before release.436 If, on the other hand,
the defendant could not have been sentenced to a term preventing his
early release on parole, the problem lies with either the degree of crime
for which he was charged or found guilty, as in White's case, or per-
haps-in some instances of serious non-homicidal crimes-with inade-
quate maximum available sentences.437
There have also been some instances in which the reason a notorious
convicted murderer was given, or considered for, parole was that the
most severe life sentence permitted parole consideration after a relatively
short time. But those instances, too, are irrelevant to a current debate
over the death penalty, because the laws in question have since been
changed to be like the laws in New York and most other states-which
do not permit parole in such cases in less than twenty, twenty-five, thirty
or forty years, or never.438 For example, a well-known case in Kentucky
was that of Allan Todd Hume, who, after being convicted of two
murders in 1978 and sentenced to life imprisonment, was released on
parole in 1985.13' This was possible because the law in effect at the time
436. A case that has become widely known due to its sensationalistic use in the 1988 presi-
dential campaign is that of Willie Horton. Horton, who was convicted in 1974 of murder and
sentenced to life imprisonment without parole, was released in 1986 under a weekend furlough
program, during which release he raped a Maryland woman and beat her husband. Such life-
term inmates are no longer eligible for furloughs, and never should have been. The problem
raised by the Horton case, a problem unique to Massachusetts, has thus been resolved without
the aid of a death penalty statute. See generally Love, Bush Backers Have Horton Victims
Speak, L.A. Times, Oct. 8, 1988, Part I, at 23, col. 4.
437. This is, however, increasingly unlikely in the present era of stiffening sentencing pos-
sibilities. Lawrence Singleton, for example, could be sentenced to life imprisonment today,
whereas when he was convicted the maximum sentence (which he was given) was fourteen
years. See Morain & Stein, supra note 426.
438. See infra notes 469-71 and accompanying text.
439. Parole Granted in Madison Murders Criticized, Louisville Courier-J., Nov. 15, 1985, at
B2, col. 1; Two Murders, Seven Years: Why Parole System Stinks, Lexington Herald-Leader,
Nov. 15, 1985, at A18, col. 1 (editorial).
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of his conviction allowed for parole after seven years." However, under
current Kentucky law, life sentences without possibility of parole for at
least twenty-five years are now available for capital murder." 1
Proponents of the death penalty also regularly cite a few notorious
cases, such as those of Charles Manson or Sirhan Sirhan, to argue that
the death penalty is needed in order to prevent the worst killers from
being considered for parole." 2 That argument again ignores the fact that
the only reason these cases are ever reviewed by the parole board is that
they were convicted at a time before California enacted its present life-
without-parole sentence for capital murder.443 Because they were con-
victed at this earlier time, they remain subject to the previous law,4' but
nonetheless have not been paroled." 5
Although the argument is sometimes made that the death penalty is
nonetheless needed to protect prison guards, this argument also fails to
survive examination of the facts. A study of all death row inmates who
had their sentences commuted to life by the Supreme Court's decision in
Furman v. Georgia"6 shows that of 558 inmates in thirty states whose
sentences were so commuted, none of them in twenty-nine of those thirty
states has killed a prison guard in the ensuing fifteen years." 7 Indeed,
440. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020 (Baldwin 1974).
441. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 532.030(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985).
442. These cases have received considerable media attention whenever parole hearings are
held or parole dates are set. See, e.g., Kasindorf, Keeping Manson Behind Bars; Prosecutor
Stephen Kay Still Fights to Make Sure the Evil of the Tate-LaBianca Murders is Never Forgot-
ten, L.A. TIMES MAGAZINE, May 14, 1989, at 9; McClay, Convicted RFKAssassin Loses Ninth
Bid For Parole, Associated Press, May 28, 1987 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file); Sirhan Says
He Feels Remorse for Kennedy Assassination, Associated Press, June 24, 1985 (LEXIS, Nexis
library, Omni file); Crime and Punishment-and Crime, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1981, at A14,
col. 1 (editorial).
443. In 1978, California enacted by initiative Penal Code § 190, which provides that a life
sentence for capital murder is served "without possibility of parole." CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.2 (West Supp. 1989). Those convicted of the type of murder for which Manson and
Sirhan were convicted would, under the present law, never be reviewed for parole. Hence, the
argument that the death penalty is needed to prevent parole eligibility for this type of case is
obviously incorrect.
444. This is required by the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution, which
forbids enhancement of sentences already determined. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
445. Jimmy Lee Smith, after he finally became the "Onion Field killer," was also sentenced
to death. J. WAMBAUGH, THE ONION FIELD 327 (1973). His death sentence was commuted
to life. Id. at 432-35. Under California law at that time, parole eligibility for a life sentence
began after seven years. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3046 (1941) (as amended 1978). Smith was
later paroled, and proceeded to commit various petty crimes. See Baker & Quintana, supra
note 434. As pointed out above, however, this could not happen today, since California now
provides that life sentences for capital murder will be served without possibility of parole.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West Supp. 1989).
446. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
447. See Marquart & Sorensen, From Death Row to Prison Society: A National Study of the
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only seven of them have committed additional homicides in those fifteen
years." 8 Four of these were against fellow prisoners, and another was
committed against an ex-girlfriend by a man who then committed sui-
cide.4 9 Only two, both in Ohio, killed prison guards.450 "[M]ost of the
Furman inmates were not violent menaces to the institutional order. As
a group, they were not a disproportionate threat to guards and other
inmates.
4 51
Moreover, at least four people from this population have already
been shown to have been entirely innocent of the crime for which they
were sentenced to death.4 52 As Professor James Marquart, a principal
author of this study, said: "Executing all of them would not have greatly
protected society. We would have executed nearly 600 convicts to pro-
tect us from [seven], and we would have killed four innocent people in
the process.
453
A separate study of inmates sentenced to death after Furman, but
whose sentences were changed to life imprisonment, reveals that none of
these inmates committed prison murders, and that these inmates were
generally less violent than the overall prison population.454 Executing
these inmates would not have saved one prison guard. Indeed, there has
been only one state prison guard killed in New York in the last decade,
during which time the state has imprisoned some 100,000 inmates.455
According to Thomas Coughlin, Commissioner of the New York
State Department of Correctional Services, the inmates currently serving
minimum sentences of seventy-five years-to-life in New York45 6 are
among the best-behaved prisoners in the entire state system.457 Coughlin
Furman-Commuted Inmates, 23 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 5 (1989). Marquart and Sorensen note
that four of the six Furman-commuted inmates who committed homicides in prison did not
receive death sentences for those homicides. Id. at 21.
448. Id. at 27.
449. Id. at 23.
450. Id. at 21.
451. Id. at 20.
452. Id. at 25.
453. See Malcolm, Society's Conflict on Death Penalty Stalls Procession of the Condemned,
N.Y. Times, June 19, 1989, at B10, col. 1.
454. See J. Marquart, S. Ekland-Olson & J. Sorensen, Gazing Into the Crystal Bali: Can
Jurors and Psychiatrists Accurately Predict Future Dangerousness In Capital Cases? (1989)
(unpublished manuscript on file at Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
455. Telephone conversation with James Flateau, Public Information Office, New York
State Department of Corrections (July 19, 1989).
456. See infra text accompanying notes 463-68.
457. Memorandum from Thomas Coughlin III, Commissioner, New York Dep't of Correc-
tional Services, to Governor Mario Cuomo (May 23, 1989). Coughlin points out that prison-
ers in New York's maximum-security prisons were involved in violent incidents at a rate of 179
per thousand inmates per year. Id. However, those inmates whose prison terms were 75 years
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reasons that "true lifers" are interested in "[a]voiding incidents of any
type, obeying the rules and attempting to ingratiate themselves with staff
as much as possible." '458 Death row inmates, on the other hand, "would
have nothing to lose by assaulting the staff.... There would be no rea-
son for them to keep a low profile, no incentive to follow the rules." '459
Michigan officials agree with Coughlin about prisoners serving life
sentences. Leo Lalonde of the Michigan Department of Corrections says
of those serving life without parole: "After a few years, lifers become
your better prisoners. They tend to adjust and just do their time. They
tend to be a calming influence on the younger kids, and we have more
problems with people serving short terms."'460
C. Currently Available Life Sentences for the Most Severe Murders Do
Provide Effective Incapacitation
Because the public is acutely aware of, but seriously misunder-
stands, the various well-publicized cases discussed above, it is not at all
surprising that most members of the public are woefully misinformed
about the actual life sentences which are now imposed on people con-
victed of the most severe degree of murder. Much of the public remains
under the mistaken impression that life sentences for such murder con-
victions result in parole after a short term of years.4 6 1 This mispercep-
tion is often central to public support for the death penalty, and it
frequently leads juries to impose capital punishment in particular
cases.462 Proponents of the death penalty often play upon (and perhaps
share) the public's misconceptions by making the utterly bogus assertion
that the death penalty would make the streets safe by preventing heinous
murderers from being released in a few years to kill again.
In New York, the sentence for the most severe degree of murder can
be as much as twenty-five years-to-life.463 Under existing law, an inmate
to life were involved in only 110 such incidents per thousand per year, making the latter a
significantly more manageable group. Id.
458. Id.
459. Id.
460. See Katz, In Mich., Life Without Parole, Newsday, June 20, 1989, at 5.
461. Paduano & Stafford Smith, supra note 136, at 211-12.
462. Note, supra note 140. For a discussion of juror misconceptions regarding parole, see
supra text accompanying notes 134-46.
463. The possible sentences for a class A-I felony range from 15 years to life to 25 years to
life. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.00(2)(a), 70.00(3)(a)(i) (McKinney 1987). The highest degree of
homicide under New York's current law is murder in the second degree, which is malice mur-
der in the traditional sense. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 1987). Murder in the first
degree as defined by the statute is for police or correctional employee killings, carries a
mandatory death penalty, and so has been held unconstitutional. People v. Smith, 63 N.Y.2d
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who receives that sentence may not even be reviewed for parole until he
has served his minimum sentence, i.e., twenty-five years. 4 4 Moreover,
where the murder was aggravated by the existence of other crimes, such
as rape, kidnapping, robbery, etc.-as would be true in most cases to
which the proposed New York death penalty law would apply-mini-
mum sentences for those additional crimes may be aggregated, and the
defendant may thus effectively never be eligible for parole.465
For example, under existing New York law, if a defendant were con-
victed of first-degree robbery and second-degree murder, the minimum
sentence for the robbery conviction, which could be as much as twelve
and one-half years, 4 6 could be aggregated with a twenty-five year mini-
mum term for the murder conviction.467 In that situation, the defendant
would not even be eligible to be considered for parole for thirty-seven and
one-half years. Indeed, as of May 1989, there were already 142 inmates
in New York serving prison terms of at least fifty or seventy-five years-to-
life, who are therefore ineligible for parole for fifty or even seventy-five
years.
46 8
However, even if the existing sentencing structure is deemed inade-
quate to ensure incapacitation, there remain various alternatives to the
death penalty. Most states have passed legislation providing for life
sentences for the most severe degree of murder which severely limit, or
totally eliminate, any possibility of parole. At least ten states have life
sentences under which parole is not even possible for twenty, twenty-five,
thirty or forty years, depending on the state.46 9 Moreover, in at least
41, 468 N.E.2d 879, 479 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1984); People v. Davis, 43 N.Y.2d 17, 371 N.E.2d 456,
400 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 998 (1978). In New York, second-degree
murder is a class A-I felony. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 1987).
464. Under New York law, a person serving an indeterminate sentence (e.g., 25 years-to-
life) must serve the minimum (i.e., 25 years, in the case of a 25 years-to-life sentence) before
being considered for parole. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.40(l)(a) (McKinney 1987).
465. Minimum sentences may be aggregated when more than one crime is found. N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 70.40(1)(a) (McKinney 1987). It should also be noted that there are no "good
time" provisions applicable to an indeterminate maximum sentence (a life sentence), since
"good time" in New York is calculated based on the maximum sentence. Id. § 70.40(l)(b).
For a discussion of "good time," see Jacobs, Sentencing by Prison Personnel: Good Time, 30
UCLA L. REV. 217 (1982).
466. First-degree robbery, under New York law, is a class B felony. N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 160.15 (McKinney 1987). Minimum sentences for such an offense may be from one-third to
one-half the maximum sentence, which may be 25 years. See id. §§ 70.02(3), (4). Hence, the
minimum term for first-degree robbery may be from 8.5 to 12.5 years.
467. See supra note 465.
468. Memorandum from Thomas Coughlin III, Commissioner, New York Dep't of Correc-
tional Services, to Governor Mario Cuomo (May 23, 1989).
469. See, eg., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (1988) (25 or 35 years before parole possi-
ble, depending on age of victim); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-1-105(4) (1986) (40 years before
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eighteen states there are life sentences with no possibility of parole at
all.47 In these states, inmates convicted of aggravated murder and sen-
tenced to the highest form of life sentence are extremely unlikely to ever
be released.47
Numerous public opinion polls show that life sentences that are per-
ceived to be adequate are preferred over the death penalty, and that the
public would prefer to achieve incapacitation through measures less ex-
treme than death. For example, a poll conducted by Patrick Caddell
Associates in May 1989, at the height of hysteria over violent crime in
New York,4 72 found that New Yorkers, by a two-to-one majority, pre-
ferred life without possibility of parole, with restitution to the victim's
family, over the death penalty.47 3 The same poll also showed that a sub-
parole possible); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.082(a) (West 1976) (25 years before parole possible);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.030 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985) (25 years before parole possible
one alternative); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:I 1-3b to 3c (West Supp. 1989) (30 years before parole
possible); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-21-10(A) (Supp. 1987) (30 years before parole possible);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1371(al) (1988) (20 years before parole possible); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2929.03(c)(2) (Anderson 1987) (20 or 30 years before parole possible); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-3-20(A) (Law Co-op Supp. 1988) (30 years before parole possible where statutory
aggravating circumstance found; 20 years before parole possible where no statutory aggravat-
ing circumstance found). In addition, as noted above, New York provides sentences under
which 25 years, or under some circumstances, 50 or even 75 years, must be served before
parole is possible. See supra notes 463-65.
470. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45(f) (1987); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-10-101(c) (1987); CAL. PE-
NAL CODE § 190.2(a) (West Supp. 1989); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(f) (West 1985);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, 4209(a) (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 1 1005-8-1(d), 1003-3-3(d)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989) (second homicide or multiple homicide); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:30(C) (West 1987); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 412(b) (Supp. 1987) (sentencer's discre-
tion); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 2 (West 1989); MICH. COMPILED LAWS ANN.
§ 750.316 (West Supp. 1989); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.020(2) (Vernon Supp. 1989); NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 83-192(9)(e), 83-1,110 (1987) (no minimum term for life imprisonment means no
parole eligibility unless commuted to term of years); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 175.552 (1986)
(sentencer's discretion); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(V) (1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 701.10 (West Supp. 1989) (sentencer's discretion); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.17 (Purdon
Supp. 1989) (power of Board of Parole extends only to "definite or fiat sentences"); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS ANN. § 24-15-4 (1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.030 (1989).
471. While clemency may theoretically be possible in such states, it is not being granted
often, if at all. For example, Michigan's governor has refused to commute life-without-parole
sentences to a lesser term, meaning that those sentenced to the maximum life term have not
been getting out of prison. See Katz, supra note 460, at 5.
472. The Caddell poll was conducted in the wake of hysterical reaction to the brutal gang-
rape of a Central Park jogger, including, among other things, full-page ads by developer Don-
ald Trump in all four New York daily newspapers calling for hatred and the death penalty and
two full-page New York Post editorials calling for the death penalty and listing the addresses
and phone number of every New York assemblyperson opposed to the death penalty. See, e.g.,
Newsday, May 1, 1989, at 9, col. 1.
473. See Opinion Poll, supra note 73. This poll showed that 72% of New Yorkers favored
the death penalty and 22% opposed it, when asked that question in isolation. However, when
asked whether they prefer the death penalty or an alternative of life without parole with the
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stantial majority favored life without parole for twenty-five years, to-
gether with restitution to the victim's family, over the death penalty.
474
These results are consistent with a wide variety of public opinion
polls conducted around the nation over the last several years. A poll
conducted in New York in mid-1989 for Gannett newspapers yielded re-
sults very similar to those in the Caddell poll. The Gannett poll showed
that when given the choice, the majority preferred life without parole
(even without restitution to the victim's family) over the death pen-
alty.47 5 A 1987 poll conducted in Nebraska, a death penalty state,
showed that the majority favored abolishing the death penalty in favor of
life without parole for twenty-five years together with restitution to the
victim's family.47 6 In addition, polls conducted in Georgia, Florida, Mis-
sissippi, and Alabama have shown that, in those states, support is higher
for alternative life sentences than for the death penalty.477
If New Yorkers knew about, but were not satisfied with, the state's
existing tough minimums for many egregious murders, they could have a
statute today explicitly providing for some type of life-without-parole
sentence. Indeed, this explicit type of sentence could have been passed in
New York by now, were it not for the fact that some death penalty pro-
ponents in the State Senate have cynically prevented a vote on such legis-
lation-which the Governor has proposed and the Assembly has
previously passed. These proponents apparently know that the enact-
ment of any form of explicit life-without-parole legislation would greatly
diminish support for the death penalty by causing many more people to
understand the fallacy of the argument that the death penalty would pre-
inmate's prison earnings going to the victim's family, 62% favored this alternative, whereas
32% favored the death penalty. See also Milligan & McCoy, Life- Without-Parole Favored,
N.Y. Daily News, May 23, 1989, at 15, col. I.
474. Fifty-four percent favored life without parole for 25 years and restitution, whereas
41% favored the death penalty. Opinion Poll, supra note 73, at 2.
475. See Gallagher, Death or Life Without Parole?, Gannett Westchester Newspapers, June
25, 1989, at Al, col. 4. This poll, which did not include restitution to the victim's family,
indicated that 52% would prefer life without parole, compared to only 41% favoring the death
penalty. Id.
476. A. BOOTH, UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA, BUREAU OF SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH, NE-
BRASKA ANNUAL SOCIAL INDICATORS SURVEY, MAJORITY FAVOR ALTERNATIVES TO
DEATH PENALTY (January 1988). This poll also showed that of the 34% who still favored the
death penalty over the proffered alternative, one-third would no longer favor the death penalty
if the alternative were increased to life with no possibility of parole at all. Id.
477. A Georgia poll conducted in 1986 showed that 53% of Georgia adults would favor
abolition of capital punishment if state law provided for life sentences with no parole for at
least 25 years, and for a restitution program. GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY, GEORGIA RESI-
DENTS' ATTITUDES TOWARD THE DEATH PENALTY, THE DISPOSITION OF JUVENILE OF-
FENDERS, AND RELATED ISSUES 24-25 (1986); Paduano & Stafford Smith, supra note 136
(reporting similar results in other states).
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vent murders by parolees.47
Thus, the most important thing to recognize about the incapacita-
tion argument for the death penalty is that it is a completely baseless
"solution" to the public's legitimate concern over serious crimes commit-
ted by parolees. As the actions of New York's State Senate illustrate,
death penalty proponents are so enamored of this phony argument that
they will do nothing-such as passing legislation which might prevent
some of the early paroles they are so eager to bemoan-that could cause
the public to realize how totally irrelevant the concern over early paroles
is to the question of whether there should be a death penalty.
VIII. THE DEATH PENALTY ACTUALLY EXACERBATES THE
PROBLEMS OF VICTIMS' FAMILIES
No question defines the moral, philosophical or penological abstrac-
tion of the death penalty more directly than this one: What if your loved
one were murdered? When invoked by death penalty advocates, this
question implies that the death penalty will best satisfy the needs of mur-
der victims' survivors. Yet, in reality, rather than affording them a quick
and final disposition of the case against the murderer, so that they may
finalize the tragedy and begin rebuilding their lives, the capital punish-
ment process often creates a second victimization of survivors. They
must contend with repeated reminders about the murder during the pro-
tracted proceedings in which the death penalty's implementation is-
usually unsuccessfully-sought. Moreover, even in the few cases where
there is an execution, it is doubtful that this really provides relief to the
victim's family.
In a system without the death penalty, there are fewer trials, less
protracted proceedings, and greater certainty that the sentence imposed
will be carried out.
A. Survivors of Murder Victims Often Oppose the Death Penalty
Many survivors of murder-victims have publicly denounced the
death penalty, and some have actively opposed the execution of the con-
victed murderer. Christine Farris, whose mother and brother were slain
in separate incidents, objected to the death sentence given to her
478. See Kolbert, As Vote on Death Penalty Nears, Cuomo Advocates Life Sentences, N.Y.
Times, June 19, 1989, at B10, col. 1; Gallagher, supra note 475. The New York Law Enforce-
ment Council, a statewide association of prosecutors, police chiefs and sheriffs, endorsed the
Governor's life without parole proposal and called on the legislature to pass it. See Milligan &
Beneson, Lawmen Call For No Parole, N.Y. Daily News, June 24, 1989, at 5, col. 1.
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mother's murderer.47 9 Ms. Farris observed simply, "You don't gain any-
thing by taking one life for another."48 Coretta Scott King, whose hus-
band and mother-in-law were both assassinated, stated, "I stand firmly
and unequivocally opposed to the death penalty for those convicted of
capital offenses. An evil deed is not redeemed by an evil deed of retalia-
tion. Justice is never advanced in the taking of a human life. Morality is
never upheld by legalized murder."48
Some victims' rights groups have opposed capital punishment, as
well. Marie Deans is founder of Murder Victims' Families for Reconcili-
ation. Although her mother-in-law was murdered, she opposes the death
penalty. Deans has asked, "How can we stand as murder victims, in our
pain and sorrow, and give it to someone else's family as well?"48 Odile
Stem, Executive Director of Parents of Murdered Children, has said that
she opposes capital punishment and is "at peace" with the life sentence
that her daughter's murderer received.483
Merri Dee, a Chicago television talk-show host who was kidnapped
along with a guest who was later murdered, has declared that she and the
members of her victims' rights group do not advocate the death pen-
alty.484 Ms. Dee was shot in the head, inducing temporary blindness and
paralysis.485 Despite her horrifying experience, she said, "Going with
the death penalty puts me on the criminal's level."
486
Some victims' families have sought clemency for the accused mur-
derer of their loved one. In the case of Kenneth Brock, both the victim's
father and the prosecutor appealed for clemency. Nonetheless, Brock
was executed by lethal injection on June 19, 1986.487 Similarly, William
479. Montgomery, You Can Never Know How It Feels to Have Loved One Killed, Atlanta
Const., Oct. 14, 1986, at IA, col. 5.
480. Id.
481. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA, THE DEATH PENALTY: CRUEL AND INHU-
MAN PUNISHMENT (1987). Family members of Nancy Allen, who was murdered in Missouri
in 1985, have opposed the death penalty for the convicted murderer, Heath Williams. See
Rosenbaum, Too Young To Die, N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1989, (Magazine) 33, 61. Upon discov-
ering that Williams, who was 16 years old at the time of the crime, was seeking the death
penalty for himself, Allen's brother-in-law concluded that life imprisonment would be a
greater punishment. Id.
482. Myers, Death Penalty Protestors Rally at Capitol, UPI, June 28, 1987 (LEXIS, Nexis
library, Omni file).
483. Buckley, A Victim of Violence, CATH. N.Y., Apr. 17, 1986, at 2.
484. Cunningham, Murder-victim Advocates, Lawyers Open Dialogue, Louisville Courier-J.,
Apr. 17, 1987, at B2, col. 3.
485. Id.
486. Id.
487. Lefevere, Many Victims' Families Recoil at Death Penalty Spectacle, NAT'L CATH.
REP., Nov. 7, 1986, at 5.
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Riley beseeched Florida Governor (now United States Senator) Bob Gra-
ham to grant clemency to James Dupree Henry, who had been sentenced
to death for the murder of Riley's father. In his letter, Riley wrote, "The
God I came to know, through my father, was one of love, mercy and
giving another a chance to do better-not one of vengeance." '488 Against
Riley's wishes, Henry was executed on September 20, 1984.489
B. Imposition of the Death Penalty Means Continued
Victimization of Survivors
According to the National Organization of Victim Assistance
(NOVA), the healing process starts with the adoption of new patterns of
thinking and acting, and generally "involves an increased remembering
of the murder victim-not the murder.""49  The system of capital punish-
ment directly undermines this healing process. Forced to endure re-
peated reminders of the crime while capital defendants are put on trial,
engage in appeals, post-conviction proceedings, and, frequently, retrials,
the survivor is repeatedly reminded of the offender's actions and is un-
able to deal with the loss of the loved one, thus impeding his or her
recovery.
As the Executive Director of Parents of Murdered Children has
said, "Most families find the court process is their second victimization
... the system is complex and impersonal."491 For example, when in-
formed that their daughter's murderer's death sentence had been re-
versed, the Fredrickson family was stunned. Their ordeal began anew, as
"the weight that had been lifted off our shoulders had been dropped back
down."49 2 Another victim's family had waited years for the death ver-
dict of their son's murderer to finally be affirmed, only to discover, "out
of the blue," that there would be a retrial. "It'll bring all the bad memo-
ries back and dredge up the unpleasant things all over." 493
Whereas survivors of murder victims need finality, capital punish-
ment brings prolonged suffering and grief. Wholly aside from appeals,
collateral proceedings, retrials and clemency hearings, the death penalty
system features trials with unique and time-consuming procedures. The
elaborate police investigations, extensive voir dire, frequent sequestration
488. Id.
489. Id.
490. National Organization of Victim Assistance, Survivors of Homicide Victims, NET-
WORK INFO. BULL., Oct. 1985, at 8.
491. Payton, How Parents of Slain Children Cope, Oakland Tribune, Mar. 6, 1987, at C7,
col. 2.
492. Corwin & Morain, The Fredricksons, L.A. Times, Aug. 22, 1985, Part I, at 33, col. 1.
493. Corwin & Morain, The Finneys, L.A. Times, Aug. 22, 1985, Part I, at 30, col. 1.
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of juries, changes of venue, numerous pretrial motions and bifurcated
trial greatly protract these cases. In short, the capital punishment sys-
tem's alienation of survivors, perpetuation of reminders of the crime, and
prevention of swift and certain finality compound the survivors' suffering
and grief.
C. Executions Do Not Provide Satisfaction
Even in those few instances in which the death penalty is carried
out, the execution of the defendant may only exacerbate the anguish of
the victim's survivors and often fails to provide any relief. According to
the Executive Director of Parents of Murdered Children, "Even if the
defendant gets the maximum sentence, it can never equate to the loss of
your child's life and the horrors of murder."4 94
After her child's murderer was finally executed, Beth Wright pro-
claimed that she was "furious" that she could not see the corpse, expres-
sing her lack of satisfaction with the execution itself.4 95 In the case of
Robert Lee Willie, the survivors attended every court argument, includ-
ing those held in another state.4 96 After witnessing Mr. Willie's execu-
tion, the step-father of the victim bitterly complained that Mr. Willie had
not suffered as much as the victim had suffered.4 97 The survivors from
that case have proceeded to attend all subsequent Louisiana execu-
tions.498
Similarly, Jack Stewart claimed a center seat for James Raulson's
execution and "looked at him right in the eye" the whole time.499 Yet
Stewart's agony did not end after the execution. Tormented by the expe-
rience, Stewart lamented, "[w]ell, what was to prevent him from being
forgiven and entering into heaven with all the good people?" 5"
494. See Payton, supra note 491.
495. Makin, supra note 20.
496. DeParle, supra note 23.
497. Id.
498. Id.
499. Dolan, The South-Nation's Death Belt, L.A. Times, Aug. 25, 1985, Part I, at 21, col.
500. Id.
[Vol. 23:59
THE EXECUTION OF INJUSTICE
IX. A DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM IS MORE COSTLY THAN A SYSTEM
IN WHICH LIFE IMPRISONMENT IS THE MOST
SEVERE PUNISHMENT
A. There Are Many Reasons Why Death Penalty Cases Require
Additional Expenditure of Tremendous Amounts of
Taxpayers' Money
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that because "death is a
different kind of punishment," much higher levels of procedural safe-
guards are required by the Constitution before it may be imposed.5 °1
What this means in practical terms is very long, complex and extremely
expensive litigation. 0 2
One must recognize, at the outset of this analysis, that the state
must incur the enormous expenses of a capital trial whenever the death
penalty is sought, no matter what the trial's outcome may be, even in the
many cases where the defendant is found not guilty or is not sentenced to
death. The enormous expense frequently can be avoided where the death
penalty is not sought, because clearly guilty defendants often plead guilty
when not facing the death penalty. But, if the state insists on seeking the
death penalty, very few defendants will plead guilty and agree to a death
sentence, even when their guilt is clear, and some sort of trial usually
occurs even when the defendant wants to be executed.
5 03
The added complexity and expense of capital trials begins wel
before trial. It is much more costly for both the prosecution and the
defense to investigate death penalty cases for two reasons. First, the
crime itself is likely to be investigated more thoroughly by both the pros-
ecution (who must prove aggravating circumstances in order to seek the
death penalty) and the defense (who must be prepared to argue the same
issues). Second, because there is a separate penalty phase where any mit-
igating evidence may be presented, the defense should develop evidence,
which the prosecution may endeavor to rebut, concerning the defend-
ant's entire background-including childhood, mental and psychological
conditions, family relations, employment history, prior arrests and con-
victions, medical history, and much more. This often entails the employ-
501. See, eg., Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977) (and cases discussed therein).
502. Indeed, the death penalty was probably more costly than life imprisonment even before
the Supreme Court granted new constitutional protections after Furman v. Georgia. 408 U.S.
238 (1972). In his concurring opinion in Furman, Justice Marshall observed: "As for the
argument that it is cheaper to execute a capital offender than to imprison him for life, even
assuming that such an argument, if true, would support a capital sanction, it is simply incor-
rect." Id. at 357 (Marshall, J., concurring).
503. See Rosenbaum, supra note 481, at 59.
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ment of social scientists, psychologists, psychiatrists, and various forensic
experts, all of whom must be paid by the state in many instances. m4 For
example, in some situations the Constitution requires the state to pay for
expert witnesses for the defense as well as the state.505
Pretrial motions in capital cases are both more numerous and more
complex than in other cases. Because there is a whole body of eighth
amendment law relating specifically to death penalty cases, many more
pretrial motions are required in a capital case. The process of voir dire
should also be far more complex and lengthy in a capital case, Where
there are enhanced constitutional concerns regarding pretrial publicity,
racial prejudice, and other areas of possible juror bias. Where pretrial
publicity has affected potential jurors, the considerable additional cost of
a change of venue may have to be incurred. Moreover, jurors should be
asked a series of questions designed to determine whether they are ex-
cludable either because they could not impose the death penalty due to
moral convictions, or because they would automatically impose the death
penalty if guilt were found.50 6
The inclusion of a separate sentencing phase in capital trials makes
such trials longer than non-capital trials, quite apart from the additional
complexities of pretrial proceedings and jury selection.
Not only are capital trials more lengthy and expensive, but, because
the defendant's life is at stake, more retrials will likely be conducted. In
some instances, one Supreme Court decision may mandate retrial of large
segments-even the entire population--of the state's death row. 7
These costs, both of the initial trial and the retrials, will be incurred even
in the many cases where the jury does not return a death verdict upon
retrial.
Additional areas of considerable expense are the constitutionally
mandated appeals process and the often extensive collateral proceedings.
The appeals process requires appointment of counsel where the defend-
ant is indigent, which usually occurs. Of course, the state must always
bear the cost of at least the prosecution's participation in all proceedings.
In addition to litigation per se, state clemency hearings entail fur-
504. For a general discussion of the costs attending the death penalty, see Spangenberg &
Walsh, Capital Punishment or Life Imprisonment? Some Cost Considerations, 23 Loy. L.A.L.
REv. 45 (1989).
505. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (state must provide defendant access to
competent psychiatrist when mental capacity is raised by either side).
506. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412
(1985); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
507. Amsterdam, In Favorem Mortis, 14 HUM. RTS. 14 (Winter 1987) (describing instances
of single decision requiring reversal of sentences of entire death row populations).
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ther expense and complexities. Assuming these clemency hearings do
not result in relief for a death row inmate, the state must then incur the
cost of the execution itself.
Two other points, frequently ignored in the studies discussed below,
should also be considered. First, maintaining a death row, even in lam-
entably poor condition, is more expensive than keeping the same prison-
ers in other forms of custody-into which many death row inmates will
go when their death sentences are overturned. Second, the extra costs of
the capital punishment system are all incurred "up front" or within a few
years, as compared to the savings from capital punishment, which do not
arise, in the few cases where executions do occur, for a great many years.
Hence, the savings from not having to incarcerate people following their
executions must be discounted back to the present through the applica-
tion of a discount rate reflecting the amount of interest which a dollar
saved today could earn over the many years before the execution occurs.
B. Numerous Studies Confirm that the Death Penalty
Is More Expensive
Several scholarly works have concluded that a criminal justice sys-
tem which uses the death penalty costs more than a system in which life
imprisonment is the ultimate punishment. 0 8 Several states have reached
the same conclusions. For example, a study commissioned by the Mary-
land state legislature and the state's highest court concluded that costs
are higher for every justice component for death penalty cases. 509 In In-
diana, a legislative study estimated that a bill which would replace the
death penalty with life-without-parole would save the state $5 million per
year."I0 Additionally, a study conducted by the New York Department
of Correctional Services estimated that the death penalty would cost tax-
payers $1 million per capital trial.5 I1
508. See, e.g., Nakell, The Cost of the Death Penalty, 14 CRIM. L. BULL. 69 (1978); Com-
ment, The Cost of Taking a Life: Dollars and Cents of the Death Penalty, 18 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1221 (1985) (authored by Margaret Garey).
509. See COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE DEATH PENALTY IN MARYLAND, FINAL REPORT:
THE COST AND HOURS ASSOCIATED WITH PROCESSING A SAMPLE OF FIRST DEGREE MUR-
DER CASES FOR WHICH THE DEATH PENALTY WAS SOUGHT IN MARYLAND BETWEEN
JULY 1979 AND MARCH 1984 (1984).
510. INDIANA LEGISLATURE, A FISCAL IMPACT STATEMENT RE SENATE BILL 531 (1989).
511. Moran & Ellis, Death Penalty: A Luxury Item, Newsday, June 14, 1989, at 60, col. 1.
In addition, a study conducted in New York State in 1982 concluded that, at that time, it
would cost the state over $1.8 million to litigate a capital case. NEW YORK STATE DE-
FENDER'S ASSOCIATION, INC., CAPITAL LOSSES: THE PRICE OF THE DEATH PENALTY FOR
NEW YORK STATE, A REPORT FROM THE PUBLIC DEFENSE BACKUP CENTER TO THE SEN-
ATE FINANCE COMMITrEE, THE ASSEMBLY WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE, AND THE DI-
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Among those reporting similar conclusions is the Houston Chroni-
cle, which reported in 1988 that capital cases cost the state of Texas $2
million each." 2 Also in 1988, the Miami Herald reported that $57.2 mil-
lion had been spent to execute eighteen people in Florida, amounting to
well over $3 million per execution, or approximately six times the cost of
imprisoning those same people for their entire lives. 13 In another 1988
report, the Sacramento Bee reported that it currently costs the State of
California at least $15 million per execution to operate its capital punish-
ment system, and that California taxpayers would save $90 million per
year by abolishing the death penalty. 14 Moreover, a recent estimate
concluded that it would cost approximately $7.3 million to sentence one
person to death in New Jersey.515 Meanwhile, in Michigan, a state with
no death penalty but with over 1,100 people serving life-without-parole
terms, many have concluded that the approximately $22,000 cost of
housing an inmate per year is a bargain compared to the cost of death
penalty trials and appeals, which, it is estimated, would be at least $1.8
million per case in that state."' 6
Accordingly, there can no longer be any serious doubt whether the
death penalty costs more than the available alternatives. The only ques-
tion now is how much money the death penalty wastes.
I
C The Death Penalty Diverts Resources Away from Fighting Crime
The constant debate over the death penalty diverts the public's at-
tention away from considering measures which could truly serve to fight
crime. Perniciously, the death penalty debate enables public officials and
legislators to falsely assert that they are being tough on crime because
they favor the death penalty. They may, at least for a while, thereby
avoid taking effective, if unexciting, measures that really would prevent
crime, such as putting more police on the street, adding courts, prosecu-
tors and defense counsel, and providing drug treatment facilities for eve-
ryone who would use them. As former British Prime Minister Edward
VISION OF THE BUDGET (Apr. 1, 1982). That study, which established a model charting
system based on 144 cost centers, only dealt with the first three levels of judicial review. See
id.
512. Gradess, The Death Penalty Doesn't Pay, Houston Chronicle, Mar. 13, 1988, § 6, at 1,
col. 1.
513. Von Drehle, Capital Punishment in Paralysis, Miami Herald, July 10, 1988, at IA, col.
1.
514. Magagnini, Closing Death Row Would Save State $90 Million a Year, Sacramento Bee,
Mar. 28, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
515. Jones Presentation, supra note 67.
516. See Katz, supra note 460, at 5.
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Heath has stated, "the constant emphasis on capital punishment is
preventing us from giving real attention and resources to the problems of
crime in a modem democracy. "517
Moreover, where the death penalty is enacted, it uses up financial
resources that could be put to far better uses which, unlike the death
penalty, could help control violent crime."' 8 According to one estimate,
the death penalty would cost New York taxpayers approximately $550
million over its first five years, "with no discernible payoff in the reduc-
tion of murder or other violent crimes." ' 9 This same money "would
buy 250 more police for the Tactical Narcotics Team... and build pris-
ons for 6,000 inmates," 2 ° measures which would surely incapacitate
more criminals than the death penalty.
New York State already faces serious difficulties in providing ade-
quate representation for indigent criminal defendants across the state.
New York has sixty-two counties with eighty separate plans for provid-
ing counsel to indigent criminal defendants. An attempt to accommo-
date capital trials within the state's currently inadequate public defense
system would surely fail. Yet, an effort to provide the proper representa-
tion which such complex cases require5 21 would be an unacceptable drain
on the state's ability to provide other required legal services. If New
York tries, as its neighbor New Jersey has, to avoid ineffectiveness of
defense counsel, it will have to pay substantial amounts in the process.
New Jersey reportedly spent $6.9 million in one year, an average of
$42,000 per trial, just providing expert witnesses for the defense, and mil-
517. ENGLISH HOUSE OF COMMONS, OFFICIAL REPORT, PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES
(Hansard), Vol. 45, No. 20, July 13, 1983. Great Britain abolished the death penalty for mur-
der in 1969. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, WHEN THE STATE KILLS: THE DEATH PEN-
ALTY; A HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE 226 (1989). Various efforts to reinstate it have been defeated
in subsequent years. Id.
518. For example, Seminole County, Georgia has gone deeply into debt just to try three
death penalty cases. See Ricks, Seminole Borrows to Pay for Alday Case, Atlanta J. and Const.,
Aug. 8, 1988, at B6, col. 4. Although the State has agreed to reimburse the County for much
of its expenses in these related cases, only a portion of the money has been paid. Id. Seminole
County Commission Chairman Robert M. Dutton reported: "We've had to borrow money to
operate." Id. Dutton continued, "We're hoping that this thing is going to end soon.... [B]ut
there's no telling." Id. Although the cases nearly bankrupted the County, two of the three
defendants have now been given life sentences. Id. The third case is still on appeal. Id.
519. See Moran & Ellis, supra note 511, at 62.
520. Id.
521. See Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty
Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 303-04 (1983); NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSO-
CIATION, WASHINGTON D.C., STANDARDS FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF
COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES (Dec. 18, 1988) (adopted by the American Bar Associa-
tion by resolution of Feb. 7, 1989).
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lions more on defense counsel.52 2
Similarly, New York's ability to provide adequate prosecution serv-
ices would be undermined by enactment of the death penalty. Most New
York prosecutors have never tried a capital case. In rural areas, many
district attorneys work only part time, and would be unable to devote the
time and resources necessary for a proper capital trial. This would make
errors, and hence the need for retrials, more likely. Moreover, con-
fronting the complexities of the death penalty would undermine the gen-
eral law enforcement effort by diverting resources, including the
prosecutors and police who would be tied down in the additional and
lengthier trials which seeking the death penalty entails.
A death penalty system would also impose a great burden on the
state-court system. Appellate court judges in other states have pointed
out the extreme burden placed on them by the death penalty, and in
some states, the highest courts have had to cut back on the non-death
cases they will hear in order to confront the tremendous burden of decid-
ing highly complex capital cases.5 23 As Chief Justice Dixon of the Loui-
siana Supreme Court has said, "Capital punishment is destroying the
system.
'524
X. THE DEATH PENALTY PLACES THE UNITED STATES IN
ISOLATION FROM VIRTUALLY ALL DEMOCRATIC
COUNTRIES AND IN THE COMPANY OF THE
WORST DICTATORSHIPS
On the same day in March 1988 that President Reagan appealed, on
"compassionate and humanitarian" grounds, to South Africa to grant
clemency to the condemned "Sharpeville Six,"5s25 Willie Jasper Darden
was executed in Florida's electric chair, despite evidence from two in-
dependent witnesses suggesting that he could not have been at the scene
of the crime when the murder was committed.5 26 Darden had main-
tained his innocence for the fourteen years he spent on death row, and
had become the focus of international debate and protest over capital
522. Jones Presentation, supra note 67.
523. For a discussion of the impact on the Florida courts, see Leonard, Death Cases Are a
Big Pain and No Deterrent, Chief Justice Says, Tallahassee Democrat, Feb. 27, 1986, at IB,
col. 1. For a discussion of the impact on the California Supreme Court, which, as a result of
death penalty cases, has had to cut back greatly on the number of non-criminal cases it hears,
see Cox, Inaction In Action, Nat'l L.J., July 11, 1988, at I, col. 1.
524. Kaplan, Death Mill, USA, Nat'l L.J., May 8, 1989, at 38, col. 4.
525. Johnson, Reagan in Appeal to Pretoria, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1988, at A3, col. 2.
526. See supra notes 383-84 and accompanying text.
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punishment. 527 More recently, in the midst of world-wide condemnation
of the Chinese government for political executions,528 the United States
Supreme Court held that states may execute the mentally retarded, 29
and the State of Alabama executed a retarded man who did not die dur-
ing the first attempt, and whose execution took nearly half an hour. 3°
Only weeks before, the Supreme Court permitted Florida to execute Au-
brey Dennis Adams,31 although the Court did not indicate any disagree-
ment with the Eleventh Circuit's unanimous holding that he had been
unconstitutionally sentenced to death in what was not harmless error.532
Among Western democracies, the United States stands virtually
alone in permitting capital punishment. It has been abolished through-
out Western Europe, and in our own hemisphere has been eliminated in
all but a small handful of countries. Throughout the world, the trend
since World War II has been toward abolition, and during the past dec-
ade an average of at least one country per year has eliminated the death
penalty for ordinary crimes or for all crimes. Today over forty percent-
nearly half-of all nations have abolished the death penalty in law or in
practice.533
European countries that have abolished the death penalty for all
crimes include Denmark, Sweden, Portugal, Norway, Holland, both East
and West Germany, Finland, England, Luxembourg, Monaco, Austria,
and France.5 4 In our own hemisphere, the following countries, among
others, have abolished the death penalty for all crimes: Uruguay, Vene-
zuela, Honduras, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Panama, and Colom-
bia. 35 In the last few years, Australia and the Phillipines have abolished
the death penalty, 536 and most recently Cambodia announced its aboli-
tion there.
537
527. See supra notes 383-84 and accompanying text.
528. It is reported that China executed 27 people during June 1989, for political crimes.
These executions were condemned by Western governments and some on Capitol Hill. See
Holley, Execution Toll Up to 27 in China; 13 More Seized, L.A. Times, June 23, 1989, Part I,
at 1, col. 3.
529. Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2952-58 (1989).
530. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
531. See supra notes 197-202 and accompanying text.
532. See Dugger v. Adams, 109 S. Ct. 1211 (1989).
533. At least 36 countries have abolished the death penalty for all crimes; at least another
18 have abolished it for all but exceptional offenses, such as genocide or wartime crimes; at
least another 27 have abolished it de facto, by no longer carrying out executions. See AM-
NESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 517, at 4.
534. Id. at 259.
535. Id.
536. Id. at 102 (Australia) and 191 (Phillipines).
537. See Greenway, Report From Cambodia, NEW YORKER, July 17, 1989, at 72, 75.
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The following countries are among those which retain the death
penalty only for extraordinary crimes such as war crimes or genocide:
United Kingdom, Switzerland, Brazil, Canada, Spain, Peru, New Zea-
land, Israel, Mexico, Fiji, Cyprus, and Italy.138 Most of these countries
have not permitted an execution in many decades, and only three (Peru,
El Salvador and Spain) have permitted executions in the last two de-
cades. 39 In addition, the following countries, among others, while offi-
cially retaining the death penalty, have abolished it in practice by not
executing anyone in at least the last decade: Belgium, Greece, Ireland,
Paraguay, Bolivia, Madagascar, Niger, Senegal, and Sri Lanka.
5 40
Several countries have abolished the death penalty and reinstated it,
only to abolish it again after a relatively short time. For example, Brazil
eliminated the death penalty for common crimes in 1891, but reintro-
duced it from 1969 to 1979 for politically motivated violent crimes,1
4 1
Argentina abolished it for ordinary crimes in 1921, reintroduced it for
certain offenses in 1976 while under military rule, then restricted it again
in 1984, after returning to civilian rule. 42 In addition, several countries
that have abolished the death penalty, reconsidered the issue several
years later, and decided not to reestablish it. For example, the United
Kingdom abolished the death penalty for murder for an experimental
period in 1965, and permanently in 1969.141 The United Kingdom re-
considered the issue, but did not reinstate the death penalty in 1983, after
extensive debate over the question.544 Similarly, Canada abolished the
death penalty for murder in 1976, reconsidered the issue in 1987, and
decided not to reinstate it.
545
A number of nations, in addition to having abolished the death pen-
alty internally, have established rules blocking the extradition of any
prisoner to any nation where that person could be executed. For exam-
ple, Austria,546 Denmark,547 the Netherlands,5 48 Switzerland, 549 and
England55 will not extradite a person if that person could face the death
538. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 517, at 260.
539. Id.
540. Id. at 260-61.
541. Id. at I11.
542. Id. at 102.
543. Id. at 226.
544. Id. at 86.
545. Id. at 116.
546. Auslieferungs-und Rechtschilfegesetz of 1979, para. 20.
547. Extradition Act of 1967, art. 10.
548. Extradition Act of 1967, art. 8.
549. Loi federale sur rentraide internationale en matiere penale of 1981, art. 37.
550. Criminal Justice Act of 1988, Part 1, § 9(1 1)(b).
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penalty by such extradition, or, in some cases, will extradite the person
only upon full assurance that he or she will not be executed.
In recent years, condemnation of the death penalty has become in-
creasingly common in international and regional intergovernmental or-
ganizations. For example, the United Nations passed a resolution in
1977 stating that the number and type of offenses for which the death
penalty is available should be continually restricted "with a view to the
desirability of abolishing this punishment." '51 In 1985, the Council of
Europe set forth in its Protocol No. 6 that "[tihe death penalty shall be
abolished. No one shall be condemned to such penalty or executed." '552
The United Nations General Assembly is scheduled to consider, during
its 1989 session, a proposal put forward by the Federal Republic of Ger-
many that would call for abolition of capital punishment. 3
There are, of course, countries besides the United States that retain
the death penalty for ordinary (as opposed to wartime) crimes. They
include Syria, the USSR, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, South Africa, Libya,
China, Cuba, Viet Nam, Uganda, Ethiopia, Chile, Hungary, Kenya,
North and South Korea, Lebanon, Thailand, Turkey, Guatemala, Saudi
Arabia, Poland, Albania, Egypt, Chad, Angola, Czechoslovakia, and
Somalia. 4 Thus, by carrying out numerous executions each year, the
United States places itself among nations most of which we routinely
condemn as human rights violators, rather than among the enlightened
democratic nations with which we otherwise prefer to be associated.
New York is in many ways a symbol of internationalism. With the
United Nations, the international financial institutions, and one of the
most culturally diverse populations anywhere, New York is a gateway to
the rest of the world. Accordingly, it is appropriate that, in 1989, New
551. G.A. Res. 32, 61 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 45) at 136, U.N. Doc. A/32/45 (1977).
552. Art. 1, 6th Protocol, Council of Europe (1985). The Council of Europe includes the
following nations: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany (Federal Republic),
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.
553. See also American Convention on Human Rights, Art. 4(2) and 4(3) (1969); M. Bos-
suyt, Guide to the "Travoux Pr6 Paratoires" of the International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights, Art. 6 (1987).
554. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 517, at 261-62. On July 14, 1989, the same
day that retarded Alabama inmate Horace Franklin Dunkins was executed in a procedure that
lasted nearly half an hour, see supra note 259, the Somali government reportedly rounded up
46 people, who were tried, convicted, and executed in a matter of hours. Somalia Executes 46
After Rioting, N.Y. Times, July 22, 1989, at A4, col. 1. The United States government con-
demned the action, and State Department spokesman Richard Boucher stated: "We are di-
recting our embassy in Mogadishu to raise our concern with the Somali Government and ask it
to insure that civil liberties and human rights are fully protected." Id.
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York continued to resist appeals to raw emotion and did not enact the
proposed capital punishment legislation.
XI. THE OLD AND NEW TESTAMENTS HAVE BEEN GROSSLY
DISTORTED AS A PURPORTED JUSTIFICATION FOR THE
DEATH PENALTY
In advocating the immoral death penalty, capital punishment advo-
cates often attempt to draw support from the Old Testament and the
New Testament. Such efforts to show that Judaism and Christianity
favor this country's implementation of the death penalty are directly con-
tradicted by the basic principles of these great religions.
The central applicable principles in our religious traditions are
found in the Sixth Commandment, which instructs, "Thou shalt not
kill," and in Ezekiel's insistence that "[w]e do not want the death of a
sinner, but that he should repent of his way and live."
555
Yet, advocates of the death penalty often quote passages from the
Old Testament which actually do not support the death penalty existing
in the United States. For while the Old Testament mentions the death
penalty as a form of punishment, 556 executions were extremely rare
under Old Testament law. This was no accident, for Judaism recognizes
that the Bible includes the death penalty as a punishment largely for
symbolic purposes." 57 As one scholar has observed, "Hebrew law abol-
ished capital punishment not by denying its conceptual validity, but
rather by allowing only its conceptual validity.
5 8
Thus, under the Talmud, there were such extensive procedural re-
quirements for the imposition of the death penalty that, by design, it was
nearly impossible to secure a death verdict.-" 9 For example, under Tal-
mudic law, capital cases were tried before large Sanhedrins, or courts,
composed of up to seventy judges, who cross-examined witnesses against
the defendant.5 60 The judges in these courts actually represented the in-
555. Ezekiel 18:32.
556. See, e.g., Exodus 21:12.
557. See Cohn, The Penology of the Talmud, 5 ISRAEL L. REv. 53 (1970).
558. Erez, Thou Shalt Not Execute: Hebrew Law Perspective on Capital Punishment, 19
CRIMINOLOGY 25, 40 (1981).
559. See id. at 40 ("The strict interpretations of rules pertaining to procedure and evidence
... rendered requirements for substantive elements of offenses almost impossible to be met in
real life, [and] transformed capital punishment laws into a dead letter.").
560. See Cohn, supra note 557, at 64 ("[R]ather absurd forms of cross-examination were
devised to confuse the witnesses, make them contradict each other and themselves, and thus
render their evidence untrustworthy."); see also Erez, supra note 558, at 34 ("The court was
actually expected to act in defense of the defendant.").
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terests of the defendant. Before a Talmudic court could impose the death
penalty, it was necessary for two competent witnesses to testify that they
saw the defendant commit the crime after he was specifically warned in
advance56' of both the unlawfulness of the act and the fact that it was
punishable by death. 62 Moreover, the use of confessions was strictly
prohibited in such cases. Whereas in the United States a criminal de-
fendant, even if mentally retarded, may go to the electric chair on the
basis of nothing but his own confession,563 nothing the criminal defend-
ant said before a Talmudic court could, under any circumstances, be
used against him in a trial for his life." 6
Furthermore, if a witness was related to the defendant, or if he had
any complaint against the defendant in the past, his testimony was inad-
missible.5 65 And, if any evidence-including the testimony of a third
eyewitness, although only two were required-was shown to be incompe-
tent, all of the evidence and testimony against the defendant was dis-
missed, because "all evidence as to the same matter is treated as a unit,
and ... disqualification of any of the component parts disqualifies the
whole.
5 6 6
It was no accident that under these strict standards it was rare to
have even one execution in a great many years. Often many decades
went by between executions. The Mishnah notes that a Sanhedrin under
which one person was executed in seven years was considered to be a
"destructive" court.56 7 Indeed, the rabbis debated whether a court
which imposed the death penalty once in seventy years was a "Bloody
Sanhedrin. ' '5 68 After the first century of the Common Era (which Chris-
tians term A.D.), adjudication of capital cases under Talmudic law was
suspended altogether, and discussion of the death penalty became a mat-
ter of purely scholarly interest.
5 69
The history of the death penalty in Israel reflects Judaism's contin-
ued de facto virtual abolition of capital punishment. Capital punishment
for murder was abolished in Israel in 1954, but retained for treason and
various war crimes. However, in the entire forty-year history of the na-
561. Erez, supra note 558, at 35.
562. Rosenberg & Rosenberg, In the Beginning: The Talmudic Rule Against Self-Incrimi-
nation, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 955, 974-78 (1988).
563. See supra notes 266-73 and accompanying text.
564. See generally Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 562, at 974-84.
565. Id.
566. Id. at 1009.
567. Erez, supra note 558, at 37 (quoting M. Makkot I, 10).
568. Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 562, at 1029; see also Cohn, supra note 557, at 64.
569. See Erez, supra note 558, at 29.
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tion only one execution has taken place-the 1962 execution of Adolph
Eichmann, the principal implementor of Hitler's "Final Solution." 7 0
In view of this history, it becomes easier to recognize that when
specific Old Testament passages are cited in support of the death penalty
in the United States, they are being taken out of context. The often
quoted "eye for an eye" principle, for example, was actually a limiting
doctrine, designed to check the use of disproportionate punishments, not
a prescription of an appropriate punishment. Its purpose was to provide,
for example, that the "eye" of a rich man would not be treated as better
than the "eye" of a poor man, 571' and it limited "the number of sheep a
herdsman could seek as restitution if one of his animals had been
killed. 5
72
Taken together with the rest of the Old Testament, this principle
formed part of a system characterized by a deep sense of fairness and
compassion, under which the death penalty could be imposed only under
circumstances which arose only once in a great many years. This in no
way supports the death penalty system in the United States, under which
hundreds of people are being sentenced to death each year, and numerous
executions take place every year.
The foregoing principles apply to Christianity as well as to Judaism.
Indeed, numerous New Testament passages make clear that the death
penalty is inconsistent with the basic tenets of Christianity. For example,
Matthew says, in a much noted passage, "[y]ou have heard that it was
said, 'An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.' But I say to you, do not
resist one who is evil. But if any one strikes you on the right cheek, turn
to him the other also." '73 Luke commands similarly, "[j]udge not, and
you will not be judged; condemn not, and you will not be condemned;
forgive, and you will be forgiven. '574 And John, denouncing an execu-
tion, challenges, "[h]e that is without sin among you, let him cast the first
stone. ,5
75
In accordance with the Bible's counseling against the death penalty,
many churches, including the Baptist, Presbyterian, Methodist, Church
of Christ, Catholic, Unitarian, Mennonite, Episcopal, Lutheran, Quaker
570. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 517, at 154.
571. See Cohn, supra note 557, at 64-68; see also Erez, supra note 558, at 37. In fact,
monetary compensation is the punishment provided for by this principle. Cohn, supra note
557, at 64-68; Erez, supra note 558, at 37.
572. MACKEY, PUNISHMENT IN THE SCRIPTURE AND TRADITION OF JUDAISM, CHRISTI-
ANITY AND ISLAM 3 (1981).
573. Matthew 5:38-41.
574. Luke 6:37.
575. John 8:7.
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and Greek Orthodox, have opposed its use.5 76 In addition, many reli-
gious organizations, including the National Council of Churches, the
United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, the American Friends
Service Committee, the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, the
Fellowship of Reconciliation, the American Jewish Committee, and the
American Ethical Union have denounced capital punishment and called
for its abolition. 77
The head of the Brooklyn Archdiocese of the Catholic Church,
Bishop Francis J. Mugavero, is among many who recognize that moral
opposition to the death penalty cannot be abandoned in the face of public
outcries about violent crime.578 Bishop Mugavero recently stated:
Capital punishment is a savage act that does not deter crime,
and often is an act of revenge that appeals to our baser in-
stincts. Worst of all, it is being used as a panacea that will keep
us from attacking the real problems at the core of the growing
violence in our streets.
5 7 9
Perhaps, upon reflection, we will reach the same conclusion as
Nobel laureate and Auschwitz survivor Elie Wiesel, one of the world's
576. See, e.g., ZEHR, DEATH AS A PENALTY: A MORAL, PRACTICAL AND THEOLOGICAL
DISCUSSION (Mennonite Central Committee 1983); THE CHURCH SPEAKS: CAPITAL PUNISH-
MENT (Presbyterian Church in the U.S. 1966). See generally MACKEY, supra note 572, at 58-
68 (summarizing positions of churches).
577. See generally NATIONAL INTERRELIGIOUS TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, NEW
YORK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: WHAT THE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY SAYS (1980) (collecting
resolutions of religious groups).
578. Such thoughts have apparently also affected New York State Senator James Donovan.
Donovan, who for over 23 years has voted for the death penalty, has recently indicated that he
opposes the death penalty and has expressed doubts on how he will vote on it in the future.
Senator Donovan's recent expression of his personal opposition to the death penalty is a result
not only of his bout with cancer, but apparently also derives from his deeply held religious
views. Senator Donovan said, "[i]n the traditional Judeo-Christian view we're supposed to be
forgiving and all men are deemed to be redemptive." McAlary, 'We're all terminal,' senator
says, N.Y. Daily News, June 16, 1989, at C4, col. 1. "I doubt very much whether electrocut-
ing people is the best illustration of our capacity to... develop a society with Judeo-Christian
principles." Stinson, Death Penalty Vote Weighs oh Key Senator, N.Y. Post, June 15, 1989, at
7, col. 1. "Ideally," Donovan continued, "we as a state or as a people shouldn't finance the
destruction of any human life." Id. In light of press reports indicating that the death penalty
might be enacted through an override of Governor Cuomo's veto, Senator Donovan concluded
that he should reconsider his prior position of voting to override such vetoes. "'The death
penalty bills that we passed in prior years were, in part, a certain amount of bravado and also
an accommodation of constituents,' said Donovan. 'Everybody... said this isn't going any-
where. That isn't the case any more.'" Giordano, Senator's Soul Searching, Newsday, June
28, 1989, at 5, col. 1. After more than two decades of voting for the death penalty, Senator
Donovan has now stated publicly, "I am personally opposed to the death penalty." Naylor,
Donovan's Coming Back, Utica Observer-Dispatch, June 13, 1989, at IA, col. 1.
579. See McKeown, Mugavero Says He Opposes the Death Penalty, N.Y. Daily News, June
1, 1989, at 4, col. 1.
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most revered moral leaders, who has said, "[w]ith every cell in my being,
and with every fibre of my memory, I oppose the death penalty in all
forms.
5 80
XII. CONCLUSION
The death penalty imposes tremendous costs on society while pro-
viding no benefits. It is arbitrary, capricious, permeated with unfairness
and racially discriminatory; it kills the retarded and the innocent, while
failing to deter crime or to provide additional incapacitation; it com-
pounds the problems of victims' families, diverts much-needed resources
away from measures which would aid law enforcement, and isolates the
United States from virtually all democratic countries while putting us
(except for such states as New York) in the company of the world's most
brutal societies.
5 81
It is a tragedy that the states with capital punishment have wasted
so much time and effort on such a useless, counterproductive, and im-
moral system. It would be even more tragic if, when the facts set forth in
this Article become widely known, the death penalty is not completely
abolished in the United States.
580. N.Y. Times, May 15, 1989, at DlI, col. 1.
581. Former Justice Lewis Powell, Jr., who still believes that capital punishment is constitu-
tional, recently stated that if he were a legislator he would vote against it. He "just can't
imagine having the job of pulling the switch on someone in the electric chair" and now be-
lieves, contrary to his original supposition, that "capital punishment has not deterred
murders," which have continued at a "shocking" level since, with his concurrence, the
Supreme Court held the death penalty constitutional in 1976. Justice Powell also made it clear
that, as a legislator, he would vote against the death penalty even if it did not entail what he
perceives to be "extended litigation and the ineffectiveness of the way the system operates."
Justice Powell stated, "I would be inclined to vote against it in any event. We are the only
Western democracy that still retains the death sentence .... We have a system that isn't
working, and I doubt very much whether you could ever by law create a system that would
work at the present stage of our civilization." Justice Powell went on to say that "I have
moral concerns as well as legal .... The taking of human life is something that I'd rather
leave to whomever one thinks of as God." Taylor, Powell's Predicament, MANHATTAN LAW.,
Oct. 3, 1989, at 12. Accordingly, legislators should "give some thought to the broader points
Powell made... : The death penalty serves no useful purpose. It will serve no useful purpose
no matter how much the review process is tinkered with. It is morally troublesome, if not,
worse. And it ought to be abolished." Id. at 14.
